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THE PAROLE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION

Many prisoners confined in state and federal prisons obtain their
liberty through parole.' The parole mechanism provides the prisoner
with a conditional release before the expiration of his maximum
term.2 While directly attributable to no single historical antecedent,
the modern parole system can trace its origins to seventeenth century
conditional pardons and indentures of servitude, and spans such
diverse experiments as the transportation of convicts to colonial
America and Australia, Irish employment of the ticket-of-leave
system, and the efforts of nineteenth century American prison
reformers.3
The crucial importance of the parole system is in removing prisoners from penal institutions. The failure of those institutions has
been clearly demonstrated by the tragic occurrences at major prisons, 4
and the penal system's failure to fulfill its rehabilitative and correctional
role is evident. Parole provides a presently existing program through
which prisoners may be removed from that environment and, hopefully,
successfully reintegrated into society. The parole system seeks to
achieve the rehabilitation of the parolee and his reintegration into
society by the time of the termination of his parole. Reintegrgation and
rehabilitation are pursued within general constraints imposed by a duty
to protect the public from any potential criminal behavior by the parolee.
I More than 60% of adult felons in state and federal institutions are released
prior to the completion of their maximum terms. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE

TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 60
REPORT].
During 1967, the most recent

year for which statistics are reported, nearly
30% of the state and federal prison population was released on parole. There were
57,721 releases out of a total population of 194,896. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1970, at 157.
2 NEW YORK STATE DvISION OF PAROLE, MANUAL FOR PAROLE OFFICERS (1953),
reprinted in C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 18 (3d
ed. 1968). Other definitions, while including the core concept of conditional release,
have emphasized the treatment and rehabilitative aspects of parole. For example:
Parole is a treatment program in which an offender, after serving part of
a term in a correctional institution, is conditionally released under supervision and treatnent by a parole officer.
D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 56 (2d ed. 1969)
(emphasis added).
BFor a discussion of these various historical antecedents, see D. DRESSLER, supra

note 2, at 56-77; G. GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 3-25 (1959); C. NEWMAN,
supra note 2, at 17-37.
4 Perhaps the clearest and most costly example was the riot at the Attica State
Correctional Facility in New York. See N.Y. Times, Sep. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 2. Other
examples include the disturbances at the Long Island City Branch of the Queens
House of Detention, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 3, and the riots at the
Manhattan House of Detention (the Tombs), see N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1970, at 1,
col. 8.
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To achieve these ends, many limitations, termed conditions, are imposed
on the parolee, and compliance with such conditions is ensured through
continuing supervision by parole officers. Violation of conditions often
results in revocation. There are many types of conditions; travel restrictions, reporting requirements, and limits upon freedom of association are common. Courts have shown little inclination to review, on
any basis, release determinations, conditions, or revocation decisions.
In fact, little regard has been given to the potential constitutional limitations on the parole system. The reluctance has often been justified by
obfuscatory legal theories, for example, that the parolee remains "in
custody" or that parole is a matter of legislative grace.
For a variety of reasons, the potential of the parole system remains
unfulfilled. Recidivism rates for parolees indicate that a substantial
number are returned to prison through parole revocation.5 This
Comment will examine the parole system as it is shaped and ordered
by the law, will analyze the effects of the parole process, and will
suggest that, at every stage in the parole process, a clear identification
and precise balancing of interests would produce a result superior to
that now achieved and that such analysis should be ensured through
increased judicial participation in the system.
First, the legal theories that define the parolee's status and limit or
eliminate judicial intervention in the system are presented. They are
important not only for their logical consistency or lack thereof; fundamentally, they are important because they provide the framework for
the definition of parolees' legal rights, and have in the past erected a
curtain behind which legislatures and administrators have operated
with largely unfettered discretion and beyond which judicial participation in the system stops.
The second section examines the initial decision whether to grant
parole. At this stage in the parole process, the system attempts to
identify those prisoners who have the best chance for rehabilitation and,
at the same time, pose the least threat to public safety. The decision is
usually made by a parole board or adult authority after a brief encounter with the prisoner. (The extent to which that encounter resembles or should resemble a hearing or more formal judicial proceeding
is considered in section IV.)
Next, parole conditions, restrictions placed on the parolee, are
examined both from a policy standpoint and from the viewpoint of constitutionally imposed limitations. Often, conditions are standardized
and, by legislative adoption, apply to all parolees, but the parole authority is also empowered to fashion additional, individualized condi5 The causes of the failure are beyond the scope of this Comment. Legislative
failure to fund prisons adequately and executive decision to minimize the use of the
system are examples. Recidivism rates for adult parolees are estimated at from
35% to 45%. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.

These estimates are inherently unreliable, however, because of difficulties in
collecting and analyzing data. For a discussion of the statistics on recidivism, see

D. GLASER, TEE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRIsON AND PAROLE SYSTEm 13-35 (1964).
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tions. The conditions may completely regulate the parolee's activities
and provide close and constant supervision, or they may only involve infrequent notification of parole officers and constitute no restraint at all.
The fourth section will consider due process requirements at
parole revocation and at the release determination. Revocation, the
system's mechanism for dealing with parole failure, is often effected
without a hearing; even when a hearing is provided or required, the
content of that hearing varies considerably among jurisdictions. In
view of the sizable stakes involved at revocation, there is persuasive
argument for surrounding the process with traditional judicial procedural safeguards. On the other hand, all parole violations do not
result in revocation, and correctional expertise and dispositional discretion may require something less than a full trial on revocation.
Similar interests are involved in the initial release determination, but
at the release stage the claim to administrative expertise may be more
justified, the inmate's interest less weighty, and the theoretical definitions of status more troublesome.
Finally, the Comment will consider judicial review on nonconstitutional grounds of two important aspects of the parole processthe release determination and parole conditions. Both are currently entrusted almost entirely to administrative discretion. It may be
anomalous to allow administrative bodies unreviewable power to do
the equivalent of determining sentences. Similarly, power to fix any
condition so long as it infringes upon no constitutional right may be
an unnecessarily deferential standard to apply to parole boards. Both
areas suggest the need for increased court supervision of the system.
I. THE

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

A. The Theories
1. Grace
The grace theory draws its vitality from Justice Cardozo's famous
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst that "[p] robation or suspension of sentence
comes as an act of grace." 6 The Supreme Court's application of the
terms "favor" and "privilege" to the conditional release concept predates
even that case.' Under the grace theory, both the establishment of a
parole system and the release of an individual prisoner are gratuitous
acts by a merciful executive. Parole is analogized to the pardon, the
grant of which was "an act of grace." "Itisthe private, though
official, act of the executive magistrate .

.

.

."

'

Using the grace

theory, the courts have been able to dismiss the possibility of prisoners'
rights to be paroled and to minimize the legal protections accorded a
6295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
7 Ughbanks v.Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487 (1908)
States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932)
8

(parole) ; Burns v.United

(probation).

United States v.Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833).
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parolee's limited freedom. In Curtis v. Bennett,9 the Iowa court, in
holding that the parolee had no right to a hearing prior to parole
revocation, noted that "[w]hen the board grants a prisoner a parole,
it does so as a matter of grace and not as a duty." 10 According to the
grace theory, since parole is a gift, it may be conditioned as the grantor
pleases. Thus, in permitting revocation of the gift, whatever the
grounds for revocation, the courts can maintain a defensible position.
2. Contract
When the parolee leaves the prison, he often signs a form setting
forth the conditions of his release. This formality has given rise to
the contract theory. The parolee accepts the conditions of his parole
just as a party to a business contract agrees to be legally bound by its
terms. 1 Consistent with the contract concept, theoretically, the parolee
may reject the proffered terms. The rejection option finds its origin in
United States v. Wilson.' The Court noted that acceptance was a
requisite of an effective pardon:
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete, without acceptance. It may
then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if
it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to
force it on him.'
Because he has accepted the parole terms, whatever rights they cut off,
the parolee is estopped from complaining about those terms. Against
the developments represented by Miranda v. Arizona 4 and Gideon v.
of the suspected
Wainwright,5 expanding and safeguarding the rights
16
criminal, the contract serves as a waiver of rights.
3. Custody
Parole statutes specifically state that parolees remain in the legal
custody of the warden, parole board, or other agent of the executive."
9256 Iowa 1164, 131 N.W.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965).
1Old. at 1168, 131 N.W.2d at 4; accord, Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199, 200
(5th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 12
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984
(1971) ("Randazzo had no right to be released from physical custody. His release
on parole was an act of grace and favor to him by the Parole Board.").
11 See Ex parte Edwards, 78 Okla. Crim. 213, 219-20, 146 P.2d 311, 314 (1944).
12 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833).
13 Id. at 160.

24384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'5372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16 E.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 15-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984
(1971).
17 E.g., CoN. GEi'.
§ 30:4-110 (1964)

STAT.

STAT. REV.

(warden).

§ 54-125 (Supp. 1971)

(parole board); N.J. REv.
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From this, courts have derived the custody theory. Parole "is in legal
effect imprisonment," 18 and the parolee is "constructively a prisoner
• . .fettered by the conditions and restrictions of his parole." 19 The
, 20 A
parolee is in "substantially the same position as a 'trusty' .
violation of the conditions of his release relegates him to the status of
an escaped prisoner.2 As are the other theories, the custody theory is
often used to insulate parole matters from judicial examination and
review on both nonconstitutional and constitutional grounds. 2 The
parolee is limited to the status of an inmate, and parole is the administrative exercise of the prison discipline authority, subject to the wide
discretion granted prison officials when dealing with persons committed
to their custody."
*"

4. Exhausted Rights
The exhausted rights theory is a concomitant of the custody theory.
Its origins lie in the view that parole is a part of the prison system, and
not a part of the sentencing process. After the accused is convicted by
a trial in which all his rights are protected, "constitutional guarantees
• . . do not extend to a later enforcement of punishment already validly
imposed." ' In short, the theory posits that the accused is entitled to
a fixed quantum of due process protection, and that this is satisfied by
his original trial and sentence. The prisoner's due process rights are
then exhausted until the end of his maximum sentence. This theory
is clearly addressed to the "criminal case" and "criminal prosecutions"
applications of the fifth and sixth amendments,' and seeks to insulate
the parole process from applications of the amendments by denying that
post-conviction disposition is within their scope. It removes the parolee
from the expansion of constitutional protection represented by Miranda
and Gideon and insulates the parole system from concepts already applied to the probation system, 6 although the adjudicative and dispositional functions of both systems are similar in some regards.
5. Parens Patriae
Closely tied to custody is the parens patriae theory. Based on the
rehabilitation model of correction, parens patriae limits the rights of
18 Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923); accord, Padilla v. Lynch, 398
F.2d 481, 482 (9th Cir. 1968).
19 People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
20 Rose v. Haskins, 388 F2d 91, 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968).
Trusty status, usually entailing special privileges or minor supervisory responsibility,
is accorded prisoners as a reward for good prison behavior.
21
Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
22 Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 948 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103).
23Id.
24 1d. at 946 n.5.
25
U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, VI.

26 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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prisoners and parolees on the basis of a perceived need for great discretion and flexibility in rehabilitating the parolee. It assumes that
"[t]he Board [of Parole] has an identity of interest with [the parolee]
• . . [to] foster his rehabilitation ....

2"

Because one need not be

protected from another who has an identity of interest, the theory serves
to insulate the parolee from judicial concern. This rationale and the
consequences of this theory are comparable to those long applied in the
juvenile law area, but rejected not many years ago in In re Gault.2"
B. A Critique
Criticisms of these theories are well developed by commentators
and acknowledged with mixed reception by courts. 9 Some criticisms
apply to the theories as a group, while others are directed to particular
inconsistencies of one theory.
1. Effect of the Theories
Generally, the critics object to the position in which these theories
leave the courts, as well as to the unreality of the theories. They object
to "inconsistent fictions which deny constitutional protections inherent
in the concept of liberty." 30 The theories operate, and were so
conceived, to exclude the courts from a substantial role in the parole
system and to place the parolee under wide-ranging and non-reviewable
administrative discretion.
The theories are inconsistent with parole policy. Criticism on this
basis is premised on the belief that parole should attempt to achieve the
reintegration of all prisoners into society. Indeed, parole has been
described as a "logical transition measure applicable in principle to all
offenders." "1 Reintegration is thwarted to the extent that theories
leave a parolee under the same controls he experienced in prison.
Whether maximum freedom or controlled rehabilitation is the objective,
neither is advanced by a system that encourages arbitrary treatment of
parolees by administrators whose decisions are not made subject to the
possibility of judicial review.
27 Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970).
28387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29 F. COHEN, THE LEALr CHALLENGE TO CoRcRTIONs

(1969); White, The Fourth
Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers,31 U. Pnrr. L. REv. 167, 176-81

(1969); Note, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969

DucE L.J. 139; Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions,

38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Parole: A Critique] ; Comment,
Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 638, 643-48
(1966). Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103), with United States ex rel. Bey v.
Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1971).
3
0Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 720.
31 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNiTED NATIONS,

2 (1954) (U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/4) [hereinafter cited as

PAROLE AND

AFTErcArE

PAROLE AND AFTERCARE].
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Although the courts speak of parole as an administrative rather
than a judicial function,32 they have isolated parole administration from
developments in other areas of administrative law. An adjudicative
situation arises when facts about individual parties, their conduct, or
property are in dispute.' When an administrative agency is about to
take adjudicative action adverse to a citizen, the due process clause,
though applied flexibly with regard to the interests of the state and the
citizen, has been held to entitle a citizen to a hearing, to notice
detailing the basis for the action, to testify, to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, to retain counsel, to a decision based on evidence adduced at
the hearing, and to an impartial decisionmaker. 4 This was essentially
the holding of Goldberg v. Kelly,35 which involved the termination of
welfare benefits. As indicated by Goldberg, the administrative characteristics of a governmental activity do not immunize it in any way
from procedural due process protections. In fact, the Supreme Court
in Freedman v. Maryland3 6 perceived a special need for judicial intervention and procedural safeguards in certain situations calling for
administrative decisionmaking affecting first amendment rights." The
Court, moreover, has not confined this thinking to procedural due
process protections. Camara v. Municipal Court," decided in 1967,
held that the fourth amendment required a warrant before an administrative inspection pursuant to the San Francisco housing code. The
Court was careful to point out that the administrative goals and problems involved in housing code inspections do not detract from the individual's interest in maintaining his constitutionally protected privacy. 9
Perhaps most disturbing is the failure of the theories to conform to
the constitutional outline of basic rights. Even accepting the "custodial"
premise that parolees are still prisoners, "it is not doubtful now that the
Constitution . . . reaches inside prison walls." 40 Johnson v. Avery 41

demonstrates that despite concededly important state interests, encroach32 Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103) (quoting Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164,
1168, 131 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1964)).
33 "Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when,
how, why, with what motive or intent . . . ." 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIW LAW
TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis].
84 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970); see Londoner v. Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908) ; Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir.
1971) (dictum).
35397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36380 U.S. 51 (1965).
3T
Freedinan involved a film censorship scheme. The Court said, "Because the
censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less
responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression." 380 U.S. at 57.
38387 U.S. 523 (1967).
39 387 U.S. at 530-32.
40 Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41393 U.S. 483 (1969)
(state prison officials could not bar inmate from pre-

paring petitions for post-conviction relief for other prisoners).
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ment on constitutionally protected activity is-even within a penal
institution-limited. Similarly, the protection of the rights of others
whose status is specially treated for legitimate governmental purposesaliens 42 and military personnel 4 -- is not eliminated on a fictional
premise that simply denies basic rights.
It is now clearly recognized that there are limits upon how far a
state may go in conditioning rights or governmental beneficence. Although the rigidity of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, 44
declaring that "whatever an express constitutional provision forbids
government to do directly it equally forbids government to do indirectly," 4' has been replaced by a more flexible judicial approach, its
underpinnings have left courts sensitive to the individual interests involved in any attempted conditioning.4 6 The more active judicial approach now assumed by courts in the context of welfare payments,4"
public employment,4" and licensing schemes,49 inter alia, undercuts the
emphasis still placed by many courts on a right-privilege distinction in
parole analysis."0
2. Logical Inconsistencies
The logical inconsistencies and infirmities of the theories, both inconsistencies of internal logic and inconsistencies between theories, have
been special targets for commentators. 1 It has become a routine
exercise to discredit the custody theory on the basis of its conflict with
the forfeited release-time concept.5 2 The parolee is supposedly still
See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
(1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1598 (1960); cf. Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise
a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.").
45 Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968); see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions
and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUTm. L. REv. 321, 321 (1935); Note, Another Look
at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144, 144 (1968).
46 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950) ; Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, supra note 45, at 151-73.
47 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
42

43 See,
44

(1963).

48 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Hunter v. Ann Arbor, 325 F. Supp.
847 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d
499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
49 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ; Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964) ; Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204
N.E.2d 504 (1965).
50 See Note, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969

DuxE L.J. 139.

G See sources cited note 29 supra.
52E.g F. COHEN, supra note 29, at 33; Parole: A Critique, supra note 29,
at 713-14.
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serving his sentence. If he violates his parole, however, all of his
parole time is forfeited as if he had not been in custody during that
time. Beyond this direct conflict, if the prisoner is considered to be in
custody, this practice is roughly analogous to the bizarre possibility of
allowing a warden to extend prison terms beyond the prescribed maximum. Similarly, the escaped-prisoner corollary of the custody theory
is internally inconsistent. A parole violator is presumed to be an
escaped prisoner without a right to a hearing to protest his reincarceration. This assumes the question, however, for before the parolee loses
his right to limited freedom, a determination that a violation has
occurred must be made; whereas the escaped prisoner has no right to
freedom under any circumstances.53
Theoretical conflicts also exist among the various theories. The
contract theory assumes that the prisoner waives rights, while the exhausted rights concept presumes those rights are already lost. The
exhausted rights concept states that parole does not affect the prisoner's
sentence; in contrast, the grace theory posits a significant benefit bestowed upon the parolee, a benefit changing both his status and the
length of his sentence.
Contradictory statements by courts and legislatures provide another
source of criticism of the theories. The dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst " is
contradicted by the statement of Biddle v. Perovich " that pardon is
"not a private act of grace .... " " Burns v. United States " flatly

rejects the contract theory.5" Both the contract and the grace theories
have been rejected by other courts as well." State statutes describe
parole as a conditional "release," 11 although, according to the custody
theory, the parolee remains in "legal custody" 61 with revocation involving a return to "actual custody." 62 Other statutes list prescribed
terms,' although the contract analogy does not support the prescription
of terms. Although one decision, Rose v. Haskins," has analogized
the parolee to the trusty,"5 various legislatures have barred parole reNote, Parole Revocation Procedures, 65 HAIv. L. REv. 309, 311 (1951).
54 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
55 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
56 Id. at 486.
57287 U.S. 216 (1932).
58Id. at 220.
9 E.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 148, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103
(1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
60 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 107(e) (1971); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,
§ 1501.5 (1964) ("a release procedure").
61 E.g., statutes cited note 17 supra.
62
E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2810 (Supp. 1969).
63 E.g., statutes cited note 82 infra. Statutes also describe parole conditions as
being "specif[ied]" and "impose[d]". E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 9 (1959) (specify)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3053 (1970) (impose).
64 388 F2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968).
65 Id. at 95.
53
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lease "merely as a reward for good conduct," 6 while good conduct
remains the basis for trusty status.
3. Disparity with Reality
Although the weakness in logic displayed by the theories is apparent, it is the inconsistency with the actuality of parole that presents
a more striking and damning flaw. As often as the custody theory is
repeated, it is an inescapable fact that a parolee is not a prisoner. He
has "a 'presently enjoyed' interest in his conditional freedom .... " "
The individual on parole clearly has something that the incarcerated
individual does not. He has established, usually by direction of the
state, a normal life-style--a home, a job, and ties to the communitythat is practically indistinguishable from that of the ordinary citizen.
The release of a prisoner to parole may be conceptualized as a grant
akin to a property interest. The dictum in United States v. Wilson
that "[a] pardon is a deed" "8supports just this approach. The deed
terminology and the occasional statutory references to parole as a "permit" " reflect the historical association of the parole release with the
conditional grant of an object, such as a ticket-of-leave. 70 Such an
expanded concept of property, which has rendered new service in other
areas of the law,7 supplies an effective counterbalance to the custody
fiction. It is, however, only a theoretical restatement of the fact that an
individual on parole has an interest different from that of an incarcerated prisoner that should be protected by the courts from arbitrary
encroachment.
The statutory definition of parole adopted by several states-a
"release . . . to the community" 72 -highlights another flaw of the
custody concept. From the community's perspective, the parolee is
undeniably present in society, not isolated in prison. There is a value
to society in securing uniform rights to all its members. While society
may feel concern for what occurs in its prisons, it is immediately affected
by whatever touches its more visible members. The parolee interacts
with other members of the community, in the process developing relationships of mutual trust and confidence. Control of his behavior is
no longer viewed by the community as an exercise in prison discipline;
his mere presence in the community creates an implied assurance that
he will be accorded safeguards similar to those provided to other mem06E.g., statute cited note 80 infra.
07United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.
1971).
68 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
09
MAss. GET. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 128 (1965); MIcH. ComP. LAWS AN.N.
§791.238 (1968).
70 See D. DREssLmR, supra note 2, at 61.
71 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Reich, The New
Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
72
E.g., ARx. STAT. AN. § 43-2801(b) (Supp. 1969).

294

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:282

bers of the community. Just as the alien's presence in a court's territorial jurisdiction gives the judiciary power to protect those rights
acquired by the alien, 73 the courts should have power to offer similar
protection to the parolee in the community. Arbitrary executive action
against the parolee, whether under the guise of contract, grace, or
custody, is anomalous in a free society.'
Economic factors belie the concept of grace)'3 Given the high cost
of confinement,7 6 it is difficult to ascribe the state's action to clemency.
This economic necessity is exacerbated by the rising number of prisoners.7 7 If parole were an act of clemency, it would probably be granted
only in exceptional cases.7 Instead, it more closely resembles a systematic means of maximum utilization of correctional resources. Were
large numbers of parolees to refuse the state's offer of grace, it is an
open question whether the frustrated donor or the recalcitrant donee
would lose more.
Moreover, to describe the executive branch as bestowing grace or
negotiating agreements with prisoners is to ignore political reality.
Preventing crime and rehabilitating prisoners are traditional governmental functions, which the executive should effect with the best means
available. If parole serves these functions, can the parole system be
properly labeled an act of grace? Even a cursory survey of state and
federal statutes demonstrates that parole is part of the criminal justice
system, 79 not an individual act of grace from a person or group within
that system.
The repeated juxtaposing of "rights" and "privileges" by the
judiciary presumes a mutually exclusive choice. This approach and the
"privilege" terminology are inappropriate in analyzing a basic governmental function. Parole is made available neither as a right, nor as a
privilege. It is the implementation of a correctional policy and is no
more a matter of grace than the decision to rehabilitate a slum or locate
a highway.
73 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950).

74 See Hahn v. Burke, 430 F2d 100, 105 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
933 (1971) ("No society is free when the government makes one person's liberty
depend upon the arbitrary will of another.") (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting)).
7r Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE

L. REv. 638, 640 (1966).
76 A 1966 survey found that state adult correctional institutions expended an
average of $5.24 per day ($1912.60/year) per inmate. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 180. Average cost of parole supervision during the same period was $323
per year. Id. 189. Thus, institutionalization was roughly 6 times more costly than
parole.

771Id. 6-7, 60-61.
78 PAROLE AND ATERCARE, supra note 31, at 1.
79 See, e.g., Aauz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1643 (1956) (indeterminate sentence
laws); N.Y. CoRREc. LAW §§210-17 (McKinney Supp. 1968) (inclusion of parole
within the correctional titles); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.1 (1964) (statement of

parole policy).
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The theories also obfuscate the interests of the several participants
in the parole process. The state has two distinct interests: rehabilitation
of the parolee and public safety. While individual executive decisionmakers-wardens, parole boards, and parole officers-share these state
interests by virtue of their positions in the bureaucracy, they also possess individual and particular administrative goals that may not be
wholly harmonious with state interests. Ease of administration and
insulation from judicial review are two such interests possessed by
parole boards. The parolee's interests are those of remaining outside
institutional confinement, obtaining, to as great a degree as possible, the
constitutional protections afforded the ordinary citizen, and benefiting
from whatever counseling, training, or rehabilitation the parole program
may offer.
Taking the view that the executive or warden bestows grace, or
that a parole board freely negotiates contracts of release with prisoners
and terminates custody, in any manner it sees fit, assumes the existence
of an executive and a parole board acting independently in their own
interest. In fact, they are administering a program designed to serve
the broader interest of the state. Custody is in the nature of a trust
for the purpose of rehabilitation, and actions conflicting with the rehabilitation of prisoners violate that trust. s° A judiciary that allows
unlimited action by a warden or parole board under the guise of grace,
and denies judicial review to the parolee, the one most likely to point
out executive abuses, fails to protect these state interests.
Revocation of parole points out the particular failures of the parens
patriae concept in describing the operation of the parole system. The
state's interests in allowing parole "for the best interest of society" 81
and for the parolee's best interests are not identical with the parolee's
exclusive regard for his own interests.
In equating the parole release document with a contract, the contract theory conspicuously fails to explain how the system operates.
The form offered is only "a notice of conditions arrived at ex parte
S. ."2 whose purpose is to give appropriate admonition to the parolee.
Terms are "prescribed ;" " no statutes provide for a bilateral 8negotiation
4
of terms; and the parolee may not have the option to refuse.
80 In some states even the warden's special interest in prison discipline is subordinated to a separate state interest in parole. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4123.14 (1964) ("No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good
').
conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned while under sentence ....

s1 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2808 (Supp. 1969).
82 F. CoHEN, supra note 29, at 33.
S3 E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.01 (E)
§4203 (1970).

(Page Supp. 1970); 18 U.S.C.

(no option to refuse pardon);
84 Cf. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927)
City of Lima v. Beer, 90 Ohio App. 524, 528, 107 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1950) (no option
to refuse suspension of sentence).
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C. Trends: A Framework for JudicialAnalysis
The theoretical underpinnings are subject to change. First, the
theories are, to some extent, reflective of parole practices, and as those
practices change, the theories may be expected to change, although
lagging behind. Economic reality and the comparative costs of custody
and parole are gradually undermining the grace concept. The obvious
discrepancy of interests highlighted in the parole revocation process
belies the parens patriae theory. Secondly, developments in other areas
of the law have potential impact on the foundations of parole theories.
In re Gault 85 presents a clear repudiation of the parens patriae
concept. Examining parens patriae, the Court found "its meaning . . .
murky and its historic credentials .

.

of dubious relevance."

86

The

doctrine was held insufficient to deny due process rights in a juvenile
hearing. The case assumes a broader meaning of "criminal proceeding"
than is accepted in the exhausted rights concept.87 It puts emphasis on
the value of apparent and actual fairness as "therapeutic" 88 and therefore indicates a danger in arbitrary administrative treatment of parolees.
Gault's requirement of due process protection and emphasis on the fact
of incarceration after actual freedom highlights the custody theory's
erroneous equation of inmates and parolees.8 9
The law of parole has been curiously insulated by the courts from
developments in two areas of the law, probation and waiver of rights.
Mempa v. Rhay's " extension of the right to counsel in probation
revocation hearings in which sentence is imposed has been strictly
limited under the "non-criminal process" concept. 9 ' The limitation
placed on consent and waivers by the Supreme Court 9 2 should lead to
close scrutiny of the parole contract as a waiver of rights. This analogy,
85 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8Od. at 16.
871d. at 49-50.
88d. at 26.

89 Id. at 27-50.
90 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
91 E.g., Morrisey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 950-51 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F2d 91, 97
(6th Cir. 1968). But see State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 185 N.W.2d
306 (1971).
92 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), dealing with waiver of the right
to counsel, established that courts should indulge in every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental rights. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708
(1948). In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court held that
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of
a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more
than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.
Id. at 548-49 (footnotes omitted). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was,
of course, a decision treating the prerequisites for effective waiver of the right to
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. The effectiveness of a parole
"contract" as a waiver of rights should, thus, be viewed against these decisions and
their progeny.
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however, has been ignored, and the parole release form is often accepted
as a valid forfeiture of the parolee's right to object to his parole
revocation.
Two recent cases dealing with "privilege" recipients directly affect
the legitimacy of the right-privilege concept, but give conflicting indications as to its application to the parole system. In Goldberg v.
Kelly 93 the Court held that individual welfare payments could not be
terminated without certain due process protections. Stating that
"[this constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument
that public assistance benefits are 'a privilege and not a right,' " " the
Court reiterated a position established by a line of decisions imposing
limitations on the state's power to grant and terminate benefits."
Subsequently, the Court decided in Wyman v. James96 that the
state could condition the receipt of welfare benefits upon caseworker
visitations. Although the decision held that this visitation was not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment,17 and thus
avoided the unconstitutional condition issue, the reasons enumerated by
the Court to justify such visitations reinforce certain parole theories.
The description of the caseworker as "a friend to one in need" I" buttresses the parens patriae doctrine's " assumption of an identity of
interest. The result, if not the reasoning in Wyman, supports a policy
of close administrative supervision of parolees.
Camnarav. Municipal Court100 and Terry v. Ohio 10' exemplify the
02
emergence of a concept that could aid in defining parolees' rights,'
and thereby remove the need for an abstract theoretical definition of
the parolee's status. In both Camaraand Terry the Court, in "balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails," 103
indicated a gradation of rights, allowing invasions in special cases of
public need.'
Wyman v. James, professing no invasion of fourth
amendment rights, determined that a state caseworker's entry into a
welfare recipient's home was not unreasonable, because it "serves a
valid and proper administrative purpose . . ."

c'and is the only means

available to obtain pertinent information. The balancing concept, employed in Camara and Terry, but not in Wyman, is analogous to
93397 U.S. 254 (1970).
94 Id. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
95 E.g., cases cited noted 47 stpra.

96400 U.S. 309 (1971).
971d. at 318.
98 Id. at 323.
99 See id. at 343-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
101 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10 2 See White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers,

31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 167, 181-97 (1969).

103 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
104 Public health in Camara, public safety in Terry.
105 400 U.S. at 326.
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temporary limitations of rights when a paramount societal interest
exists and the invasion of private rights is the only means to protect that
interest. Similarly, the parolee's controlled release confers certain
rights subject to limitations to allow administrative guardianship and
the protection of public safety.'0 6 The more specific implications of
these decisions will be explicated later in this Comment.
In the intellectual struggle to define the parole concept, the critics
of judicially fabricated theories have won the battle on a logical level.
"[T]he 'holy trinity' of legal rationalizations . . . have been . .

thoroughly discredited ....

107

",

And the antiquated legal formulae

are not to be replaced with new legal fictions. 08 Writers focus on a
rational balancing of factors and a candid recognition that where conflicting interests exist, "a state must pursue even its valid ends by the
least restrictive [means]." '09
But on the practical level the commentators have not achieved
judicial implementation of their primary objective-a recognition and
protection of the parolee's liberty and rights that are inherent in that
liberty. The theme that the "parolee is . . . given a certain liberty
which should be accorded some protection" "0 is a recurrent one
among the writers."' Until the parolee is protected from the uncontrolled exercise of administrative discretion, the legal scholarship will
continue to prod the judiciary to abandon its "inconsistent fictions."
These proddings have effected some changes. It cannot be said that
the entire judiciary is impervious to the intellectual challenge of parole
theory and the practical consequences that follow. Dissenting judges 112
and some courts ...have, to various degrees, adopted the proffered
analysis and suggestions. For most courts, however, there is continued
reliance upon the theories to deny particular rights." 4 Even courts
recognizing the parolee's interest and adopting a balancing approach
continue to refer to custody and administrative grace." 5
Understanding why courts show such reluctance to abandon old
concepts is helpful in determining the future directions of parole theory.
106 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100
(1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
107 F. COHEN, supra note 81 at 31-32.
'

08

See Note, Parole Revocation Procedures, 65 HARv. L. REv. 309, 319 (1951).

109 84 HARv.L. REv. 1727, 1730 (1971).
110 Note, supra note 108, at 311.
111 See, e.g., Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12
WAYNE L.REv. 638 (1966); 84 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1971).
112 E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952 (8th Cir.) (Lay,J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No.5103); Menechino v.
Oswald, 430 F2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting); Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bey v.Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir. 1971); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938

(1970).
114 E.g, cases cited note 91 supra.
115 E.g., Heath v. State, 94 Idaho 101, 482 P2d 76 (1971).
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Looking to the concurring opinion of Judge Anderson in Menechhlto v.
Oswald,n" or the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Baxter v.
Comntmonwealth,"7 one finds a judiciary apparently awaiting legislative
direction. The existing parole statutes are in fact conceptually inconsistent and reflect no legislative inclination toward a rights-oriented
conceptual scheme."' Unfortunately legislative efforts are currently
directed toward other considerations.
In addition to the lack of legislative direction, courts have been
deterred by practical considerations that would attend a judicial invasion of the field. In addition to the problems of an expanding
judicial workload," 9 parole "is a correctional device" best left to those
with expertise. 2 Recognition of the special value of non-adversarial,
administrative proceedings has made the courts wary of imposing requirements that would fundamentally alter that system.
There remains the question what direction future developments in
parole theory will follow. Factual trends undermine those theories
treating parolees as a class without rights. If the attainment of a
recognition of those rights is a function of power and commitment, the
rapidly increasing number of prisoners and parolees 121 will render them
a minority group of high visibility. The economic necessities of release
and the urgent need for better crime prevention and control emphasize
the need for a more realistic parole theory. Even administrators of the
correctional system, those to whom courts have shown the greatest
solicitude, have recognized the bankruptcy of the old concepts. The
modern correctional process is designed for "integrating or reintegrating the offender into community life . ..

,12.2 With this orientation

toward rehabilitating the offender, "it becomes anomalous to regard
[correctional decisions] as unreviewable matters of grace." 123 "[Authorities] are telling us that the old idea that the 'convict' has had his
day in court and that due process ends with conviction is no longer
tenable."

'

Perhaps these observations suggest a further question: can the
theoretical framework be abandoned altogether? However the parole
system is defined, there are participants whose interests must be clearly
recognized. Parolees should have, to the greatest extent possible,
116 430 F.2d at 412.
117
Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1971).

118 See statutes cited note 60 supra & accompanying text. See also TENN.

CODE

ANN. § 40-3614 (Supp. 1970).
119 Pre-revocation hearings are viewed with some alarm by the judiciary. "It
would dump a whole new load of hay on the back of an already overburdened camel."

State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 563, 185 N.W.2d 306, 318 (1971)
(Hansen, I., concurring).

120 Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103).
121
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7, 60-61.
122 Id. 7.
123 Id. 12.

124 Bixby, A New Role for Parole Boards, 34 FED.

PROBATION,

June 1970, at 25.
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cognizable interests capable of judicial protection. These interests are
circumscribed by those of the parole system itself. The needs of the
system account for the longevity of the current theories. In place of
grace and parens patriae, the system requires a means to protect itself
in permitting the reasonable exercise of discretion informed by expertise. To replace the contract and exhausted rights theories, the
normal panoply of constitutionally protected individual rights must be
limited to the extent required by the state's interest in rehabilitation and
public safety. If the custody theory is abandoned, a continuing state
interest must allow protracted contact with the parolee throughout the
rehabilitation process.' 2 5 In addition to treating the interests of the
state, society, and the parolee, any proposed theoretical or nontheoretical approach must contend with the desire of the judiciary to
insulate itself from "non-judicial determinations for which it is not
equipped by training or experience." 126 The balancing analysis, which
has already met with some judicial approval," 7 should serve this purpose. Its emphasis upon recognizing and balancing real interests on a
rational basis contrasts sharply with the current reflex application of
sophistic theories.
The danger remaining in the balancing approach is that of dilution
of basic rights, a dilution that may be an unavoidable consequence of
choosing this method to extend protection to parolees. It might be
concluded that the remedy for this difficulty is full recognition of a
normal complement of constitutional protections for the parolee. 128
Exactly what path the courts will follow depends on the ability of the
parole system to function in accommodating judicial concerns. If the
courts, with their demonstrated ability to thrive on logical inconsistencies, are to be shaken from their present positions, much will
depend on the practical changes wrought in the system.
II. THE PAROLE RELEASE DETERMINATION
A. Composition of the Parole Board
Because the parole release determination is largely a discretionary
the individuals composing the parole boards have significant
effect on the system. In the majority of states the parole board is
one,' 2 9

125 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr.
100, 104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965) ("Intense scrutiny by the correctional authorities is a vital ingredient of a publicly acceptable parole system.").
126 Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1970).
12 7 See United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971) ; People
v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 953 (1965).
128 State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938

(1970).
129 See text accompanying notes 139-53 infra.
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composed of members appointed by the governor, 30 while in the remaining states members serve either ex o.icio 'I"* or through appointment by officials of the state correctional authority.' 32 The United
States Board of Parole is appointed by the President subject to Senate
confirmation.3 3 The ex officio board is clearly the worst of these
systems: Governors, Secretaries of State, and even Correction Commissioners are unlikely3 to have the necessary time or qualifications to
make parole decisions.'

1

Unfortunately, board members may also be selected on the basis
of political, rather than correctional, qualifications.' 3' This is particularly true in the many states with part-time parole boards. The
appointment system may also lead to favoritism for those prisoners who
retain certain attorneys. 36 Absent even such improper considerations,
the political appointment procedure leads to conservatism in release
policies. Parole boards, constituted of public officials, would rather
keep a man in prison than risk the public outcry likely if a parolee
should commit another crime.' 3 Several states have made some attempt
to limit the role of politics in board appointment by enacting statutory
qualifications for parole board members.'s
B. Operating Procedures
1. Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking procedures show considerable variation. In some
jurisdictions, all board decisions are made en banc. 3 1 In other jurisdictions decisionmaking authority is delegated to subordinate bodies or
individuals; often, one or two members of the board, or possibly a
30 E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-401 (A) (Supp. 1971) ; CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-124a (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2228 (1963); see TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67.
13' E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:31 (Supp. 1970) (board of trustees of

state prison).
132 Eg., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-18-1 (Supp. 1969) (Executive Director of
Institutions); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 108 (1971) (Secretary of Public Safety &
Correctional Services).

18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970).
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
135 Id. 67; see Tappan, The Role of Counsel in Parole Matters, 3 PRAc. LAW.,
Feb. 1957, at 21, 25-26; Wright, The Need for Education in the Law of Criminal
Corrections,2 VALPARAISO L. REv. 84, 91 (1967).
136 Wright, supra note 135, at 91.
137 See JOINT COMM'N ON CORECTIONAL MANPOWER & TRAINING, PERSPECTIVES
ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING 62 (1970); Bixby, supra note 124, at
24, 26.38
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (Supp. 1970) (Governor appoints from a list of
best qualified applicants as determined by an examination given by experts in penal
treatment and criminal justice) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1551 (1964) ("persons
133
134

with special training or experience in law, sociology, psychology, or related branches
of social science").
139 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.19 (1964) (requiring a unanimous vote).
The content of any hearing granted the parole applicant, though relevant here, will
be discussed in a later section. See text accompanying notes 493-542 infra.
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hearing examiner, conduct individual hearings and make recommendations to the full board. 4 ' This use of hearing examiners is a recent
innovation that can allow the board to focus on broader policy decisions
and function as an agency of appellate review. 41 The hearing examiner
system may be faulted, however, because it may lead to frustration of
prisoners who never confront the ultimate decisionmaker. The Joint
Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training has proposed that
the governor or correctional authority appoint a central board to make
broad policy decisions, consider appeals, and handle cases of major
importance. A hearing board, composed of a central board member, a
correctional institution staff member, and a private citizen, would make
most decisions. This structure would eliminate the possible frustrations of the hearing examiner system by forcing board members into
closer contact with the prisoners than would be maintained through the
use of hearing examiners."'
2. Informational Inputs
Ideally, the decisionmaking process operates with a full range of
information related to the inmate. Perhaps the most comprehensive
information requirements are found in the Model Penal Code. The
Code would require the parole board to evaluate the following information:
(1) a report prepared by the institutional parole staff,
relating to [the prisoner's] personality, social history and
adjustment to authority, and including any recommendations
which the institutional staff may make;
(2) all official reports of his prior criminal record, including reports and records of earlier probation and parole
experiences;
(3) the pre-sentence investigation report of the sentencing court;
(4) recommendations regarding his parole made at the
time of sentencing by the judge or the prosecutor;
(5) the reports of any physical, mental and psychiatric
examination of the prisoner;
(6) any relevant information which may be submitted
by the prisoner, his attorney, the victim of his crime, or by
other persons;
140 E.g., OIO REv. CODE ANN. §5419.10 (1970); 28 C.F.R. §2.15 (1971).
141 TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 1, at 67; see e.g., CAL. PENA.L CODE § 5076.1
(1970) ; 28 C.F.R. §2.15 (1971).
142 JOINT CoMM'N ON CoRRE TioNAL MANPowER & TRAINING, supra note 137,
at 63; see Bixby, supra note 124, at 27-28.
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(7) the prisoner's parole plan;
(8) such other relevant information concerning the prisoner as may reasonably be available.'
Although state statutory requirements rarely go to such depth, when
they do the list is quite similar.144
Much relevant and potentially helpful information is frequently
lacking. The shortage of institutional staff, particularly professionals,
has affected the abilities of parole boards to obtain information. It is
unusual for the board to have a psychiatric report, and follow-up
therapy information is a rarity. 4 ' Overworked caseworkers often make
reports on the basis of a short interview with the prisoner and meager
institutional records. The resulting reports are often highly stereotyped,
making it difficult for parole boards to consider the individual aspects
of the case. 14 1 In some jurisdictions the board's information is14limited
7
to the prisoner's criminal record and his prison conduct record.
Another cause of insufficient information is the superficial nature
of reports provided by public officials. Although official statements
regarding the prisoner's habits, history, associates, and reputation, given
by the judge or prosecutor at the time of trial, or evidence adduced at
trial, are generally given considerable weight by the boards, they are
often so incomplete as to be worthless, 148 even in the states that require
them by statute. 4 9
Even when substantial information is available, it is often in the
form of judgments by correctional personnel, who are sometimes overly
concerned with the prisoner's ability to adapt to institutional life.'
There is danger that the staff's concern with institutional needs will
prevent objective recommendations.' 1 Yet it is not uncommon for the
§305.10 (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
CODE ANN. § 77-516 (1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.18 (1964);

143 MODEL PENAL CODE,

144 E.g.,

GA.

28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1971); see Oswald, Decisions! Decisions! Decisions! Alt "Outside"

Look from the "Inside" on Parole Board Hearings, 34 FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1970,
at 27. For a discussion of the quality of information gathered, see G. GrADINX,
supra note 3, at 104-19 (1959).
145 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-65.

146 d.; see Hazelrigg, An Examination of the Accuracy and Relevance of Staff
Perceptionsof the Innmate in the Correctional Institution, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 204
(1967) (study indicating that staff perceptions of inmates may be largely governed
by unfavorable stereotyped images of the inmates).
147 See G. GIARDINI, supra note 3, at 132; Dawson, The Decision to Grant or
Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 WASH. L.Q.
243, 247 (comparing Kansas, which had only criminal record and prison conduct
records,
with Michigan and Wisconsin, where pre-sentence reports were utilized).
14 8 See A. BRUCE, A. HARNO, E. BURGESS & J. LANDESCO, THE WORKINGS OF
THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PARoLE SYSTEM IN ILLINoIS 76-79
(1968) ; D. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 116.
149 E.g, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 125 (1971).
150 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 65; D. Dressier, supra note 2, at

115-16.
151 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 65; cf. Dawson, supra note 147, at 279.
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parole boards to52 uniformly follow the recommendations of the correctional staffs.1
The board may also have prediction tables based on the recidivism
rates of former parolees with similar characteristics. In addition to
these various records, reports, and recommendations, the board will
generally conduct a hearing or interview with the prisoner, but the
hearing is often quite brief, and the prisoner is often unable to provide
meaningful information that will affect the board's decision.' 53
3. Criteria for Parole
Although some states '.. and the federal system"' allow all pris-

oners to be considered for parole, many states prohibit consideration of
certain offenders, 6' including those serving life sentences.5' Eligibility
for parole generally depends on completion of a specified fraction of a
definite minimum sentence, 158 or completion of the minimum of an indeterminate sentence, 5 ' although some statutes provide for immediate
eligibility for parole. 6 °
Statutory criteria as to which prisoners should be paroled are
generally so vague as to provide no real guidance to the parole board.'The most common statutory scheme authorizes the board to grant parole
"when in its opinion there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner
can be released without detriment to the community or himself." 162
Although many statutes require a reasonable probability that the prisoner will not violate the law," those requiring the same probability that
the parolee will not violate his parole conditions 164 are unrealistic be152 Interview with Carolyn Temin, former General Counsel, Pennsylvania State
Board of Parole, in Philadelphia, Aug. 23, 1971.
153 See text accompanying note 518 infra.
154 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.16 (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.05
(Supp. 1971).
-15 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970).
156 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4 (Supp. 1971) (armed robbery & certain
narcotics offenses); Miss. CODE ANN. §4004-03 (Supp. 1971) (if record shows
prisoner is confirmed & habitual criminal).
157 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 133A (Supp. 1970) ; NEv. REv. STAT.
§213.120 (1965) (sentence of "life imprisonment without possibility of parole").

158 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §31-411 (Supp. 1971)

(M of sentence); ME.

REv.

STAT. ANN.
Miss. CODE ANN.

tit. 34, § 1672(2) (Supp. 1970) (aV of sentence minus good-time);
§ 4004-03 (Supp. 1971) (% of sentence); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-9832 (1969) (4 of sentence minus good-time).
159 E.g, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-411 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-125 (Supp. 1971).
160 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 57.07 (Supp. 1971).
161 See Allen, Legal Values and Correctional Values, 18 U. TORONTO LJ. 119,
125 (1968).
& PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD PROBATION & PAROLE AcT
For similar provisions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4 3 47(a) (Supp.
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.18 (1944); Mo. REv. STAT. § 549.261 (Supp. 1971).
163 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (a) (1970); N.Y. CoRRmc. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp.
1971) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 144.240 (1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 293 (1964).
164 E.g., ALASrKA STAT. § 33.15.080 (1962).
162 NATIONAL PROBATION

§ 18

(1955).
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cause of the prolixity and harshness of those conditions."" The only
major difference in statutory criteria relates to conduct while in prison;
some jurisdictions prohibit parole boards from using parole as a reward
for good conduct while other statutes provide that such conduct must be
considered by the board.:'0
Despite differences in statutes, the major criterion of all boards is
the probability of recidivism." 7 Various predictive devices are used by
the boards; studies indicate that convicts with extensive criminal records
are more likely to violate parole than are first offenders. 6 ' Studies also
indicate that different types of crimes show varying rates of recidivism.'" 9 The board must also consider the type of crime to gauge the
probable impact of repeated criminal behavior; the danger of a forger
returning to his former ways, though more probable than the rapist
repeating his crime, 7 ° is certainly less serious. Correlations have also
shown differences in parole success among parolees of different ages.l7 t
While the discussion of parole criteria has considered objective,
quantifiable measures of future behavior, the boards uniformly pride
themselves-whether justified or not-on their individualized consideration of each prisoner, and use that claim as a basis for their wide discretion.1' 2 A primary consideration is the prisoner's attitude toward
himself. The board is often impressed with his involvement in institutional self-improvement programs-educational, occupational, religious, and psychiatric.'
4. Other Considerations
Parole boards may feel compelled to parole certain prisoners
despite their belief that recidivism is probable. This is particularly true
near the end of the prisoner's sentence when the board would rather
release him under supervision for a significant period of time than have
16 5 See text accompanying notes 198-99 infra.
166E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§607:39, 607:51-a,

-b (Supp. 1971).

For a

more thorough, though somewhat dated summary of statutory criteria, see Dawson,
supra note 147, at 256-57, 274-75, 278, 286-87.
167 See G. GIARDINI, supra note 3, at 133-34; Dawson, supra note 147, at 249-65.
' 68 D. GLASER & V. O'LEARY, PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PAROLE OUTCOME
(1966), reprinted in C. NEWMAN, SOuRcEmooK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS
413, 415-21 (3d ed. 1968).
169 The crimes showing the highest rate of recidivism by parolees are non-violent
crimes against property, theft, burglary, fraud, and forgery. Homicide shows the
lowest rate, followed by rape and other sex offenses, and felonious assault.
Id. 421-26; D. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 157-58, 433.
170 D. GLASER & V. O'LEARY, supra note 168, at 427, 433.
171 Age is inversely correlated to the recidivism rate. Id. 412-15.
172 "[I]t is safe to say that we know as much, if not more, about the prospective
parolee than he knows about himself." Oswald, supra note 144, at 27; see Thomas,
An Analysis of Parole Selection, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 173, 177 (1963).
173 See G. GIARDINI, supra note 3, at 143-44; Chappell, Federal Probation, 37
F.R.D. 207, 210 (1964) ; Dawson, supra note 147, at 253-56.
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him released automatically later under no supervision or under a short
period of supervision in jurisdictions with mandatory release pro4
17

grams. '

Unfortunately, the boards often consider factors unrelated to either
the prisoner's or society's welfare. One major consideration is the need
to support and reinforce prison behavioral values, primarily discipline.
Consideration is given to prison conduct despite the lack of evidence
indicating that good conduct is probative of post-release behavior. In
fact, "there is reason to believe that a less smooth adjustment [to incarceration] may give evidence of the existence of a well-integrated
personality." 171 Yet conduct will probably continue to be considered,
largely because of the institutional need to maintain discipline and the
perceived effectiveness of this means of maintaining it. In deciding
whether to continue to use this criterion, parole officials should at least
evaluate its effectiveness in promoting prison discipline. Partly due to
overcrowded conditions, good-time is so automatically granted by
officials in some prisons as to be ineffective in maintaining discipline.
One writer has suggested that in order to use parole for disciplinary
control, and prevent the parole board from considering in-prison behavior, prison officials should be authorized to delay parole consideration
for a short period of time.1 7 This scheme, however, ignores the likelihood that in the very same prisons where overcrowding prevents the
effectiveness of the good-time incentive plan, the institutional staff will
be unwilling to delay the parole eligibility of many prisoners. Its only
difference from the present system would lie in moving the discretion as
to whether to apply good-time to a parole determination from the parole
board to the prison officials. Because prison demeanor would still influence the release decision, the scheme would not remove a factor unrelated to rehabilitation or public welfare from the parole system, but would
merely help ensure that the parole board's decision is untainted. Moreover, analogous plans, when adopted without statutory authorization,
have been attacked successfully in court.
The parole decision may also involve a covert importation of board
value judgments that are arguably improper considerations in the correctional process. The board is properly concerned with the kind of
support a prisoner's family, friends, and community can provide in helping his readjustment to society.1 79 In making this type of judgment,
however, the personal values and social biases of board members that
174 For example, federal prisoners must be released after a term equal to their
maximum term less good-time allowances. 18 U.S.C. § 4163 (1970). They are then
subject to parole supervision for a period that terminates 180 days prior to the
expiration of their original term. Id. § 4164.
178 PAROLE AND ATERcARE, vupra note 31, at 4.
176 See Dawson, supra note 147, at 279.
17

7Id.

178 E.g., People
179 G. GARDINI,

ex rel. Abner v. Kinney, 30 Ill. 2d 201, 195 N.E.2d 651 (1964).
supra note 3, at 146-50.
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are necessarily involved may unduly influence the decision. Board
members should be aware of the danger of abuse and guard against it. 8 '
Finally, the board may be faced with private pressure on behalf
of the prisoner, public sentiment, or political pressure. As a result of
the appointment process, these pressures often cannot be ignored. Even
if the board resists personal or political pressures, resentment of those
pressures may prevent objective consideration of the prisoner.' s ' One
possible solution to an unfavorable public sentiment or community
attitude is to parole the prisoner to another community. This may also
avoid political criticism and is likely to aid the parolee, for the absence
of a hostile environment will facilitate his attempt to readjust to
society.'8 2
III. PAROLE CONDITIONS

A. Purpose of Parole Conditions
From the lenient and vague English Penal Servitude Act of
1853,183 to the numerous, complex, and often stringent regulations
prevalent in the United States today, the release conditions imposed on
the parolee have reflected confusion and disagreement over the purpose
of parole. The numerous and varied conditions imposed 184 indicate that
it has become necessary to redefine the purpose of imposing conditions
and to discard those conditions that do not aid in achieving those
purposes.
Parole conditions serve two distinct purposes: facilitation of the
rehabilitation and reintegration into society of the parolee, and protection of society. While these purposes are often complementary, occasionally their execution may lead to contradictory results. 8" For
example, strict surveillance of parolees may best provide short-run
public safety, but is also likely to be dysfunctional to the rehabilitative
goal, thus creating a greater long-run problem for society.
Some specific parole conditions fulfill both goals. Monthly reports
require the parolee to exert the self-discipline necessary to record and
transmit information, 8" and enable the parole officer to exert greater
180 See Thomas, supra note 172, at 175-76.
is' Id. 176-77.
182 See D. DREssLER, supra note 2, at 114.

183 16 & 17 Vict., c. 99, §§ 9-11. The Act granted the parolee "leave to be
at large," with conditions amounting to "good behavior." See Arluke, A Summary
of Parole Rules, 2 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N J. 6, 6-7 (1956) (discussing
the disorder and confusion resulting from failure to supervise released prisoners
under early practice, and the resulting imposition of specific conditions).

184 See Arluke, supra note 183, at 10 (indicating that some states imposed as
many as 20 conditions).
185 See Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 726.
186

That reports do act as a control on the individual is suggested by this
writer's field experience. It was a matter of note that, too often to be mere
chance, when a parolee who had been reporting weekly had his status relaxed
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supervision through detection of potentially problematical situations at
their inception.
Other specific conditions are substantially or totally protective of
society. Perhaps the clearest example is a condition preventing or
limiting travel by the parolee without permission of the parole officer.
The major purpose is control of the parolee and limitation of the opportunity to commit further crime.117 Curfew requirements are similarly
aimed at control and surveillance of the parolee, although they may have
some ancillary rehabilitative purpose.'
Rules limiting the parolee's
association with other parolees, convicted criminals, or persons of bad
repute are largely protective in nature.' 89 The regulation, however,
may have adverse effects on rehabilitation. Self-esteem is an important
factor in successful rehabilitation, and such conditions may serve to
remind the parolee that he is considered an improper associate for other
parolees and is effectively relegated to the status of something less than
a citizen.
Other protective rules prohibit general criminal activity. Such
conditions are designed to remind the parolee of the presence of the
law, especially when the condition enumerates specific illegal acts. These
conditions may also allow the parole board or adult authority to reincarcerate the parolee prior to a hearing on the alleged offense.
Finally, they may allow the board to revoke parole even when the
evidence is insufficient to convict the parolee of a subsequent crime.190
Some conditions may not be related to either of the two purposes,
though putatively directed at insulating the parolee from situations conducive to recidivism. For a parolee who committed a crime while under
the influence of alcohol, a condition restricting or prohibiting the use of
alcohol serves both purposes. For a parolee who committed a crime
while sober, yet who has a drinking problem, the restriction, while
arguably proper for rehabilitative reasons, would be irrelevant to considerations of public safety. But for those parolees who have no
history of excessive use of alcohol, the condition serves no legitimate
purpose and should not be imposed. While no longer a common condition,' 9 ' compulsory church attendance is perhaps the clearest example
of a condition not related to either rehabilitation or protection of the
to a monthly basis, he got into trouble immediately thereafter, as if the
lessening of restraints was too much for him.

D.

DRESSLER,

supra note 2, at 243-44.

187 The condition may also provide a method for revocation based on a technical

violation.
188 The condition may, for example, encourage regular attendance in employment.
189 In one instance, parole conditions were interpreted to forbid association with
other parolees even at petitioner's place of employment, where other parolees were
also employed. The Supreme Court reversed a revocation decision by interpreting
the condition more narrowly. Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971).
190 See note 491 infra.
191 As of 1969, only Nebraska imposed church attendance as a condition of parole.
See Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRImE &
DELINQuExcy 267, 272-73 (1969).
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public. Compelling the parolee to attend church is more likely to result
in resentment toward the system than to bring about religious conviction. The only possible realistic function of such a rule is to gain
support for the parole system from one segment of the population, but,
while public support is important, it should not be gained through rules
that are not only dysfunctional, but probably constitutionally prohibited
as well. 92
In order to best realize the purposes of parole, conditions should be
individualized:
[R]ules must be designed to fit the individual. This is particularly significant because rules demand that the man who
has broken a law must live by a more exacting code than the
one in force for the rest of society. The rule must represent a
goal that can be realistically attained by the individual and that
can reasonably meet society's expectation of desirable behavior. 93
The rules should be individualized in both requirements and objectives.
The operation of the rules should largely depend on the parolee's intelligence, maturity, and ability to assume responsibility. For example,
a prohibition on installment purchases may be required to prevent an
impulsive parolee from falling into hopeless debt, while it may be
completely unrelated to rehabilitation and control, and unnecessarily
restrictive, in some cases. Other conditions, too, may be appropriate
only in certain instances:
The restriction against drinking may be necessary to protect
society in the case of a parolee who has committed a crime
of violence, but it would bear no reasonable relationship to the
legislative ends when applied, for example, to a forger or a
safecracker whose very ability to repeat the crime depends on
a state of sobriety, and whose past history does not indicate
susceptibility to commit crime as a result of the use of
alcohol."'
Application of these considerations should result in no conditions at all
for some parolees.
Individualization of conditions is possible. As noted earlier,'
parole boards pride themselves on the careful consideration given each
individual in making the parole release decision. At that time, with the
full record before it, the board could also determine what individual
192 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946) (condition
requiring juvenile on probation to attend church held unconstitutional); Imlay &
Glasheen, See What Condition Your Conditions Are In, 35 FED. PRoBATION, June

1971, at 3, 8.
k93 Wallace, The Casework Approach to Rides, 2
Ass'x J. 14, 16 (1956).
194 Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 726.
195 See notes 172-73 supra & accompanying text.
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conditions would be proper. If counsel were permitted or provided, he
could provide additional information for the board's use in forming
conditions. By individualizing the conditions at the time of release, the
board could eliminate the necessity for much of the extensive and often
unreviewable exercises of parole officer discretion.' 96
The first sixty to ninety days after release are the most critical in
the rehabilitation process. 91 The parolee is often frightened, bewildered,
and sometimes embittered.' 98 He may be emotionally immature, and
recognition of this possible immaturity has led parole boards to overwhelm the parolee with conditions. While this proliferation of conditions may serve a useful purpose during the immediate post-release
period, the goals of parole would be best served by gradually diminishing parole conditions as the parolee demonstrates that he is achieving
stability and reintegration into society. In place of the futility born of
the knowledge that these same restrictions will control his behavior until
his original sentence expires-no matter how he behaves-there would
be an incentive to earn more freedom by adjusting to societal behavioral
norms.
This "incentive plan" has been employed by California. As in
most states, the parolee in California is required to submit monthly reports unless otherwise directed by his parole officer:
However, if progress and stability are shown, plus steady
residence .

.

. , fewer reports may be required.

Some

parolees, in fact, have been instructed that no reports are necessary unless residence or employment has changed. 199
This method of gradually increasing the grant of freedom could also be
used with effectiveness in regulating conditions such as the use of automobiles or installment purchases, thereby giving the parolee a sense of
earning his freedom and of acceptance by society.
B. Implementation Philosophy
Parole administrators and legislatures have tried a variety of approaches to parole condition formulation. Blanket rules, which completely prohibit a particular activity, are the easiest to administer. 2"
Because a parolee is told that he may not, for example, drink alcohol
under any circumstances, he knows exactly what conduct is expected of
him. This eliminates the possibility of unknowing violations, which
might occur under a more flexible rule prohibiting only drinking to
196 Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 727.
3.97 Milligan, California'sParole Rules, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 275 (1969).
198 Id.
199 Id. 277. But see D. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 243-44.
200 See 84 HAzv. L. REv. 1727, 1731-32 (1971) (discussing conditions limiting
speech and association).
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excess. But these prohibitions needlessly prohibit much harmless behavior and are likely to lead to evasion and resentment. Further, nonenforcement of such conditions may have negative effects:
We should not enjoin unless we mean to enforce. If we say
the former offender must not take even one drink, we must
be prepared to exact a penalty every time he does. If we do
not mean to do so, we ought not make the rule so positive
and rigid. To establish a rule then allow it to be violated with
impunity makes the regulation meaningless and invites contempt of all regulations.'
Even when this type of rule is enforceable, or the parolee unwilling to
risk violation, it is unwise to subject him to rules that the remainder of
society would be unable to observe. 2 Unreasonable rules not only lead
to resentment, but may also result in the parolee lying to his parole
officer. Taken together these may render counsel more difficult and
destroy mutual confidence and trust, both of which are essential to the
rehabilitation process.
Unlike blanket rules, some parole conditions prohibit only excesses
of a specified behavior.0 3 Conditions that prohibit a parolee from staying out "beyond a reasonable hour" or from "drinking to excess" provide the parolee with some additional freedom, but they also introduce
elements of vagueness and ambiguity. A parolee may restrict himself
more than the rule intended, or he may innocently violate his parole by
failing to restrict himself sufficiently.
Parolees are frequently forbidden to associate with "doubtful companions," "evil associates," "questionable associates," or "persons of
bad reputation." Prohibited places may include "improper places of
amusement," "objectionable places," or "undesirable places." 204 These
nebulous conditions serve only to confuse and frustrate the parolee. If
such conditions are not constitutionally defective because of vagueness, 0 5
they should nevertheless be redrafted by the parole boards or legislatures
to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible.
A third tack in the imposition of parole rules is exemplified by
England's Criminal Justice Act,20 ' which completely dispenses with
concrete conditions and instructs the parolee to lead an "industrious
life" and "keep in touch." 207 Under such a system, the relationship
between the parolee and his parole officer is stressed. While under the
201

D. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 238; see Arluke, supra note 183, at 12.

202 See D. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 238.
203

See 84 HARV. L. REv. 1727, 1731-32 (1971).

204 See Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 737-38.
205 Cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)
(applying the warning component of vagueness theory to regulations imposed on aliens).
206 Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 59-64.
207 A license is issued to the parolee with instructions to: report to a parole
office; place himself under the supervision of a parole officer; keep in touch with
the parole officer; inform the officer of residence or employment changes; and maintain
good behavior and lead an industrious life. See Arluke, supra note 191, at 274.
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American parole condition system there is danger of arbitrary and nonreviewable actions by parole officers, particularly when prior permission
to engage in a particular activity must be obtained from the parole
officer," 8 under the English system the absence of such prior permission
conditions prevents such dangers. But problems might arise that would
make difficult the adoption of the English system. The large caseloads
of many parole officers, for example, might make the system administratively unworkable." 9 Or, the elimination of specific rules and conditions could lead to an erosion of public support for the parole system.
In addition to conditions prohibiting all or excessive degrees of
behavior or activities, many states use conditions placing primary emphasis on regulation rather than prohibition.21 Rules that require the
parolee to receive prior permission before traveling outside the jurisdiction, 1 ' changing employment,212 marrying, 213 or associating with
other parolees 2 14 provide more flexibility and rehabilitative potential
than blanket prohibitions. Because the prior permission scheme introduces an element of rationality and allows the parole officer an opportunity to explain his decision to the parolee, this formulation seems to
be far more functional for rehabilitative purposes.
A major drawback of the prior permission procedure is that "[t]he
action of a single parole officer in withholding permission may well be
arbitrary, and administrative convenience will not permit an appeal to
the board every time one of these essential acts comes into question." 25
In addition, a parolee may consider it demeaning, and an adverse
psychological effect may result, when he must ask permission to marry
or travel to another state. Often the parolee will simply break the rule
or condition rather than accept a denial of permission.216
Although in some activities, permission is "seldom, if ever, denied," 217 provisions should be made to allow the parolee to appeal
denials of certain decisions. For example, refusal to allow a residence
change or an application for a driver's license should be appealable. For
other activities, the prior permission format should be replaced by a
prior notification procedure. The most compelling instance requiring
Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 727.
209See 39 N.Y. ST. COMM. OF CoRREcnioN ANN. REP. 442 (1965).
21o Regulatory conditions, along with the 2 previously discussed categories, are
termed "technical conditions," because the violation of a condition in one of these
categories, though not a violation of substantive criminal law, may nevertheless lead to
revocation of parole.
211 See Arluke, supra note 191, at 270-71.
212
Id. 270.
213 Id. The requirement is rationalized as providing the prospective spouse with
information on criminal background and as enabling the parole officer to ascertain
the rehabilitative consequences of the proposed marriage.
214 Id!.
215 Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 727.
216 See Holtzoff, Duties and Rights of Probationers, 21 FFD. PROBATiON, Dec.
1957, at 3, 7.
217 Milligan, supra note 197, at 276.
208

1971]
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the institution of a prior notification system is the current marriage
permission requirement. Even when a parole officer has good and
sufficient reason to oppose a proposed marriage, the final decision should
be the parolee's. The procedure of prior notification could also be
utilized where it would be arguably unconstitutional to restrict the
parolee's activity, for example, due to the right to interstate travel."'l
In addition to conditions that prohibit or regulate the permissible
degrees of activities, some conditions require the parolee to perform
specific acts. The duty to observe all laws and comport with the
requirements of citizenship is no more than that which is required of
all members of society, but the parolee's failure to observe this vague
condition may be sufficient to effect his return to prison. Further, as
previously discussed,219 the parolee is required to maintain a periodic
reporting schedule.
C. Limitations on Specific ConstitutionalRights
Beyond the claim that many parole conditions are abuses of discretion,220 some conditions have been attacked as constitutionally prohibited. This section will examine the viability of, and judicial
responses to, those challenges.
1. Limitations on Parolee Travel
Restrictions on the parolee's freedom of movement, typically in the
form of travel limitations or residency change prohibitions, are nearly
universal conditions of parole.2 2 1 Few cases challenging travel restrictions have been reported, and the dispatch with which courts have
dismissed the idea that such restrictions might be invalid indicates the
strong presumption generally accorded their validity." 2
There are variations in the types of control mechanisms, but most
involve a prior permission scheme. m3 In 1956, two states, Iowa and
Montana, imposed conditions absolutely prohibiting out-of-state
travel, 24 but according to a 1969 study, only one state now uses an
218

For an analysis of the advantages of a prior-notification system with respect
to out-of-state travel, see Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at 722-23. For an
analysis of the constitutionality of travel restrictions, see notes 221-61 infra & accom-

panying text.
219 Note 186 supra & accompanying text.
220 For a discussion of review of conditions on nonconstitutional grounds, see
notes 568-92 infra & accompanying text.
221 See Arluke, supra note 191, at 272-73.
222 E.g., O'Callahan v. Attorney Gen., 338 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 926 (1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963).
223 E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (1971). The provision announces that "it is the general
rule of the Board that a parolee may travel outside his supervision district only with
the prior approval of the Board." Power to grant prior permission is thereafter
delegated to the individual probation officer, subject to a series of exceptional situations in which only the Board may grant prior permission. Id.
224 See Arluke, supra note 183, at 8-9.
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absolute prohibition." 5 That state, Mississippi, limits travel to "a
specified area." 26 Apparently, no states use a prior notification system.
Shapiro v. Thompson,2 7 a decision premised in large part on the
constitutional right to interstate travel, should lead to a judicial reconsideration of the presumed validity of travel restrictions. This
section of this Comment will first analyze Shapiro and its implications
for the parole system. It will then criticize the approach taken by
Shapiro and, in the parole context, suggest a slightly different manner
of treating the right to travel.
Shapiro held that one-year residence requirements for the receipt
of state welfare benefits deny equal protection of the law to excluded
applicants. In brief, the Court recognized the classification established
between state residents of more than one year and those of less than
one year, then found that the various state interests promoted by the
classification were either not legitimate or not compelling. The Court
held the state interest in deterring the immigration of indigents to be
illegitimate, since its effect was to chill the exercise of the constitutional
right to interstate travel.2 2 More importantly, the Court decided that
this right is fundamental and that therefore any classification burdening
its exercise by one of the groups so classified must be justified by not
just a legitimate governmental interest, but a compelling governmental
interest: 229
But, of course, the traditional criteria do not apply in these
cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be
judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.2 3 °
In the past, one indicium to the Court that the governmental interest is
not "compelling" has been the existence of "less drastic means" for
In Shapiro, however, the Court's
achieving the same purpose.2 3
dictum appeared to take the unprecedented step of including the less
v2
drastic means test as part of the traditional "mere rationality" test.
Arluke, supra note 191, at 272-73.
Id. 273.
227394 U.S. 618 (1969).
228 Id. at 631.
229 Id. at 634.
230 Id. at 638.
225 See
226

231 See note 279 infra.
232 394

U.S. at 637-38. The Court stated:

We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use and have
no need to use the one-year requirement for the governmental purposes suggested. Thus, even under traditional equal protection tests a classification of
welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the state for one
year would seem irrational and unconstitutional.
Id. at 638.
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Shapiro, of course, was not the first decision to enunciate the constitutional right to travel. Various decisions have used the right for
different purposes and found its origin in different places. United
States v. Guest,"3 relied upon by Shapiro, premised its holding-that
an indictment charging a conspiracy to impede a citizen in the exercise
of a constitutional right 23 4 had been improperly dismissed-on the existence of the right to travel. The Court in Guest recognized that this
right is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but found it unnecessary to discuss the source of the right:
In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States
has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." 5
Edwards v. California236 invalidated a statute creating the criminal
offense of bringing an indigent person into the state. The Court found
this law not to be a valid exercise of the state police power, but rather
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. 237 A very early
case, Crandallv. Nevada, 8 founded the right of interstate travel upon
the "privileges and immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Still other cases have held that the "due process" clause of the fifth
amendment (and presumably the fourteenth amendment) secures the
individual's freedom to travel.0 9
No court has yet had occasion to evaluate the competing governmental and individual interests in the area of interstate travel of parolees,
but this is clearly called for, in light of Shapiro, once the confining
theories of continuing custody and contractual waiver are discarded.
The governmental interest in restricting the travel of parolees lies
in better achieving the basic goals of the parole system. Restrictions
upon residence and upon travel for extended periods enable parole authorities to maintain close contact with the parolee and facilitate the
gathering of information that may point to incipient recidivism or the
need for increased supervision. Travel limitations may aid authorities
in providing social services and counseling. Restrictions may result in
better job attendance and increased stability in home life, and may
facilitate positive social contacts and reintegration into the community.
It seems, however, that these governmental interests are promoted only
by residence restrictions and by restrictions upon travel for extended
periods. A one-day, or even one-week, trip away from the community
U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
U.S.C. §241 (1970).
235 383 U.S. at 758.
236 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
2 37
1d. at 177.
238 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
233 383

23418

239 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505, 514 (1964); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 129 (1958) ; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 670
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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should do little to interfere with the gathering of information as to the
parolee's reintegration into the community. It should not impede the
administration of counseling or social services, and, if limited, should
not affect job attendance. It is true, however, that travel for the purpose of crime or other dysfunctional activity

240

will defeat both the

rehabilitative and the crime preventive goals of the parole system, and
that the surveillance and supervision system might be escaped by travel.
It is probably also true that the government has an interest in knowing
the parolee's general whereabouts, even for trips of short duration. If
dysfunctional activity is suspected, knowledge of travel areas, and
perhaps surveillance, would facilitate the information-gathering and
judgment-making processes. If the parolee does commit a crime or a
parole violation, the state certainly has an interest both in detection of it
and in the parolee's prompt return to the paroling jurisdiction.
Although it does not aid in the problem of supervising out-of-state
travel, the Interstate Compact for Supervision of Parolees and Probationers "' dilutes any state interest in restricting residence. The
Uniform Act provides for supervision of the parolee by a state to which
the parolee might move and preserves the right of the sending state to
retake the parolee."
The parolee's interest is in retaining his liberty to travel at will for
lawful purposes. Travel or residence restrictions limit the employment
opportunities of a parolee. A promising job within the state of his
residence may require travel into a bordering state, or, if he lives within
commuting distance of a metropolitan area of another state, travel restrictions would prevent his employment in that area. The parolee
may wish to visit out-of-state friends or relatives or to pursue out-ofstate recreational interests. These are both natural interests and
pursuits highly beneficial from a rehabilitation viewpoint. Conditions
denying them may be counterproductive to the parole system as well as
to the parolee.
Shapiro's equal protection analysis is applicable to the parole situation. Two distinct classes are created by state action in placing travel
restrictions on parolees. The question is whether the state has a compelling interest in those restrictions, including whether less drastic means
are available. An absolute prohibition, such as Mississippi's, must fall.
Travel restrictions do serve to prevent dysfunctional activity that might
be committed outside the parole district, but the probability of that
activity is so remote that the state interest is "uncompelling." 243 A
prior-permission or a prior-notice system would be a more palatable
240 This term is used to mean any activity that could detract from the rehabilitation of the parolee, for example, associating with other ex-convicts.

241 E.g., N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 224 (McKinney 1968).

For a discussion of the

Compact, see text accompanying notes 291-304 infra.
242 E.g., N.Y. CoRRxc. LAW §224(2) (McKinney 1968).
243 While statistics indicate that recidivist behavior is likely, they do not support
the proposition that such behavior is likely to occur outside the paroling jurisdiction.
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alternative and would serve the purpose of allowing knowledge of and
limited supervision and control of the parolee's travel activities. Nor
would a compelling interest exist to require prior permission before
travel. Prior notice would serve adequately those governmental interests that are compelling. Notice would ensure the parole officer's
knowledge of the parolee's travels and pursuits, and would facilitate
supervision and surveillance when warranted, yet, its requirement would
leave protected the individual's interest in freedom to travel.
Thus, under Shapiro, both absolute travel or residence restrictions
and prior-permission schemes are vulnerable due to the infringement on
the fundamental right to travel. The prior-notice system, however,
probably can be justified by a compelling state interest. At least one
decision, In re Mannino,2 4 has applied Shapiro to travel restrictions
imposed as a condition of probation. Although the discussion of this
point is brief, no reasons for a different result as to parole conditions
are indicated; indeed, none exist.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to question the equal protection
analysis of Shapiro. The first problem is the fundamentality of the
right to travel and the Court's use of the "compelling interest" test.
The literal language of the Court says that a classification penalyzing
the exercise of any constitutioialright evokes this strict scrutiny standard. 245 The cases cited for that proposition 246 do not support it: two
involved first amendment rights; 247 one involved racial exclusion from
a military area, 24 s and the other involved sterilization.24 9 Although
each articulates the "compelling interest" test, its application was based
on either the unique nature of the respective rights involved or a suspect
classification. Even if one does not take the Shapiro decision literally,
it is doubtful that the right to travel can be considered fundamental
on the same level as other rights that have led to the application of this
standard. The Shapiro decision did not premise strict scrutiny on the
right to subsistence,25 ° and the nonfundamentality of this subsistence
right was reaffirmed in Dandridge v. Williams,2'' After Dandridge, it
may be difficult to sustain the application of strict scrutiny to deprivations of the right to travel.252
24414 Cal. App. 3d 953, 965, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (1971).
245 394 U.S. at 634.
246 Id.

247 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
248 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
249 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
250 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
251397

U.S. 471 (1970).

252Justice Harlan disputed its application to the Shapiro case on the broader
ground that a compelling state interest should never be demanded on the basis of
the right affected:
I think this branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine particularly
unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception
which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule. Virtually
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If the compelling state interest test based on the right to travel
were rejected in its application to parole conditions, perhaps the rational
relationship test of Dandridge would be adopted. 3 It is unquestionable that even an absolute prohibition of travel would be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Although less drastic means could
be found, contrary to the Shapiro dictum, such alternatives have never
been a part of the mere rationality test.
A curious result occurs, however, when one applies two separate
tests, so different in the nature of their demands, based solely on the
way that the interest affected or classification effected is characterized.
There is no apparent in-between. Justice Harlan, in Shapiro, circumvented this problem by bottoming the "fundamental" right to interstate
travel on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.254 Using the
due process clause, Justice Harlan then applied a balancing test.255 This

result makes eminent sense, but the distinction between the use of the
due process clause and the equal protection clause does not. Although
the distinction does not matter when the right to travel is involved,
because that right is protected under the due process clause, it is a
distinction with a difference when a court is treating a right unprotected
by a specific guarantee. 56
Instead of sanctioning the Harlan approach, courts should, under
the equal protection clause, engage in a visible and more refined balancing process to ensure the consideration and correct weighting of all relevant factors. 257 The "new equal protection analysis" ought to be subordinated to a more discriminating analysis.255 At least two prior
every state statute affects important rights. This Court has repeatedly held,
for example, that the traditional equal protection standard is applicable to
statutory classifications affecting such fundamental matters as the right to
pursue a particular occupation, the right to receive greater or smaller wages
or to work more or less hours, and the right to inherit property. Rights
such as these are in principle indistinguishable from those involved here, and
to extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in which such rights are
affected would go far toward making this Court a "super-legislature."
394 U.S. at 661.
253 For other uses of the rational relationship test, see Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
254 394 U.S. at 671 (dissenting opinion); see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971).
255 394 U.S. at 671-77 (dissenting opinion).
256 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
257 See Comment, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1032 (1971).
258 If nothing more, respect for the Court as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution would be enhanced:
[Albility to rationalize a constitutional judgment in terms of principles
referable to accepted sources of law is an essential, major element of constitutional adjudication. It is one of the ultimate sources of power of the Court
-including power to gain acceptance for the occasional great leaps forward
which lack such justification . ...
t . . The power of [such landmark cases] rests upon the accuracy of
the Court's perception of what it took to be the dominant theme of American
political development . . . . Out of such a coup de main great legal prin-
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Supreme Court decisions have adverted to a balancing approach under
the equal protection clause, but ultimately applied the more mechanistic
"compelling interest" measure. 9 Similarly, justice Marshall, in
Dandridge,articulated a balancing test for that particular case, but did
not repudiate the "compelling interest" and "mere rationality" tests for
other situations.260
A balancing approach, then, must be applied to parole travel restrictions. Balancing the respective interests of the state, a court might
find the state interest to prevail in prohibiting travel, even absolutely,
for extended lengths of time, absent an adequate existing supervision
mechanism. Without such restrictions, it would be possible, even when
prior permission or notice were given, that close contact could be lost.
If the parolee travelled for long periods, the reliability of the information
assimilation process would suffer, and administering social services or
counseling would be difficult. Even these problems, however, might be
unimposing if a prior-permission system for controlling extended travel
were used. This would allow the denial of travel when the parole officer
perceived his contact to be insufficient or when he reasonably feared
dysfunctional travel. It would not force burdensome surveillance. Particularly when a parole term is close to expiration, there may be no need
for travel restrictions, and prior permission would preserve the flexibility
necessary to deal with this eventuality.
Prior permission for regular short-term travel is a closer question.
It would allow denial of travel rights when the parole officer believes
travel would be counterproductive to parole purposes. But it is difficult
to perceive how it would be counterproductive if not prolonged. Certainly job or recreational pursuits would not be counterproductive. If
the parolee intends to travel for the purpose of crime, he would certainly
not so inform his parole officer. The state has no interest in an arbitrary
exercise of the power to grant or deny permission, which may well result from a prior-permission scheme. Prior notice would seem to adequately serve legitimate state interests to the extent that they are to be
allowed to prevail over individual freedom. Notice would facilitate any
surveillance deemed expedient, and the limited burdens on the parole
board of this checking-up would seem particularly justified by the indiciples may occasionally be created. As a staple diet, however, political perceptions without roots in objective standards are an inadequate basis for
law ....
Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,

The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. Rxv. 91, 98 (1966).
259Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)):
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection
Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification."
26
0 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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vidual and societal interests. 2 G' Short-term travel may be necessary for
a job or for cultural or educational pursuits, essential to the individual
and societal interest in the parolee's rehabilitation.
2. Conditions Limiting Free Speech and Assembly
In contrast to the judicial treatment accorded challenges to other
parole conditions, cases challenging conditions attempting to prohibit or
regulate activities protected by the first amendment have received careful
scrutiny. Two factors account for this difference in treatment. First,
conditions regulating speech or participation in public assembly are not
imposed as a matter of course; 262 they are drafted on an individual
basis, usually for parolees whose convictions were connected with political activity.2
Such persons have been more likely to challenge perceived restrictions on their freedom of speech. Secondly, increased
federal court scrutiny of claims of first amendment infringements made
by those currently incarcerated"26 has prompted examination of similar
claims by parolees.
Recent decisions dealing with restrictions of speech, expression, or
assembly have focused first on the justification for restrictions, 2 5 whatever their nature, and then on the precision required in drafting those
conditions. Courts have applied several standards in testing justifications for such conditions. One is the determination whether the
restriction protects the parolee from his own irresponsibility and thus
reasonably effectuates the rehabilitative function of parole.2 66 The most
recent and most persuasive parole decisions indicate that a mere assertion of a rational connection to the rehabilitative goal will not suffice to
validate a speech restriction. In Sobell v. Reed 267 the district court
enjoined the United States Board of Parole from preventing, or from
withholding future permission for, a parolee's participation in peaceful,
political demonstrations, or his making speeches of a political nature,
unless the Board could demonstrate a clear and compelling necessity to
do so. 26 s The court specifically took the Board to task for its attempt to
261 Although the decision in Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rested on first amendment grounds and applied only to that case, it did proscribe a
prior-permission system for travel for speaking purposes. Id. at 1306.
262 See Arluke, supra note 191, at 272-73. Association with "undesirable" individuals and engaging in certain correspondence, both of which fall within the purview
of first amendment protection, are, however, commonly regulated by standard conditions. Id.
263 E.g., In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
264 E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
265

2 66

Cf. F. COHEN, supra note 29, at 42.

See People v. King, 267 Cal. App. 2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1968) (probation condition prohibiting participation in political demonstration held reasonable
where probationer had been convicted of assaulting a police officer during a demonstration) ; People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103, 323 P.2d 397, 412-13, cert. denied,

357 U.S. 907 (1958).

267327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
268 See Fortune Society v. McGinnes, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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justify denial of permission on the basis of "the shibboleth of 'rehabilitation.' "269 In the court's words, the Board was not permitted to deny
the exercise of first amendment rights, "except upon a showing that such
prevention or withholding of permission is necessary to safeguard
against specific, concretely described and highly likely dangers of misconduct by plaintiff himself."

20

A second standard applied by the courts is that of requiring the
parole authority to demonstrate a "clear and present danger" of substantial evil that would result without the proposed restriction."' This
test originated in cases involving prisoners 272 in which the hypothesized
evil was danger to prison security or discipline. The Sobell court
acknowledged that, "[[w] hile there are differences between prisoners and
parolees (or released persons like Sobell), there are none that diminish
the protections enjoyed by the latter under the First Amendment." 273 In
fact, the differences that exist suggest expanded rights for those outside
the prison walls.
The "clear and present danger" test sharpens the difference between
restrictions placed on parolees and analogous restrictions imposed on
those actually incarcerated. The most frequently voiced justification
for prison rules limiting freedom of expression, the danger of a deterioration of institutional discipline if certain types of speech and association are left unregulated,2 74 is obviously inapplicable to parolees. The
"clear and present danger" to society posed by a parolee's exercise of
first amendment liberties is exactly that posed by the same speech of any
other citizen. 7 5 The only different danger would be that pertaining
to the rehabilitation of the parolee, and, as Sobell suggests, the probability of such danger should be strongly supported before it can
override first amendment interests.
269

Finally, there is the shibboleth of "rehabilitation." The word is, of
course, from the domain of what ought to be the Parole Board's professional
competence. But it has-at best, on the present empty record-no content.
Totalitarian ideologies we profess to hate have styled as "rehabilitation" the
process of molding the unorthodox mind to the shape of prevailing dogma.
Nothing in what the Board submits contains any explicit suggestion of that
sort, and the court infers no such alien premise.
327 F. Supp. at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
270 Id. at 1306.
27
1 Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
272 Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968); Fortune Society v.
McGinnes, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
273 327 F. Supp. at 1304
274 E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Fulwood v. Clemmer,
206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
27" But see Iyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
The
state parole board attempted to justify denial of permission to address public gatherings on the need to maintain order within prison. The parolee planned to address a
college audience on conditions at the Soledad State Correctional Center. Although
the court held that the state failed to substantiate its claim of a serious and imminent
danger of a disintegration of prison discipline, the case suggests that the activities of
the parolee may, under certain circumstances, bear a relation to the maintenance of
prison discipline.
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Even courts that approve a given condition restricting first amendment rights on the ground that it serves either a specific rehabilitative
purpose or that it guards against a "clear and present danger" may
nevertheless feel compelled to modify the condition, if they find it overbroad."' "It has become axiomatic that '[p] recision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' " 277 This is the substance of the overbreadth doctrine. The
principle of the overbreadth doctrine was repeatedly relied upon by the
Warren Court in treating first amendment freedoms:
[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
In order to determine whether a regulation, or parole condition, sweeps
unnecessarily, and therefore unconstitutionally, broadly, assuming the
existence of a substantial government interest in some regulation only
incidentally touching first amendment rights, a court must first inquire
into the means of regulation
chosen; it must explore whether less
279
infringing means exist.

The adjudication of first amendment rights, as most other constitutional adjudications in the area of individual rights,2 ° is essentially a
balancing of interests. Different tests are articulated, but, stripped of
verbal embellishments, they usually reflect only a perceived importance
or non-importance of the right at stake. Often the manner of formulation of the test confuses what is at stake, allows unwarranted judicial
subjectivism, and leads to unsatisfactory and conflicting results. This,
perhaps, succinctly summarizes the history of the "clear and present
276

See In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971) (probation
condition prohibiting membership in political groups modified to prohibit only active
participation in demonstrations sponsored by organizations whose activities were
prone toward violence).
277 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967)
(quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). For a discussion of overbreadth, see Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAv. L. Rv. 844 (1970) ; Note, Less
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YA.LE L.J. 464 (1969); Note, The
Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
278
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
279 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964) ; Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Shelton Court viewed the issue as follows:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.
364 U.S. at 488 (footnotes omitted), quoted in part in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
280 See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
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danger" test in the first amendment area.28 1 One commentator has
suggested that the test has evolved, and will have its greatest use, as an
expression of the overbreadth doctrine, or, in his terms, "the test of
immediate nexus." 282 But, whatever the principle is called, a weighing
of interests attaches to the process: overbreadth signifies that the weight
of the governmental interest in the chosen means is governed by the
availability and effectiveness of less drastic means to achieve the same
goal. This process is as important in reviewing the constitutionality of
restrictions on the first amendment rights of parolees as it is elsewhere.
Further cases involving parole conditions may be expected to follow
Supreme Court pronouncements requiring that state regulations and
restrictions on speech or assembly be so framed as to impose limitations
only to the extent necessary to effectuate the justifiable governmental
interest.
In re AIannino,2 3 although an easy case to decide because of the
extremely harsh conditions imposed, is illustrative of the application of
the overbreadth doctrine to parole conditions. Mannino involved probation conditions, but it is equally applicable to parole conditions.
Mannino had been convicted of assault after an incident that occurred
in a "highly charged emotional atmosphere" during a demonstration at
the College of San Mateo.28 4 Probation was granted, but with very
confining conditions. 21 5 On a habeas petition, the court invalidated a
number of the conditions. One condition prohibited active or passive
membership in any political organization on or off campus that advocates
any form of protest of existing conditions. The court held this condition
invalid for prohibiting passive membership. Without defining just how
far the conditions could extend, the court did indicate that restrictions
would have to be related to the crime committed." 6 Other probation
conditions that had been imposed prohibited the petitioner from writing
for any publication or speaking for any organization. These were held
overbroad, since the court could fathom no way in which speech unrelated to an actual political demonstration would promote recidivism.2

7

Finally, the court did uphold a proscription of active par-

ticipation in political demonstrations:
It suffices to state that the restraint on petitioner's freedom
from prohibiting his active participation in demonstrations
reasonably relates to his reformation and rehabilitation; that
the value accruing to the public from the imposition of such
conditions outweighs the resulting impairment of constitu281 See Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Sehenck to

Brandenberg-And Beyond, 1969 S. Cr. REv. 41.
282 Id. 76-77.

283 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
284 Id. at 962, 92
285 See id. at 957

Cal. Rptr. at 885.
n.2, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n2.
280 Id. at 964, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
2
87id. at 965, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
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tional rights; and that the narrow restriction, to circumstances which are apt to become emotionally charged, is an
alternative which correlates
closely with the purposes to be
288
served by probation.

Sobell, too, was essentially an overbreadth case, although the court
did not explain it in exactly that way. There, as in Mannino, the conditions were not precisely enough drawn.
Judicial evaluation of the competing interests in the area of speech
restriction has highlighted the difficulties in structuring the administration of parole conditions so that abuses of discretion are avoided.
In Hyland v. Procunier,28 ° the court invalidated a condition requiring
the parolee to obtain permission before attending public gatherings, although Sobell upheld a similar condition, albeit premised on the parole
authority's ability to demonstrate "specific, concretely described and
highly likely dangers of misconduct by [the parolee] himself." 220
Assuming the power of the state to regulate such activity, it appears that
the Hyland solution errs in depriving the parole authority of means to
effectuate legitimate state interests. The Sobell solution, while admittedly not foreclosing the possibility of future abuse, strikes a more
satisfactory equilibrium by informing parole authorities exactly what is
expected and required of them and in setting standards against which
the exercise of discretion will be judicially tested.
3. Extradition
Extradition is the normal mechanism through which persons convicted of or indicted for criminal activity are removed from one state,
the asylum state, to a second state, the demanding state. Underlying
extradition is the constitutional requirement:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in
another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed
to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.2 9'
The constitutional prescription has been further amplified by a federal
statute requiring that the executive authority of the demanding state
produce a copy of the indictment or charging affidavit upon which
extradition is founded,2 92 and an additional provision apportioning the
costs of apprehension and extradition. 293 These procedures are seem288 Id. at

968, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 889.

289 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
290 327 F. Supp. at 1306.
291 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
29218 U.S.C.
2 98

Id. § 3195.

§3182 (1970).
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ingly abrogated, however, when a parolee is extradited through the
Interstate Compact for Supervision of Parolees and Probationers,2 94 or
through the individual parolee's agreement to waive extradition, a
standard condition in the majority of jurisdictions.2 95
The Interstate Compact is unique in two aspects. First, under
certain circumstances,20 a state (termed the "sending" state by the
Compact) may allow a parolee to reside in and be supervised by another
state (the "receiving" state) for the term of his parole.29 7 Secondly, in
apparent contradiction of the constitutional and statutory requirements,
the Interstate Compact allows the sending state to retake the parolee
merely by establishing the authority of the judicial or administrative
officer performing the retaking and the identity of the parolee. The
Compact provides an express waiver of all other legal requirements of
extradition:
All legal requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from
justice are hereby expressly waived on the part of states party
hereto, as to [any person on parole or probation].298
The Compact has successfully withstood challenge to its apparent
dilution of federally specified procedure. Approval of the Compact is
premised on assumptions about the purpose of the Extradition Clause
and federal legislation pursuant thereto. The clause and legislation are
held to be directed primarily at the adjustment of interstate relationships, 2 9 specifically for securing to the demanding state the cooperation
of other states in the apprehension and return of fugitives. 3 ° Since the
purpose of extradition is securing rights or protecting interests of
political entities, without conferring ancillary rights on the individual,
the asylum state may, through adoption of the Compact, require its
executive to extradite on terms less demanding than those that would
obtain in the absence of the Compact. In short, constitutional and
federal statutory requirements compel extradition only as a matter of
interstate relations, but, despite seemingly procedural language, do not
294 The Interstate Compact has been adopted by all states. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNmENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS 1783-1966, at 83 (1966). For specific provisions

of the compact, see, e.g., N.Y. CoREc. LAW §224 (McKinney 1968).
295 See Arluke, supra note 191, at 272-73.
296 Two situations are within the coverage of the Interstate Compact: first,
reception by the receiving state is mandatory if the parolee was a resident of the
receiving state prior to the commission of the offense for which he is now on parole;
secondly, reception is predicated upon the consent of the receiving state in all other
cases.
297 The supervision and standards governing the parolee are those of the receiving
state. Thus, it would seem that the parolee might exercise a considerable power
over his parole conditions through choice of his receiving state. Given the wide
disparity among state conditions, such choice could materially affect the nature of
his parole.

298 N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 224(3) (McKinney 1968).
299 See, e.g., Woods v. State, 264 Ala. 315, 87 So. 2d 633 (1956).
300 See, e.g., Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
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mandate any specific procedure. The asylum state is free to agree to a
less rigorous procedure so long as extradition is effected."'
The Interstate Compact also operates to narrow appreciably the
scope of review of decisions of asylum state courts in habeas petitions
brought by parolees. If extradition is effected under the constitutional
clause and applicable federal statutes, there is no disagreement that the
parolee would be entitled to raise the issues of the formal requirements
of the extradition papers, of whether he is charged with a crime or a
violation of parole conditions in the demanding state, of whether he is
a fugitive from the demanding state, and of whether he was actually in
the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime or violation." 2
Under the Interstate Compact, however, the parolee is limited to challenging only the elements required by the Compact-the authority of
the official performing the retaking and the identity of the parolee. 3
The limitation is buttressed by an explicit statutory provision:
The decision of the sending state to retake a person on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable
within the receiving state .

.

.

.

Thus, whatever the scope of challenge available to the non-parolee under
federal extradition procedure, it is appreciably greater than the narrow
and limited relief available to the parolee according to the terms of the
Interstate Compact.
4. Searches, Seizures, and Parole "Visitations"
Parolees have been accorded varying degrees of protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures. A few courts have attributed to
parolees the same fourth amendment protection enjoyed by other citi301 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Simmons v. Lohman, 228 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.
1955) ; Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942) ; State ex rel. Morris
v. Tahash, 262 Minn. 562, 115 N.W.2d 676 (1962); Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d
52, 195 P.2d 112, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948).
302 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Hendrick, 430 Pa. 575, 243 A.2d
438 (1964). For further discussion of the traditional, narrow view of proper subjects
of inquiry on federal extradition habeas petitions and the somewhat unclear effect of
later federal cases on that standard, see Comment, Extradition Habeas Corps, 74
YALE L.J. 78 (1968). What the proper scope of inquiry upon extradition encompasses is not crucial to the analysis presented here, for it is apparent that the scope
under the Interstate Compact is less than even the minimal standards applicable when
constitutional and statutory procedure is utilized.
303 See, e.g., Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d 52, 195 P.2d 112, cert. denied, 335
U.S. 834 (1948).
And if a state has elected to follow the federal procedure and claim the
constitutional guarantee, the fugitive of course has the right to insist, on
habeas corpus, that the procedure conform to the federal law. Similarly the
parolee detained under the interstate compact has the right to complain, by
means of habeas corpus, if that law is not complied with by the authorities.
Id. at 58, 195 P.2d at 116 (quoting Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 678, 128 P.2d
338, 343 (1942)).
304 N.Y. CoRaEc. LAW § 224(3) (McKinney 1968).
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zens. 305 Other courts have denied the full panoply of fourth amendment protections, usually on one of two grounds: first, waivers executed
by parolees as a component of parole conditions, and, second, judicial
adoption of a parole theory defining the legal status of the parolee as
somehow less deserving of constitutional protection than other citizens.
This section will look first at restrictive judicial approaches to parolees'
fourth amendment rights under theories unrelated to any waiver, and
then under theories relying on a waiver. It will next separately treat
visitations and searches executed pursuant to a release condition waiver.
Visitations are defined as interviews within the parolee's home. At a
visitation the parole officer is permitted to observe the immediate surroundings in the meeting room, but is not permitted to generally inspect
the residence or the parolee's belongings. A search, on the other hand,
encompasses a probing inspection of the parolee's residence and effects.
a. The Custody Theory and Control of Police Abuse
Judicial limitation of the fourth amendment rights of parolees
through acceptance of a theory of parole according the parolee only
diluted fourth amendment protection is illustrated by a line of California
decisions. In People v. Denne 306 the court implied that parolees were
under a lesser degree of fourth amendment protection than ordinary
citizens, and in People v. Hernandez3 0 the court made explicit the
rationale for the Denne dictum. Because prison authorities may subject those in custody to surveillance as intense as security requires and
because a parolee remains in the state's custody, "the [parole] authorities may subject [the parolee], his home and his effects to such constant
or occasional inspection and search as may seem advisable to them." 308
Adoption of the custody theory leaves the parolee no right to demand
that searches by the parole officer be conditioned on the traditional prerequisites of probable cause or consent, and prevents any balancing of
interests. The Hernandez rationale limits the authority of the parole
officer only by the requirement that searches not be employed solely for
the purpose of harassing the parolee.309 This Comment has already
In addition,
criticized the theoretical basis of the custody rationale.
practical problems in the specific context of the assertion of fourth
amendment rights have arisen.
305 Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (dictum);
United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
306 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956).
307229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953
(1965).
308 Id. at 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
3 09
See United States ex rel Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd on other grounds, 418 F2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
984 (1971) ("Such a search could become 'unreasonable' only if made too often . . .
or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the parole
officer.").

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

328

[Vol.120:282

Cases of cooperation between parole agents and other law enforcement authorities illustrate the problematical nature of the application of
both custody and waiver rationales. The paradigmatic situation has
involved police receipt of information that a suspect is a parolee and
enlistment of a parole officer to conduct or assist in a search. The
problem of deciding whether to admit evidence produced by these
searches has prodded the courts to formulate a corollary to the
Hernandez rationale: because the parole officer's broad power to search
derives from the statutory authority to supervise parolees, any search
directly related to the exercise of that supervisory authority is reasonable in terms of the fourth amendment; 310 if the exercise of authority is
solely a means by which the police may avoid the normal fourth amendment requirements, however, the search will be deemed unreasonable.
The test has the seeming virtue of placing a check on police misconduct
by applying the exclusionary rule at any later criminal prosecution if the
search is conducted by the parole officer for the police, while leaving
the parole officer free to carry out his legitimate responsibilities. Yet, in
attempting to pursue both goals, the test contains a latent malleability,
which is readily employed according to the predelictions of any given
court, as two cases with very similar factual settings illustrate.
In People v. Thompson, 1 the defendant, a parolee, was arrested
on charges of kidnapping, assault, and robbery. A special parole agent,
working with the local police on an unrelated matter, was informed that
the defendant was a parolee. On the day following the arrest, the agent
made a search of the defendant's hotel room and found a bullet casing
later introduced at trial. Holding the evidence properly admitted, the
court concluded that the parole officer, in his search for weapons or
other evidence of a parole violation, was acting on behalf of the parole
authority and pursuant to its rules.
In People v. Coffinin,"1 the police requested that defendant's parole
officer accompany them in a search of the parolee's apartment. The
parole officer led the search and the stolen goods discovered were held inadmissible at the subsequent trial. Thompson was distinguished, in
part, because the Coffman search was conducted at the desire and request of the police. Moreover, the purpose of the parole agent's presence
and the relation of that purpose to the goals of parole were quite differently perceived in Coffman:
310 Compare the cases discussed at text accompanying notes 311-16 infra. Here,
the theory is that because parole conditions uniformly require that the parolee obey
the law and because the parole officer is charged with enforcement of that condition,
the danger of the police using the parole officer to avoid the warrant requirement is
minimized when the parole officer's participation is substantial and his goal is the
enforcement of a specific parole condition. E.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971).
311 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930

(1968).
312 2

Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
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The parole agent's physical presence, even his nominal
conduct of the physical acts of search, does not signalize validity. The purpose of the search, not the physical presence of a
parole agent, is the vital element ....
. . . The parole agent was not engaged in administering
his supervisorial function. He had not instigated the search
nor evinced any official interest in it except in his role as a
"front" for the police. 313
Yet there are other, equally relevant considerations in both cases
that, if emphasized, could have changed the results. The Coffman court
could have concluded that because commission of a new crime is automatically a violation of parole, the search by the parole officer was a
proper exercise of his authority 14 Similarly, in Thompson the court
easily might have concluded that but for the information received from
the police, the search would not have been made. In fact, one could
maintain that the contention that the fruits of the search were intended
for parole purposes was contradicted when the evidence was turned over
to the police. In short, because the operative facts in situations involving cooperation between police and parole authorities are numerous
and capable of being accorded whatever weight a given court desires,
courts are able to place the facts within or without the boundaries of
constitutional conduct as determined by the authority of the parole
officer. This latent defect, when combined with the ready opportunity
for the police to shape the facts,3 15 renders the Hernandez corollary
seriously deficient in controlling police misconduct and protecting the
parolee.3 16
Thus, even if the custody theory is retained, the Hernandez
rationale and its corollary are inadequate. One resolution might be to
make the evidence seized in performance of the parole officer's duties
available only for parole revocation and not for a new prosecution.
Such a policy starts with the virtue of theoretical consistency. If the
purpose of the search is to enforce parole conditions, and not to serve as
a substitute for a search by police investigating crime, then the consequence of the search should reflect this purpose; the effect of parole
revocation is a proper consequence of such a purpose, while a new conviction is not. In addition, this policy has the practical virtue of deterring police misconduct to some extent, since new convictions will not
be effectuated by using the parole officer as a stalking horse.
Id. at 688-89, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 786 (footnote omitted).
This argument has been adopted by at least one federal court. United States
ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) aff'd on other grounds,
418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (191).
315 For example, by having the parole officer search alone.
816 It does not, of course, even meet the theoretical objections to the custody
theory. For a discussion of these problems, see text accompanying notes 29-84 supra.
313
314
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To accept this distinction would require a legal rationale for excluding evidence, lawfully procured by a parole officer, from a new
prosecution." 7 Such an application of the exclusionary rule, also, might
not adequately deter improper cooperation between police and parole
officer; it might, in fact, encourage the use of parole revocation as a
substitute for a new prosecution. The obvious solution to this remaining dilemma is to give protection to the parolee against all government
officials including the parole officer. The exact nature of the protection
that should be afforded the parolee is discussed below."' It is sufficient
at this juncture to conclude that, even if the custody theory is accepted,
the problem of police abuse provides a strong reason for according
parolees fourth amendment protections against both police and parole
officers.
b. Waiver
Conditions in release agreements have been held to constitute consent to a search of the parolee's residence. In some cases, a clear and
specific consent has been required."1 9 In others, a consent to search has
been implied from an agreement.32 In United States ex rel. Randazzo
317 The fact of initial lawful procurement would probably serve to justify use
of the fruits of a search in any prosecution. Two theories for exclusion, however,
have been advanced and deserve mention. One of the alternative grounds for the
holding in State v. Cullison, 173 N.W2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938
(1970), provides a basis for drawing a distinction between the use of evidence at a
parole revocation hearing and at a trial for a new offense. The court held that introduction of the evidence against a parolee "might well" violate the requirements of the
equal protection clause, id. at 538, presumably since non-parolees could not be convicted on the basis of such evidence. Although the court did not discuss the issue,
the use of such evidence at a revocation hearing probably would not violate this
constitutional provision because a non-parolee would never face such a proceeding.
One problem with the theory is that the custody theory distinguishes the parolee from
the non-parolee, even for purposes of a prosecution.
Another legal theory that supports the application of the exclusionary rule to
one type of proceeding and not the other was expounded in a recent case, United States
v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971), dealing with the use of the exclusionary rule
in probation revocation hearings. The dissent argued for the employment of the
rule on the ground that, quite apart from the purpose of deterring illegal police conduct,
one of the primary reasons for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was to maintain the integrity of the judicial
process by refusing to sanction searches that fell below fourth amendment requirements. Id. at 820 (Fairchild, J., dissenting) ("The philosophy that courts must not
sanction violations of constitutional rights is as evident in the opinion which promulgated the exclusionary rule as is the more pragmatic proposition that the rule will
deter the police from such activities." (footnote omitted)). This reasoning would
lead to the application of the exclusionary rule at trials for new crimes, but not
necessarily at parole revocation hearings, which are not judicial functions.
318 For a discussion of the standards that apply, see text accompanying notes
350-54 infra.
319 People v. Sickler, 61 Misc. 2d 571, 573, 306 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170-71 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1969).
320 E.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), affd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
984 (1971).
While the agreement does not specifically state that consent to a search
is given, such seems to me the clear meaning of the permission in the agreement "to visit me at my residence."
Id. at 15.
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v. Follette,32 ' the sustaining of a search on the basis of a waiver agreement was premised on the parole officer's need to find out whether
Randazzo had violated parole conditions and on the perceived impossibility of effectively supervising parolees if searches could be made
only with probable cause and a search warrant.322
These cases depart from prior Supreme Court decisions setting
the requisites of a valid waiver of fourth amendment protection. As
Bumper v. North Carolina.2 indicates, if circumstances surrounding
a purported consent indicate duress, verbal assent by the consenting
party may be irrelevant. 2 ' In Bumper, the mere assertion of possession
of a warrant was held illegally coercive despite the consenting party's
in-court statement that "I let them search and it was of my own free
will." 25 In the parole context, the consent executed as a condition of
parole must be examined; next the consent at the parolee's residence
must be considered. Because the alternative to agreeing to the prescribed conditions is continued imprisonment, consent to a parole condition permitting visitations or broader searches cannot be considered
freely given. Nor can any consent given at the parolee's residence be
characterized as untainted by duress or coercion, since the alternative
to consent may be parole revocation and incarceration. At least one
case has applied these standards to a parolee, although not to a release
agreement waiver 26 While the Bumper case would seem to require
an application of a "free and intelligent" standard, as will be explained
in the following section, a "clear and explicit" waiver in the release
agreement should suffice in limited circumstances.
c. Visitations, Conditions, and Wyman v. James
Many jurisdictions require the parolee to sign a release agreement
consenting to home visitations by parole authorities. 2 7 The constitu321 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
32 2

Id.at 15-16.

323 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
324 See note 92 supra; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir.

1960) (search without warrant lawful only "if the individual freely and intelligently
gives his unequivocal and specific consent to the search, uncontaminated by any duress
or coercion, actual or implied") ; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
325 391 U.S. at 556 (quoted in dissenting opinion).
326 United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184, 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
327.g, N.Y. Official Compilation of Codes, Rules, & Regulations, tit. 7, ch. 1,
§ 1.15 (requiring that the parolee "permit the parole officer to visit him at his residence," and providing that the parolee "consents to any search of his person, his
residence, or of any property or premises under his control which the Board of
Parole or any of its representatives may see fit to make at any time in their discretion") ; see Arluke, supra note 191, at 272-73; Parole: A Critique, supra note 29, at
737-38. For a discussion of the desirability of having specific consent provisions
written into release agreements, see Holtzoff, The Power of Probation and Parole
Officers to Search and Seise, 31 FFD. PROBATION, Dec. 1967, at 7. Judge Holtzoff
feels that such explicit conditions would amount to an effective waiver of fourth
amendment rights.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

332

[Vo1.120:282

tionality of such waivers has been subjected to judicial scrutiny, usually
in the context of parole revocation or prosecutions based on evidence
seized pursuant to a waiver-based search. Whether explicitly considering the validity of the waiver or simply determining the admissibility of
seized evidence, courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
waivers.mS
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of home
visitations as a condition for receiving welfare benefits, and this decision certainly warrants close examination in deciding the constitutionality of both parole visitations and broader searches of parolees' homes.
In Wyman v. James32 9 the Court reasoned, first, that visitations are not
searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3 30 and, second,
that even if the visitation is a search, it is not forbidden by the fourth
amendment because it is not "unreasonable." 331
If its reasoning is accepted, Wyman would be applicable to the
parole visitation. The entirety of the first point is contained in the
following quotation:
It is also true that the caseworker's posture in the home visit is
perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But
this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and
far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a
search in the traditional criminal law context. We note, too,
that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and that
the beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act.
If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes
place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case
may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no
search.

332

Parole visitations have the same dual character, being both rehabilitative and investigative. Similarly, parole visitations are not compelled,
and denial of permission is not a criminal act. The final two sentences
of the quotation might also apply to parole visitations. If parole is considered a privilege, it can be said that denial of permission to visit merely
leads to withdrawal of a government benefit-in this case, the freedom
828 See, e.g., People v. Randazzo, 15 N.Y.2d 526, 202 N.E.2d 549, 254 N.Y.S.2d
99 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965) ; People v. Sickler, 61 Misc. 2d 571, 306
N.Y.S.2d 168 (Dutchess County Ct. 1969). See also United States ex rel. Sperling
v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable in parole revocation proceedings). Although the search in Sperling was not
executed pursuant to a waiver, the concurring opinion of Judge Kaufman expresses
a clear preference for explicit waiver language in the release agreement. Such language would then constitute an effective waiver of whatever fourth amendment protection would otherwise be accorded to the parolee. Id. at 1168.
329 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
380 Id. at 317-18.

-33 Id. at 318.
82

Id. at 317-18.
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parole affords. And the home need never be entered: although refusal
is a violation of a parole condition and such a violation might justify
immediate arrest, the parolee can protect the privacy of his home by
surrendering voluntarily.
On the second point, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, cited
Terry v. Ohio " for the proposition that "the specific content and incidents of [fourth amendment protection] must be shaped by the context
in which it is asserted." "' The context emphasized by the Court in
Wyman included the welfare program's concern for children, the duty
of the agency to prevent fraud, the need for "close contact" in a rehabilitation program, the absence of false pretenses or force in gaining entry,
the use of trained caseworkers rather than uniformed authorities for
the visit, the noncriminal nature of the investigation, and the absence
of criminal penalties resulting from a refusalY35 Justice Blackmun distinguished Camarav. Municipal Court.. because in that case the conIf the analogy is
sequence of refusal was a criminal prosecution."
valid, most of the characteristics of welfare visitations emphasized
in Wyman would indicate that, to the extent a parole visitation is a
search, it is a reasonable search. Parole release is premised on the
ability of the agency to ensure the parolee's reintegration into society
and to protect society against antisocial behavior. These purposes often
require close contact. The means of gaining entry are similarly confined in that parole officers make the visitations, which take place at
reasonable hours and with consent. Refusing permission to enter is not
a criminal offense.338
It appears that Justice Blackmun was correct in treating the limited
home visitations in connection with welfare eligibility as different from
a full search for the purpose of finding evidence of a crime. A better
mode of analysis, however, might be attempted, particularly in applying
Wyman's result in the parole context. Traditionally, the fact of an
invasion of privacy, and not the purpose of an entry, has determined
whether there is a "search." The fourth amendment applies whenever
an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy. 3 9 "In
an era of rapidly burgeoning governmental activities and their concomitant inspectors, caseworkers, and researchers, a restriction of the
Fourth Amendment to 'the traditional criminal law context' tramples the
U.S. 1 (1968).
400 U.S. at 318 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).

333392
334

335 Id. at 317-23.

336387 U.S. 523 (1967).
337 400 U.S. at 324-25.
338 It may be that justice Blackmun would find the consequence of a parole visitation refusal-revocation-sufficiently similar to a criminal prosecution that he would
adjudge the visitation "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

This, however, is unlikely in light of his failure to attach any significance to 'the
felony of welfare fraud despite the visitation purpose of preventing fraud. Id. at 323.
339 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351, 361 (1967)).
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ancient concept that a man's home is his castle." " If one must deal
with visitations in terms of whether there is a search, the home visitation
could be viewed as similar to the administrative inspection in Camarav.
Municipal Court. At the very least, Camara stands for the proposition
that the fourth amendment has applications beyond the "traditional
criminal law context." If a search within the purview of the fourth
amendment is found to exist, its permissibility would then involve one
or both of two questions. The first is whether the search was pursuant
to a valid consent. The second, which arises if there was no consent,
is the second question asked by Justice Blackmun-whether the search
was nevertheless reasonable.
In both the parole context and the welfare context, it would be
difficult to find a valid waiver under the established standards as already discussed.
In finding the search-if one occurred-to be reasonable, the
Wyman Court stretched the reasoning of Terry to the breaking point.
According to Terry, in assessing the reasonableness of a government
agent's conduct, it is necessary for a court:
"first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[or seizure] entails." 341
And, in finding it reasonable for an officer to frisk for weapons while
investigating the possibility of a crime, the Terry Court explained:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger.34 2
The sole justification of the search in the present situation is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it
340

Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 339 (1971)

(Marshall, J., dissenting).

341 392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35,

536-37 (1967)).
342

Id. at 27.
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must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.3"
The Court was careful to state that it was not retreating from prior
holdings that whenever practicable the police must obtain advance
judicial approval of searches through the warrant procedure, and that
failure to comply could be excused only by exigent circumstances. 344
Thus, Terry narrowly confined its exception to the warrant requirement to cases involving danger to a police officer, and other exceptions have been similarly circumscribed. Although the case indicated a balancing approach, a very significant state interest in dispensing
with the usual warrant procedure was present. The state interests
specified in Wyman are not as compelling as those in Terry or other
cases in which an invasion of privacy has been sustained. By considering consent in the balancing calculus, the Court effectively diluted the
extent of the invasion of individual privacy, facilitating a characterization of the search as reasonable, a characterization precluded unless the
individual's consent is considered. But, once again, it appears that the
Court treated the consent in a manner departing from previous fourth
amendment decisions. If consent were free and intelligent, then the
fourth amendment is no longer a barrier, and there is no need to balance
interests in order to determine reasonableness.
The very problem in applying the traditional consent standards to
the parole and welfare situations-the inevitable duress-suggests the
inaptness of the traditional criminal law search and seizure doctrines to
a conditioning of benefits upon the surrender of a right. The doctrines
do not produce a satisfactory result unless distorted beyond their original
meaning. A better line of analysis would not ask whether there is in
fact a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but would
concede that values protected by the fourth amendment are compromised
by the statutory or administrative scheme conferring the benefit. It
would then seek to balance the state interest promoted by the search
against the degree of infringement of individual interests. Although
the result in Wyman would probably remain the same, the actual determination would be clearer when not clouded by traditional fourth amendment doctrines. An unconstitutional conditions analysis avoids these
difficult problems as well as the right-privilege distinction, the distinction between a purpose to find evidence of a crime and a purpose to
protect a governmental program, and the distinction between refusal as
leading to a loss of a benefit and as leading to a criminal prosecution.
343 Id. at 29.
344 Id. at 20. For examples of circumstances in which a search without a warrant has been excused, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit) ;
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (disappearance of evidence); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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The constitutionality of conditioning parole on the surrender of
fourth amendment protection against warrantless visitations entails a
balancing of interests.34 The extent of the invasion of the individual's
privacy is limited. The visitation is similar to an interview. The purpose is rehabilitative as well as investigative. It does not represent an
unconfined foray through the parolee's residence, for the visitation can
only take place when the parolee is at home. The interests of society
and the parole board are facilitating the parolee's reintegration into
society by checking on progress, detecting any detrimental developments,
and offering counseling and assistance. This process also aids in
preventing recidivism, and demands the sort of close contact that
visitations permit. Holding the visitations inside the home is important because the parolee's home life is a significant factor in his
rehabilitation. On balance, the state interests seem sufficiently important to justify the limited invasions occasioned by visitation conditions
and thus the conditions must be regarded a constitutional exercise of
the state's power.
d. Consent to Searches as Conditions
Conditions granting parole officials explicit power to search, while
considerably less common than those conferring visitation powers, 346
have also withstood constitutional attack when the language of waiver
was clear and specific. 347 The consent to search seems more
susceptible to constitutional challenge than do the visitation consents.
The invasion of individual rights is potentially more substantial, and
the state's burden of justification should be greater. Moreover, to the
extent that visitation conditions amply effectuate the legitimate aims of
the parole system, consents to search may represent needless waivers of
constitutional rights.348
There are no limits upon the extent to which a full search can
invade the individual parolee's privacy. The search is not limited
to any part of his abode. It can be executed at any time of the day,
and, presumably, even when the parolee is not at home. In
surrendering completely his fourth amendment rights, the parolee loses
both the limitations inherent in the nature of a visitation and the requirement that a warrant particularly describe the things to be seized.
345Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 345
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
346 The 1969 survey, conducted by Arluke, reported such conditions as standard
elements of release agreements in only 3 jurisdictions. Arluke, supra note 191, at

272-73.
347 People v. Sickler, 61 Misc. 2d 571, 306 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Dutchess County Ct.
1969).
48United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
(holding unconstitutional a
provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act that, while it did not coerce waivers of
fifth and sixth amendment rights, encouraged such waivers). People v. Sickler, 61
Misc. 2d 571, 306 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Dutchess County Ct. 1969), recognized the potential
application of Jackson to parole waivers, but, applying a balancing analysis, found
society's interest in the parole process weightier than that of the parolee.
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This invasion of fourth amendment interests is much closer to that of
searches in the traditional criminal law context, and this fact should be
considered in the balancing of interests necessary to determine the
constitutionality of a release condition.
The state's interests in the full search are similar to its interests in
a visitation. The rehabilitative aspect, however, is almost eliminated.
The search does not involve any counseling or supervision; it involves
only inspecting the parolee's residence for evidence of a crime or parole
violation. The state might argue that the decision to release is grounded
on the assumed ability to guarantee that the parolee will become a useful
member of society and will not revert to criminal activity. But, although the broad power to search might aid in guaranteeing the effectiveness of the parole program, this objective could adequately be
attained through the use of visitations and, when necessary, of searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant. The search of the parolee's residence
would be conducted in a manner similar to the search of a normal citizen's residence and would be directed toward similar goals. The primary reason for conditioning release upon waiver of this right is the
avoidance of the requirements of the fourth amendment in circumstances
like those in which the amendment has always been applied. Particularly when parole is granted to avoid an approaching, unsupervised,
mandatory release, this seems to be a way to circumvent the law that
should not be judicially approved. 49 But, even in circumstances not thus
tainted, no pressing reasons appear for distinguishing the parolee from
the normal citizen in regard to protection against unreasonable searches
without a warrant. The unlimited warrantless search may actually be
detrimental to the state interest in the parolee's reintegration into society
to the extent that his feeling of self-worth is reduced by these forays.
It would seem that promoting respect for the law by the parolee will
better be accomplished by demonstrating the controls built into the law
for the protection of the individual, and their applicability to the parolee.
In holding unconstitutional a parole condition waiving the right to
object to a search, and thereby requiring a warrant in the absence of
exigent circumstances, a court should remember that the circumstance
of being on parole may be properly considered in assessing probable
cause in a particular case. In Martin v. United States,"' a case involving a probationer, the court recognized this point:
The Amendment applies in this case to Martin, a probationer,
and to his garage located near his home, although his status
351
is a circumstance to be taken into consideration ....
341 This possibility is explained in note 174 supra & accompanying text.

35o 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950).
351 Id. at 439. The Martin court considered the petitioner's status as a probationer
in determining whether a search was reasonable in the absence of a warrant. It
appears to have erred on this point, since there is nothing to indicate that a proba-
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This position would also square with recent developments in the area
of searches for administrative purposes. After determining that an area
search pursuant to the housing code necessitated a warrant, the Court in
Camarav. Municipal Court 352 explained how probable cause would be
satisfied:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to
inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will
vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be
based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building
. . . , or the condition of the entire area ....
85
Camarais not directly applicable to the extent that it says probable
cause may be satisfied by focusing solely on a whole class of individuals
and on their common characteristics. An administrative determination
that all parolees are prone to recidivism should not in itself serve to
constitute probable cause. On the other hand, Camara does stand for
the proposition that probable cause standards may vary according to
the purpose of the search and class of individuals that the subject of
the search belongs to. "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant." "I For a parolee, for example, being seen one block
away from the place of a crime ten minutes after its occurrence might be
viewed to constitute probable cause for a search of his residence, although these facts clearly would not constitute probable cause for a nonparolee. This hypothetical probably goes too far in relaxing probable
cause standards, but would not if additional inculpatory circumstances
were present. The court might look further to whether the crime
committed was the type the parolee previously had been convicted of.
That the parolee was running at the time he was observed in the vicinity
of the crime, and any other suspicious circumstances, would add to the
validity of the belief that he was implicated in the crime. Having
tioner's status as such renders procuring a search warrant in any way impracticable.
The Martin court rejected impracticability of procuring a warrant as the standard,
relying on United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Rabinowitz was explicitly overruled by Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969). Impracticability of
obtaining a warrant has been the sole basis for an exception to the warrant requirement. See note 344 supra & accompanying text. United States ex rel. Randazzo v.
Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969),

cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971), followed the Martin case in holding that status as
a parolee contributes to reasonableness.
352387 U.S. 523 (1967).
353 Id. at 538; cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
354 387 U.S. at 523. The Camara Court did distinguish the criminal investigation,
id. at 539, and did say that it was not disturbing "time-honored doctrines applicable

to criminal investigations," id. This dictum, however, is consistent with the modification of those standards in the parole context due to the valid public interest in a
different standard.
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knowledge of all of these considerations, a court might find probable
cause to search the parolee's residence, despite the failure to satisfy the
usual requirement of a reasonable belief that evidence or contraband is
actually in the parolee's residence and despite the question that would
remain as to a non-parolee with regard to his connection to the particular
crime. A court should have no more difficulty administering this
standard than it does the usual, non-parole probable cause standard or
its modification in Camara.
If Camara were not applicable to the issue of probable cause in the
parole context, very significant governmental interests might be harmed.
Parole authorities would probably argue that proper performance of
supervision duties would be impossible. They could neither protect the
public from recidivism of parolees nor ensure the rehabilitation of the
parolee for his own sake. If this were the case, the parole system would
be ineffective if continued. Without the ability to adequately supervise
the parole program, parole authorities would probably be inclined to cut
back drastically on the number of prisoners released on parole.35
Whichever of these results eventuates, important functions of the
present parole system would no longer be performed.
IV. PAROLE REVOCATION AND PAROLE RELEASE:
DUE PROcEss REQUIREMENTS

The Supreme Court, in a series of landmark cases, has shown
increasing concern for the constitutional rights of the criminal accused. 35 6
The Court has not limited its scrutiny to the in-court adjudicatory
proceedings, but has addressed itself to the pre-trial 3" and sentencing
stages 3, as well. But the judiciary is reluctant to scrutinize the convict's treatment. 5 0 In contrast to the expansion of rights in other areas
of the criminal justice system, post-conviction, parole process has remained conspicuously isolated from these developments. Consequently,
the questions of the rights of the parolee at the parole release and
355 That such a reversal of recent trends of increasingly liberal release policies is
possible is indicated by current release statistics for the United States Parole Board.
In 1967, 6253 individuals were released on federal parole; by 1970 that figure had been
reduced to 4042. Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Apparently the scarcity of
prison resources has not prevented a partial retrenchment in federal parole policies.
356 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
357 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
358 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948). See also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949).
359 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) (& cases
cited therein) ; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963). But see Rubin Developments in CorrectionalLaw, 16 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
185 (1970) (noting a recent trend rejecting the "hands off" policy). See also Note,
The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners"Rights, 53 IoWA L.
REv. 671 (1967).
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revocation proceedings remain a much debated and largely unsettled
area, subject to variations imposed by fifty-two jurisdictions. 6
A. Due Process
A preliminary examination of the concept of due process suggests
that it is, as Chief Justice Warren observed, "an elusive concept": "'
Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is
imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process..
Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right
obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of
factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature
of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding,
are all considerations which must be taken into account.36
Two recent cases, which reiterated this basic principle, are particularly important in determining what due process requires in the
context of parole release or revocation determinations. In Jenkins v.
McKeithen " the Court reversed the dismissal of a complaint challenging the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute creating a LaborManagement Commission of Inquiry. The Court held that the statutory
scheme's denial of the right of the person investigated to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him and to present evidence on his
own behalf contravened due process of the law.3 ' This decision was
based on the alleged adjudicatory and accusatory nature of the Commission.3 65 In the Court's words, "[T]he Commission exercises a
function very much akin to making an official adjudication of criminal
culpability." 66 Because of this character, the Court distinguished the
Commission in Jenkins from the Civil Rights Commission in Hannahv.
Larche,367 whose function was considered purely investigatory and factfinding for legislative purposes. 6 ' More particularly, the same due
process requirements did not attach in Hannah because the Civil Rights
Commission did not indict, punish, impose legal sanctions, or "make
360 For a discussion of these variations, see Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation
and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Cim. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
361 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
36 2 1d.
363 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
364 Id.
365 Id.

at 428-29.
at 427-28.
366Id.at 427.
367363 U.S. 420 (1960).

368 Id. at 441.
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1971]

determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty or property." "'9 It
was not empowered to "take any affirmative action which will affect an
individual's legal rights." 370
In a second decision, Goldberg v. Kelly,37 ' the Court held that
termination of public assistance payments without affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing prior to termination falls below constitutionally required procedural due process standards. The Court found
"one overpowering fact" to be controlling, that the welfare recipient is,
by hypothesis, destitute. 7 2 Further, the Court explicated the balancing
process entailed in deciding the incidents of due process in any specific
context:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss," . . . and depends upon
whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs
37 a
the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
The Court determined that the eligible recipient's interest in uninterrupted assistance and the state interest in preventing erroneous terminations "clearly" outweighed the state's competing concern for preventing
the increased fiscal and administrative costs that a hearing would
entail.37 4' The Court was careful to explain that a pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial trial. Specific rights in addition
to the basic hearing included: (1) notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed termination; (2) an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by orally presenting argument and
evidence in rebuttal; 375 (3) the right to retain an attorney if desired; 370 and (4) a decision resting solely on legal rules and evidence
adduced at the hearing, and explained by a statement of reasons.3 7 7 In
explaining these requirements, the Court noted their importance when
the recipients have challenged proposed terminations as based on incorrect facts as well as when the recipients allege "misapplication of
rules or policies to the facts of particular cases." 378
These same principles have been applied in situations more nearly
37
approximating the parole system. At issue in Specht v. Patterson 1
was the constitutionality of a trial court's invocation of Colorado's Sex
369

Id., quoted in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 426 (1969).

370
371

Id.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).

372

Id. at 261 (quoting the district court).

373 Id.at 262-63.
374 Id.at 266.

Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 270.
377 Id.at 271.
378 Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
379 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
375
376
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Offenders Act 8° without affording the convicted criminal against
whom it was invoked an opportunity for a separate hearing on its
applicability. The statute allows punishment for an indeterminate term
of from one day to life. It may be invoked if the trial court believes
that a person convicted of certain sex offenses, "if at large, constitutes
a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual
offender and mentally ill." 81 This sentence then preempts the maximum sentence limitation prescribed for the specific crime for which he
has been convicted. The Supreme Court held that due process mandated a hearing, the right to be present with counsel, and the rights to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and present evidence. 3 8 These
requirements applied because application of the act required "a new
finding of fact." '83 In reaching this result, the Court distinguished, but
reaffirmed, an earlier decision holding that due process normally does
not require a hearing, at which the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is granted, for the determination of a convicted person's
sentence.84
B. Due Process and Revocation
1. The Mechanics of the System
Violation of specific parole conditions 8 85 or a criminal conviction
while on parole"8 ' may lead to the implementation of the parole revocation procedure. While the particulars of revocation procedure vary
considerably among jurisdictions,38 7 the operative consequences for the
parolee are fairly uniform. Upon a finding that a parole violation has
or is about to occur, the parole board may issue a warrant for the retaking of the parolee."8 8 Such warrants may be executed by police or
correctional officers, and upon execution the parolee is immediately
Act of April 23, 1957, ch. 122, [1957] Colo. Laws 329-32 (amended 1968).
Id. § 39-19-1, [1957] Colo. Laws 329.
386 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 608.
384 Id. (referring to Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
385 A violation of a specific conditions of parole is termed a "technical" violation,
the parolee thus being a "technical" violator.
386 Conviction of a crime while on parole results in "convicted" violator status for
the parolee. This distinction between a convicted and technical violator may result
in important procedural differences in the revocation process. For example, many
states that accord procedural safeguards to the technical violator dispense with such
procedures when revoking the parole of a convicted violator. E.g., HAWAII REv.
ANN. § 353-66 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §331. 2 1(a) (1964). Presumably, the
distinction is drawn because factual issues have already been determined in the case
of a convicted violator.
387 See notes 392-403 infra & accompanying text.
388 The police or parole officer is often empowered to retake without a warrant
under certain circumstances.
E.g., N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 216 (McKinney 1968)
("where a parole officer has reasonable cause to believe that any . . . parolee has
violated the conditions of his parole in an important respect").
380
381
382
383
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placed in custody to await the final action by the board. 3" Final action
usually comprises two analytically distinct board functions: first, the
determination of the factual question whether the parolee violated the
condition of his parole (a determination that, in the case of the convicted violator, has already been conclusively made for the parole
board);" second, a dispositional determination that may range from
continuation of parole on the same conditions to reincarceration for the
remainder of the parolee's original term. 8 ' The former stage may be
characterized as adjudicative or factfinding, and the latter as discretionary dispositional.
Disparities among jurisdictions surface when one examines the
specific elements of the process. Fundamental is the question whether
the parole violator will be accorded a hearing and notice of the charges
against him. Provisions for revocation hearings vary considerably: 392
some jurisdictions explicitly provide a hearing prior to the final revocation decision; ...others specifically empower the board to revoke without first according an opportunity to be heard; "' yet other jurisdictions
have been legislatively silent on the subject, leaving it to the courts to
determine whether a hearing is required.895
Once the initial hurdles of hearing and notice are surmounted, the
disparities increase exponentially. Counsel is sometimes provided for
the indigent parolee,n8 occasionally permitted to those able to retain
private attorneys, 9 7 and often prohibited entirely. 98 Even if counsel is
provided or permitted, his participation is usually confined to the adjudicative portion of the hearing." 9 Dispositional decisions are made
within the sole discretion of the boards. The parolee may be allowed to
present witnesses,400 but is seldom allowed compulsory process to assure
their attendance. 40 ' He may have the opportunity to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses, 402 but more often their identity will remain
389 Incarceration may be at the place where retaking is effected or at the institution that paroled the violator.

390 See note 386 mtpra.
391 See notes 486-88 infra & accompanying text.
392 Sklar, vtpra note 360, at 176-82.
393 E.g., Mica. CouP. LAws Awx. §791.240a (Supp. 1971) (except for convicted
violator).
394 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3060 (West 1970);
.. GEN. LAws ANN. § 13-8-18
(1970).

§247.9 (1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127,
For a more complete enumeration within these 3 categories, see
Sklar, supra note 360, at 176-80.
398 Warren v. Parole Bd., 23 Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970).
397 E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 2.41 (1971).
398 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3619 (1955).
395 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN.

§§ 148-49 (1965).

399 See note 485 infra &accompanying text.
400 E.g., 28 C.F.R. §2A1 (1971).
401 E.g, Id. §2.41.
402
See Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1954).
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unknown, shrouded by the boards' policy of secrecy, which is designed
40 3
to protect informants.
2. Parole Theories and Due Process
The dispute over the theoretical foundations of parole '0 has impeded resolution of due process questions at the revocation stage.
Not until the right-privilege distinction is abandoned can due process
analysis be correctly applied. The question whether revocation fits
within the prosecutorial, critical-stage framework of the fifth and sixth
amendments 405 cannot be broached if the fiction, that the parolee has no
freedom of which he can be deprived, survives. Similarly, labeling
revocation an administrative proceeding serves merely to obfuscate the
individual interests under consideration." 6 Here the effect of the
theories concerning the existence of parolee rights and liberties is pervasive, for the proposition that a parolee has nothing to protect negates
the requirement of any procedural safeguards. Once these labels are
discarded,"0 7 however, the nature of the proceeding turns upon what is
at stake.
Debate on provisions for notice and a hearing provides a focal
point for the arguments against due process in general. A recent opinion
by the Iowa Supreme Court, rejecting the argument that procedural
due process is denied when parole is summarily revoked, cogently exSee notes 438-44 infra & accompanying text.
Text accompanying notes 6-128 infra; see Parole: A Critique, supra note 29;
Comment, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DuIE
L.J. 139.
405 See United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1971); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Warren v. Parole
Bd., 23 Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W2d 664 (1970) ; People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden,
27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971) (all answering in the
affirmative). Contra, Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374
(10th Cir. 1968); Lawson v. Coiner, 291 F. Supp. 79 (N.D.W. Va. 1968); Snedeker
v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 552 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). For a discussion of the legal status
of the revocation hearing, see F. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation,and the Rehabilitative
Ideal: The View From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1968); W. Cohen, Due
Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings,42 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 197 (1970).
406 Many lower courts have acted on the theory that the judicial function of the
criminal process extends no further than the original imposition of sentence. Parole
revocation is therefore classified as an administrative proceeding and procedural
rights are limited. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968) ; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) ; Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862, 873 (4th Cir. 1964) ;
Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 1168, 131 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 958 (1965) ; Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 256, 260, 453 P.2d 35, 39-40, 42,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Baxter v. Commonwealth, Mass. -, -, 268
N.E.2d 670, 673 (1971) ; Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 59, 419 P.2d 253, 256 (1966) ;
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 421, 454 P.2d 624, 626 (1969). For a discussion of
the administrative law aspects of parole revocation, see DAvis,- supra note 33,
§7.16 (Supp. 1970).
407 For a discussion of these and their specific inadequacies, see text accompanying notes 30-128 supra.
403

404
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pressed the positions advanced by those jurisdictions that deny hearings.40 s The denial of a constitutional right to a hearing was predicated
primarily upon the theory that parole is an administrative procedure,
operative at the discretion of the state legislature, and therefore largely
independent of judicial scrutiny." 9 The court endorsed the "act of
grace" dictum of Escoe v. Zerbst to support its conclusion. 41" Additional arguments advanced by other courts include the fear that a hearing would be a time-consuming, unproductive burden on the parole
board and the claim that this additional impediment to revoking parole
would increase the board's reluctance to grant parole to deserving
prisoners.4 1 '
Both on doctrinal and policy grounds, these negative views are of
doubtful validity. The dictum in Escoe, foundation for much of the
narrow due process rationale, has been severely undermined by subsequent Court decisions, notably Mempa v. Rhay41 2 and Goldberg v.
Kelly. 413 A court should have no difficulty repudiating the privilege
theory after its clear rejection in other areas 414 and in light of its logical
inconsistencies and disparity with reality. 415 Continued adherence would

render the law of parole an unfortunate vestige of a misguided theory.
Indeed, it is very difficult to conceive of a parolee's freedom as more of
a "privilege" than the welfare benefits at stake in Goldberg.
Moreover, even Justice Cardozo in Escoe recognized the important protection a hearing on an accusation provides. 416 The Iowa
court's implicit assumption that categorizing a proceeding as "administrative" removes it from judicial concern stands on soft theoretical
ground.4 17 Finally, the contention that increased procedural safeguards
at revocation will result in fewer decisions to release prisoners is undercut by significant release rates in jurisdictions with some of the more
liberal requirements. For example, Michigan, which guarantees by
statute almost the full range of due process rights, has had one of the
highest parole rates in the country.4 1 The appropriate analysis for
408 Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 131 N.W.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.

958 (1965).
409 Id. at 1168, 131 N.W.2d at 4.
410 See

text accompanying notes 6-10 supra. This position was recently adopted

by the Eighth Circuit in Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103).
411 See, e.g., In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 345, 142 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1957).
412389 U.S. 128 (1967).
413 397 U.S.254 (1970).
414 "The

constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public

assistance benefits are 'a privilege and not a right.'" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 (1970) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)); see
cases415
cited notes 47-49 supra.
See text accompanying notes 51-83 supra.
416 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1935).
417 See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
418 Comment, Criminal Law--Insane Persons-Influence of Mental Illness on the
Parole Return Process, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 1101, 1102 n.11, 1110 n.47 (1961).
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determining due process requirements in the parole revocation process
is one that begins by defining the individual interests affected, the goals
the process is designed to achieve, the government's interest in summary
adjudication, and the potential burden on the proceedings imposed by
the procedural changes. This is the clear command of the most recent
developments in the due process concept. 19
3. Interests in Increasing Procedural Safeguards
The traditional due process analysis presupposes "a complexity of
factors" that are weighed to determine the need for procedural protection. The parolee's interest in retaining his presently enjoyed freedom
is obviously a significant consideration. Both the parolee and the
government have an interest in the parolee's establishment and maintenance of stable relationships in the community. Where no countervailing interests exist, the constitutional framework seems clearly to
mandate the provision of basic procedural safeguards, at least at the
adjudicative phase.
The countervailing considerations in the due process balance may
be the goals and necessities of the parole system. Analysis leads to the
conclusion, however, that most of these are consistent with the parolee's
interest. At revocation the rehabilitative functions of the system must
be accommodated. Rehabilitation is often articulated as the primary
goal, but denial of procedural protections impedes a rehabilitative
function to the extent that procedure indicates to the parolee that the
law protects the individual from unreasoned discretion. Moreover,
if rehabilitation is the primary goal,4 0 progress toward reaching this
end has been singularly unimpressive." 1 Given the limits of correctional
resources, it may well be impossible to achieve; but, as a state interest,
it militates in favor of procedural safeguards.
The recent trend in defining the goals of parole identifies parole as
a means to "permit both a smoother transition from the dependency of
prison to complete freedom and earlier release from incarceration under
conditions designed to test the prisoner's capacity to 'make it on the
Skeptical of the prospects of molding the offender into
outside.' "
a model citizen, proponents of this view emphasize facilitating the reinThis is actually part of
tegration of the parolee into the community.'
the rehabilitation goal. This reintegration process is interfered with
419

72

See text accompanying notes 361-84 supra.
Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings,

420 See Comment, Freedom and
YALE L.J. 368, 370 & n.28 (1962).
421 F. COHEN, supra note 29, at

29 & n.18; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 62 (35-45% of adults released on parole are subsequently returned to prison);
Bixby, supra note 124, at 24-25.
422 United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.
1971) ; accord, Bixby, supra note 124, at 24; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 62.
423 Cf. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.

19711

THE PAROLE SYSTEM

by groundless or unreasonable reincarceration. Procedural safeguards
fortify the process by protecting against unreasonable action. Furthermore, the reintegration and the rehabilitation models leave the parole
board with the responsibility for operating in a manner consistent with
the security of the community, and that security may be threatened if
prisoners are finally released without having been rehabilitated by the
parole system.
In achieving its objectives, however, the board must operate within
constraints imposed by the scarcity of available prison resources.4 2 Because jail cells are not of unlimited supply, and citizen resistance to
increased tax burdens makes a major expansion of correctional facilities
improbable, many offenders will never be incarcerated or, if confined at
5
all, will eventually return from confinement to the community.4
Optimally, only those offenders whose conditional liberty is not inconsistent with the safety of society and their own rehabilitation or reintegration will be released and retained on parole. To the extent that
correctional institution capacity is limited, however, ideal goals are
compromised. The revocation determination is essentially one of choosing the most favorable risk from among many questionable ones.
Given the constraints imposed by limited resources, rational decisionmaking is essential. The reincarceration of good-risk parolees
may well mean either that bad-risk parolees will be allowed to remain
on the streets or that prisoners who are in fact poorer risks will be
paroled for the first time. The community eventually pays the cost,
measured both in terms of the increased probability of the bad-risk
parolee committing crimes and the adverse consequences of the reincarceration of his good-risk counterpart. 426 The correct decision, not
necessarily the quickest one, serves the best interest of the community.
To make such a decision the board should seek a maximum of reliable
information. The need for such information should weigh heavily in
the due process balance.
4. Interests Militating Against New Safeguards
Finally, although long-range considerations of rational decisionmaking call for procedures maximizing the flow of reliable information,
the problem of short-range resource allocation remains. The limited
man-hours of state parole boards and the current burdensome workload of the public defenders illustrate the problems with extending
procedural protections. Those who advocate substantial reform should
424

See notes 75-78 supra & accompanying text.
425 See generally TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
426 Bixby, supra note 124, at 24 (prolonged incarceration increases likelihood of
recidivism); Bixby, New Concepts in Parole and Misdemeanant Probation, in JOINT
Coum'N ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER & TRAINING, PERSPECTIVES ON CORRECTIONAL
MANPOWER AND TRAINING 59, 60-61 (1970) (citing study indicating a high correlation
between period of incarceration and recidivism rates).
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not overlook the propensity of officials to circumvent restrictions, and
the concomitant danger of fostering a species of sham process. As
Professor Kadish has noted in discussing the role of counsel at revocation hearings:
The problems of overburdened parole boards would appear
remediable by measures directed to the problem rather than by
render the work of the boards
the pursuit of measures which
42 7
less just and less adequate.
Another state interest is ensuring the availability of adequate resources for the operation of other aspects of the parole system. Courtimposed procedural safeguards will force the allocation of more resources to the revocation procedure and might take away resources
from other important activities, such as surveillance and supervision of
parolees. One final interest, which is quite limited in its implications,
is protecting sources of information. Requiring the parole board to
hold a hearing at which it must introduce all of the evidence upon which
a decision is to be based, and permitting the parolee to cross-examine
428
all witnesses might prove detrimental to the investigative process.
Indeed, fear of reprisals could lead some informants to refrain from
testifying in any manner.
5. Notice and Hearing
Notice and hearing have long been recognized as basic to due
process. As stated first by Justice Jackson, and more recently reiterated
by Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Boddie v. Connecticut:429
Although "[m]any controversies have raged about the
cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause . . .
there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case." 430
To be meaningful, notice must be timely and contain a statement detailing the reasons for the proposed action against the individual."'
The due process clause should be read to compel, prior to parole
revocation, provision of a hearing and notice detailing the basis for the
427 Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Coutuel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINx. L. Rav. 803, 837-38 (1961).
428 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
429 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
4 0
3 Id. at 377-78 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
431 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
33 (1967).
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proceeding.4 32 As in Specht v. Patterson, revocation clearly involves
the determination of new facts. Applying the standard enunciated in
Goldberg v. Kelly, a court must conclude that parole revocation causes
the parolee to suffer "grievous loss." His interest in retaining his
presently enjoyed freedom should outweigh the state interest in conserving its revenue and its related interest in channeling limited resources into other parts of the parole system.3 3 This result is reinforced
by the joint interests of the state and the parolee in the parolee's rehabilitation and in a decisionnaking process that yields accurate results.
In furtherance of the parole board's interest in obtaining the maximum amount of reliable information, a fact-determination hearing
provides the parolee the opportunity to contest information submitted
by parole agents whose supervisory reports play an important role in
the board's determination. 4 Exclusive reliance on the parole agent,
whose extensive case load may permit only superficial contact with the
parolee, and whose reports may reflect personality conflicts and community pressures, produces a result of doubtful objectivity and reliability.43 5 Also, the possibility of arbitrary or groundless action poses
a major hazard if a hearing is denied. The existence of an adjudicatory
hearing, both as a source of necessary information, and as a reassurance
to the parolee that he is being treated fairly, serves the rehabilitative
function of parole.
The next question that arises is whether there is a right to an
initial, pre-incarceration hearing. There has been little judicial resistance to preliminary incarceration of the parolee pending a hearing.
In general, this question has been overshadowed by the uncertainty
pervading the basic hearing and notice questions. In any event, preliminary incarceration is justified. The parolee is released on the
premise that he is no longer a threat to the public. When this premise
becomes dubious, there is a public interest in immediate reincarceration
pending a hearing. In addition to the immediate danger to the public,
the ability of the parole board to prevent flight by the parolee is questionable. Particularly if the parolee knows that valid grounds for
revocation exist, he has a strong incentive to flee the jurisdiction.
432 Some cases have held that there is no right to a hearing on parole revocation.
E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288
(U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968). Other cases have explicitly held that due process compels a hearing. E.g., Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104-05 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Goolsby
v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407,
135 A.2d 439 (1957).
433
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
44 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F2d 942, 943 n.1, 944 n2 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); cf. Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968).
43U See, e.g., 4 THE AT-roRNEY GENERAi's SuRvEY OF RELEASE PRocEDuREs 246-47
(1939) ; Bixby, New Concepts in Parole and Misdemeanant Probation, supra note
426, at 63; Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 YAE LJ. 698,
704-06 (1970).
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Acknowledgement of the value of notice of charges and a hearing
raises the further question of the nature of the hearing. To use the
analysis applied in Jenkins v. McKeithen, there can be no doubt that the
revocation hearing is not purely investigatory. The parole board does
punish and impose legal sanctions depriving the parolee of liberty.
Parole revocation provides a much stronger case for requiring the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence on
behalf of the party prejudiced by the proceeding, than the facts in
Jenkins. In terms of the nature of the injury to the individual, parole
revocation would also seem to provide a stronger case than Goldberg.
Moreover, the principle in Goldberg was stated very broadly:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn
on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.4 6
Quoting an earlier decision, the Court explained that the right to examine the government's evidence to show that it is untrue is basic, and
that when evidence consists of the "testimony of individuals whose
memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy,"
then the ability to disprove that evidence is even more important. 7
These considerations indicate that due process should be held to entail
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the parole
revocation hearing. Goldberg could be distinguished on the ground
that the governmental interest in protecting the secrecy of its witnesses
is greater in the parole context than it is in the welfare context. But,
even were this so, this distinction should not be determinative, due to
the nature of the individual right affected.
The parole board defends its denial of access to information sources
with the argument that if the privilege of confidentiality were removed,
many informants would refrain from providing valuable information.
Much of the board's information is from friends and family of the
parolee 438 whose desire for secrecy is predicated in some cases on a
fear of reprisal. In cases where information leading to revocation is
provided by an employer, the revelation that a particular employer had
informed on a fellow parolee could result in animosity of other prisoner's
toward that employer, eliminating him as an effective source of employment for future parolees.43 9
Balanced against the board's desire to.retain information sources
is the danger of unreliable information when these sources remain unchallenged. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here the disclosure
437

397 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)).

438

See Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings,

436

supra note 420, at 375; 20 BuFF. L. REv. 713, 722 (1971).
439 W. Cohen, supra note 405, at 197.
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of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication . . .
is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [of secrecy]
must give way." 440 The policy behind this conclusion has been attributed to the informer's fear that "the information they have will not
withstand the test of cross-examination ....
" "' While there may
be instances in which secrecy is warranted, the revoking authority
should be put to the choice of either revealing its sources and allowing
the information to be tested fairly, or justifying revocation without
resort to information that it desires to keep secret. 4 2 Even if secrecy
is not entirely ruled out,443 its use should be restrained by a requirement

that the board
justify secrecy whenever it feels compelled to protect its
4
sources.

44

Requiring the presence of adverse witnesses not only presents the
problem of reprisal, but also increases the number of participants at the
hearing, raising the possibility of delays similar to those experienced in
courtroom adjudication. 4 5 To strike the balance between the immediate
need for an unimpaired informational flow that creates the least drain
on the board's limited time resources and the necessity for information
that has been tested by the adversary process to ensure its reliability,
the procedural safeguard of confrontation and cross-examination can be
allowed in a modified or limited form. 4
Commenting on the importance of the parolee's right to contest
the board's case at revocation, Professor Davis notes:
The right to explain or rebut, even without a right of
cross-examination, will often mean correction of factual misjudgments based on inadequate investigation of facts, and the
Board's policy of releasing a prisoner who is ready for release
will be furthered. 4
Thus, even if cross-examination is limited, some right of rebuttal is
essential.
440 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) ; cf. McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informer's identity properly kept secret at pretrial hearing to
determine the question of probable cause for an arrest or search).
441 Sklar, supra note 360, at 195.
442
Id. n.165.
443 E.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
444 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
445 See Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings,
supra note 420, at 375.
446 As a means of reconciling these potentially conflicting aims, Professor Davis
suggests modeling the revocation proceedings after the German civil trial. This
might include a presiding officer in full control, a reduction in the role of counsel,
no right to cross-examination except when the presiding officer feels it is desirable
to bring out additional information, and the right of the parolee to know the evidence
used against him and to rebut or explain such evidence. See K. DAvis, supra note
33, § 7.16, at 357-58 (Supp. 1970). For a critical discussion of the German civil
system as a source of ideas for reform, see Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on
the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REv. 409, 422, 424 (1960).
447 K. DAvis, supra note 33, § 7.16, at 356 (Supp. 1970).
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Although courts have recognized that, at a minimum, knowledge
of the nature of the charges is essential for the parolee effectively to
contest the accusation, they have generally denied pre-hearing discovery.448 Access to parole board records presents a more difficult
question than does access to evidence directly on the issue of a particular
violation. If due process requires that the board decision be based
solely on evidence adduced at the hearing, 44' limiting access to board
files may be justified, since any evidence in those files that is relevant to
a defense against the alleged violation will either be open to scrutiny at
the hearing, or be unavailable for use by the parole authorities. Moreover, the decision must be limited in that manner if other procedural
safeguards are to have any significance. Cross-examination is of little
value if not performed on a crucial witness or issue. Similarly, unless
the parole board is required to state the reasons for its decision, whether
the board complies with the requirement that the decision be based on
evidence adduced at the hearing could never be ascertained. 450 These
final requirements of due process would not significantly burden the
proceeding and therefore should attach at parole revocation.
6. The Right to Counsel
Following a determination that the right to a hearing exists, the
next unresolved question is the right to assistance of counsel. This
section will treat first the right to the assistance of retained counsel and
second the right to state-appointed counsel. Some states by statute expressly extend the right to retained counsel; 451 in other jurisdictions the
absence of a legislative mandate has allowed judicial interpretation implying the right to retained counsel.f 2 Those that oppose extending
this right argue that counsel is not constitutionally required 4 3 and that
his presence would not be beneficial to the proceedings.
The policy rationale for barring counsel rests on the characterization of revocation hearings as non-adversarial, with parole board decisions based on the advice of experts. Counsel in this setting, the
courts fear, would turn the revocation hearing into a "legal battle." 4r,
448See, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 957 (1963).
449 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
4501d.
451 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42,

§ 12 (1959); D.C.

STAT. ANN. §947.23(1)
(Supp. 1971); MONT.
(1969); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.122 (Supp. 1970).

FLA.

CODE ANN.
REv.

§24-206 (1967);

CODE ANN.

§ 94-9835

452 E.g., Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
For additional cases,
see 20 BUFF. L. REv. 713, 717 n.21 (1971).
453 Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1970) ; Williams v. Patterson,
389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967) ;
Gonzales v. Patterson, 370 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan.
253, 453 P.2d 35 (1969) ; Snedeker v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 552 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) ;
see Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288
(U.S. Dec. 21, 1971) (No. 5103); Lawson v. Coiner, 291 F. Supp. 79 (N.D.W. Va.
1968).
454 Sklar, supra note 360, at 195-96.
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Justice Breitel, dissenting in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden,4"
expressed this judicial attitude in opposing the anticipated flood of
procedural issues connected with extending the right to counsel. Before
the Menechino decision, New York law had expressly barred even the
right to appear with retained counsel. Justice Breitel believed this
system consistent with due process, particularly due to the new burdens
that participation by counsel would impose upon the judicial system. 45 6
Some courts have justified the refusal to permit retained counsel by the
assertion that parole is a privilege and that prior Supreme Court decisions extending the 457
right to counsel are inapplicable to the parole
revocation proceeding.
Focusing on actual state interests, the Second Circuit has indicated
that the presence of counsel at revocation hearings should "advance, not
retard the 'modern concept of individualized punishment' and rehabilitation." '5s In performing his primary functions of clarifying and focusing the issues and facts for determination, counsel may contribute to
the speed and efficiency of the decisionmaking. 4 9 Results of a study
of the Michigan parole system, a state in the forefront of formalizing
revocation procedural safeguards, indicate that increased procedural
safeguards will not produce more conservative release policies. 6 °
Counsel's presence could also provide a needed stimulus to critical
evaluation and new thinking by the board. In aiding the board to
obtain more reliable information, and in providing the parolee with an
articulate spokesman for his interests, counsel functions in a manner
entirely consistent with the parole system's goals.
The premise that the parole revocation hearing is non-adversarial
in nature is fallacious because of both the nature of the board and the
importance of the question at issue-the parolee's liberty. As a consequence of political pressure and public criticism, the board is likely to
assume a prosecutorial posture.4 6 ' In its desire to avoid unfavorable
publicity, the board tends to be retributive toward those who have
failed the system and therefore to view incarceration as a penalty for
the parolee's failure. 62 The result of such pressures is a system the
primary concern of which is its own immediate protection from hostile
455 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
456 Id. at 394-95, 267 N.E2d at 249-50, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
457 Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1970); Williams v.
Patterson, 389 F.2d 374, 375 (10th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253,
255-57, 453 P.2d 35, 39-40 (1969); see Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.

1960).
4-8 United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.
1971) (treating right to appointed counsel).
459 See Kadish, supra note 427, at 832.
460 Comment, Criminal Lau--Insane Persons-Influence of Mental Illness on the

Parole Return Process, supra note 418, at 1110 n.47; see United States ex rel. Bey
v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971).
461 See, e.g., Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, supra note 420, at 368, 376 n.50.

462 Id.

354

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.120:282

public opinion; consequently the board fails in its essential purpose-to
make accurate decisions consistent with the rehabilitative and reintegration ideals. The resultant adversarial nature of the parole hearing,
despite the application of the "administrative" label, indicates the need
for counsel at such proceedings.
The floodgate claim 4 6 3-- the fear that granting a right to counsel
would open a Pandora's box of other procedural issues-although
presenting a legitimate concern, is an unpersuasive argument that could
be made against almost every procedural advance; were it accepted, expedience would be elevated to a position superior to that of specific, constitutionally secured rights. Under the due process clause, each procedural issue should be evaluated on its own merits. Moreover, the
implicit assumption of the floodgate objection, the assumption that the
right to counsel is an all-or-nothing proposition, fails to acknowledge
the limits that parole boards may legitimately place on counsel's activity." ' While the power to limit counsel's role must itself be circumscribed so that it does not conflict with the standard of effective representation, it is unreasonable to assume that unlimited expansion of
procedural devices and endless delays are the inevitable consequences
of permitting effective counsel.
Goldberg v. Kelly and Jenkins v. McKeithen both extended the
right to retain counsel to proceedings substantially affecting individual
rights. 65 These were not proceedings that would lead to incarceration.
Without any substantial difference in the state interests in barring
counsel, a fortiori, under the due process clause counsel must be allowed
at a parole revocation proceeding. Parole revocation does involve a
determination of new facts, and, therefore, Specht v. Patterson466 is in
point and should be read to require that the parolee be allowed to retain
counsel at revocation. The discussion of the due process right to retain
counsel, however, may be purely academic due to the most recent
developments extending the right to state-appointed counsel.
If retained counsel is permitted, this issue of the indigent's right to
appointed counsel follows inevitably. Decisions on this question are
not uniform. Where not statutorily mandated, some courts have held
it within the discretion of the parole board to preclude appointment of
counsel.4 67 Others have found appointed counsel required under an
463 E.g., People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 394-95, 267 N.E.2d
238, 249, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 464-65 (1971) (Breitel, J., dissenting).
464 See United States ex reL. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1971) ; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
To avoid this problem, Professor Davis has suggested alloting each parolee a
fixed amount of time to use in whatever fashion he chooses. K. DAvIs, supra note
33, § 7.16,. at 358 (Supp. 1970). While this proposal is indicative of the flexibility
and possible alternatives which the board should consider, it may fall short of the
hearing that, ideally, would be related to the extensiveness of the evidence offered
by both the board and the parolee.
465 See text accompanying notes 379-84 supra.
466 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
4 67
See Heath v. State, 94 Idaho 101, 482 P.2d 76 (1971).
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equal protection rationale. 6 s Still others have found that parole
revocation
is a critical stage at which appointed counsel must be
46 9
offered.

The basic principle of the appointment-of-counsel cases is fairly
clear. That principle was stated in Mempa v. Rhay : 470
[A]ppointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every
stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a
criminal accused may be affected.4 7'
Gideon v. Wainwright,472 in which the Supreme Court first held that
the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel applied to the states and
therefore required the appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal
trials, articulated a similar rationale: the right to counsel is fundamental
because in our adversary system a person can only be assured a fair
trial if represented by a lawyer.47 Undoubtedly, substantial rights are
affected at a parole revocation proceeding. The similarity of revocation
of parole to the issue in Mempa and the perceived substantiality of the
rights affected by parole revocation has led a number of courts to
require appointed counsel at parole revocation. 7 4
Of course, the reasoning of those cases that denied a right to stateappointed counsel upon the absence of such a right at probation revocation proceedings 47' has been undercut by Mempa. The distinctions
proffered by those courts that have refused to apply Mempa to parole
revocation are also unpersuasive. For example, Rose v. Haskins 47" distinguished Mempa on the ground that in Mempa the probationer's case
was theoretically still pending in state court because sentence had never
been imposed. This distinction is artificial and misses the principle of
Mempa. Similarly, in Morrissey v. Brewer 47 7 the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the deferred sentencing at issue in Mempa is a stage in
the criminal proceeding and that revocation of parole is not.478

Mor-

468See Warren v. Parole Bd., 23 Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970);
cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
469 United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971);
Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971) ; People ex rel. Menechino
v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971) ; Commonwealth
v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
470389 U.S. 128 (1967).
471 Id. at 134.
472 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
473 Id. at 344.
474 Cases cited note 469 supra.
47
5 E.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
476 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968).
477443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 21,
1971) 7 8(No. 5103).
4
Id. at 951; accord, Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Halprin v. Parker 418 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1969) ; see Jones v.
Rivers, 338 F2d 862, 874 (4th Cir. 19645.
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rissey, also, failed to recognize that substantial rights are affected by
parole revocation and that the kinds of determinations made at the
combined probation revocation and deferred sentencing hearing in
Mempa would be the same as those made at a parole revocation hearing.
It is difficult to find the one type of hearing any more a part of the
criminal proceeding than the other, particularly when the effect upon
the individual of each is compared." 9 Mempa should be read to require appointment of counsel at a parole revocation hearing pursuant to
the sixth amendment as incorporated in the due process clause.
7. The Disposition Phase
Even if due process is held to require a hearing and assistance of
counsel at the adjudicative phase of the revocation process, the issue of
the due process requirements at the dispositional phase remains. In
this regard, Williams v. New York "' is instructive. In that case
Williams was convicted of first degree murder and the jury recommended life imprisonment. The trial judge, after considering evidence
of "thirty other burglaries" that Williams had allegedly committed but
had not been convicted of, sentenced him to death.48' The Supreme
Court held that the trial judge had not deprived Williams of due process
by considering this evidence without affording him the right of confrontation and cross-examination. The Court drew a distinction between evidence used for trial on the issue of guilt and evidence used for
the purpose of determining a sentence. The Court reasoned that judges
would be unable to obtain much of the information needed for guidance
in adapting the sentence to the individual if confrontation were allowed.
"The type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not
impossible open court testimony with cross-examination." 482 As late
as 1967, the Supreme Court purported to uphold this decision. 3
The disposition of parole violations is of undeniably great consequence to the parolee. One major difference from the adjudicative
phase is the state interest in allowing the parole board to rely upon its
administrative expertise in evaluating the parolee and deciding what
action will be most consonant with parole objectives. To the extent
that this is done, the decision reached is not based solely on evidence
adduced at the hearing. Unless this is allowed, the parole system could
not operate effectively as it is currently structured and with its current
objectives: expertise would be minimized in the process.
It might be maintained, also, that guaranteeing the reliability of
information is less important than guaranteeing large quantities of the
479 See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 99 (6th Cir.) (Celebrezze,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) ; cf. It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
480 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
481
Id. at 244.
482 Id. at 250.
483 Text accompanying note 384 supra.
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information at the disposition phase, although this is not true at the
adjudicative phase. This was the import of the Wiliavms case This
difference in priorities between the two phases, although not explicitly
articulated in this manner by Williams, might be based on the different
use to which the evidence will be put: the evidence at disposition is used
only to help frame an opinion as to what determination will best comport with the goals of the parole system and is only a minor input in the
overall disposition determination; evidence on the adjudicative questions
is used to make narrower factual determinations." s The consequence of
this difference in priorities is the conclusion that due process does not
compel the right to confrontation and cross-examination at the disposition phase of the revocation hearing.
The result of this balancing and the need to protect information
sources, however, are inapplicable to the issue of according the parolee
the right to assistance of counsel and the right to offer evidence on his
own behalf. Some authority suggests that the assistance of counsel
will be extended only if a contested issue of fact exists.4" 5 These courts
reason that once the fact of a violation has been established, the need
for counsel disappears. This position, however, does not withstand
examination. Conviction does not obviate the need for counsel, but
merely changes the focus of the decisionmaking process. The board
may not be required to reincarcerate, and the individual should have
an opportunity to affect the disposition. 6 The range of dispositional
alternatives is broad enough that counsel could be of significant aid to
both the board and the parolee in selecting the optimum alternative."'
Further, considerations at disposition are similar to those at sentencing
or probation revocation, 88 where the need for counsel has been recognized.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion to Hyser v. Reed, Judge
Bazelon articulated the distinction between the fact determination and
484

See 337 U.S. at 246-47.

485 See, e.g., Cotner v. United States, 409 F2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1969);

cf. Murphy v. Turner, 426 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1970); United States ax rel. Haiprin
v. Parker, 418 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1969) (and cases cited therein).
486 F. COHEn, supra note 29, at 62-63.
487 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1082
(2d Cir. 1971) (listing as dispositional alternatives: parolee could be reprimanded;
his parole might be continued under more stringent conditions or closer supervision;
time previously earned toward reduction of his term of imprisonment could be withheld or withdrawn; parole could be revoked) ; cf. United States ex rel. Heacock v.
Myers, 251 F. Supp. 773 (R.D. Pa.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 925 (1967).
Some statutes specifically allow the board dispositional discretion upon revocation.
E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §549.265 (Supp. 1971).
488 Cf. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 86; W. COHEN, supra note 405, at
225-28 (suggesting that failure to provide probationer and parolee with the same
procedural rights may entail a denial of equal protection) ; Comment, Constitutional
Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DuKE L.J. 139, 147-51; Specht
v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (sentencing). See also PRESWIENT'S CoMMISSION
oN LAW ENFORCEM.ENT & ADiMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SocIETY 179-80 (1967). For further suggestions on the potential role of
counsel, see Brief for Appellant, Commonwealth v. Collins, No. 976 (Pa. Super. Ct.,
filed Dec. 3, 1971) (brief filed by Univ. of Pa. Prison Research Council).
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the subsequent dispositional decision: he explained that the first is
factual and retrospective, not calling for discretion or expertise, and the
second is prospective, demanding a high degree of discretion and expertise. In his words, disposition often involves "an educated guess." 48
But counsel can give direction to the exercise of discretion. In hearings
of a discretionary nature, there exists a special need for counsel. As
noted in the context of juvenile proceedings,
In both conduct and condition determinations, the judgment
• rests on an inference to be drawn from past facts.
Although greater reliance on expertise is characteristic of
condition determinations, the adversary system is no less
suitable here than elsewhere. If the customary adversary
system employing clashing expert witnesses is not ideal,
neither would it be wise to rely totally on official expertise.
Experts have been known to err, and it is in the nature of the
adversary process that it is likely to discover or suggest such
error. Moreover, the danger of arbitrariness is far greater in
a system in which the expert's judgment is conclusive rather
than merely probative. 9
Representing the convicted violator, counsel may argue for concurrent
rather than consecutive sentences. 91 Counsel can place in perspective
the seriousness of the new offense, the circumstances under which it
was committed, and the parolee's established ties to the community.
Because the parole revocation decision includes both determinations
and interpretations, some procedural safeguards improve the fairness of
the process and the accuracy of the factfinding. At the disposition
phase, balancing the competing interests of the state and the individual,
due process should be interpreted to mandate the rights to assistance of
counsel and to introduce evidence,492 but not the rights to confrontation
and cross-examination and to have a decision based solely on evidence
adduced at the hearing.
C. Due Processand the Release Determination-Right to Counsel
The parole release determination presents the inmate with his
initial contact with the parole system. 93 Unlike the revocation stage,
489318 F.2d 225, 249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
490 The Supreme Court, 1966
491 F. COHEN, supra note 29,

Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 175 (1967).
at 63. In some instances, counsel may advise the
parolee to admit to a technical violation in return for dismissal of possible criminal
charges arising therefrom. Id.
492A contrary result would have to ignore the thrust of Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128 (1967), as well as much older conceptions of the nature of the right to
counsel. See Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 892 (1950) ("The very nature of the proceeding at the time of imposition
of sentence makes the presence of defendant's counsel at that time necessary if the
constitutional requirement is to be met.") ; Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
493 For a description of the process, see text accompanying notes 129-82 supra.
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where the provision of a hearing is a subject of divergent practice,49 4
release hearings are provided by a large majority of jurisdictions pursuant to explicit statutory provision.4 95 In the context of the release
determination, then, attention focuses on the content of that hearing,
particularly the right to assistance of counsel in the presentation of the
parolee's case to the board. Often the hearing is more accurately termed
an interview. In the wake of Mempa v. Rhay,'9 courts have examined
the nature of such hearings and have sought to answer the question
whether due process mandates certain minimum requirements for the
hearing.
1. Appointed Counsel
Mempa held that counsel must be provided in combined probationrevocation and deferred-sentencing hearings. Counsel was required
even though the judge was obligated to sentence defendant to the statutory maximum and the actual sentence determination was thereafter
made by the Board of Prison Terms and Parole. Speaking for a
unanimous court, Justice Marshall said:
[T]he sentencing judge is required by statute, together with
the prosecutor, to furnish the Board with a recommendation
as to the length of time the person should serve ....
Obviously to the extent such recommendations are influential
in determining the resulting sentence, the necessity for the aid
of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of
mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting
the defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent.49 7
Unlike most right-to-counsel cases, those dealing with parole release
hearings have frequently dealt not with an indigent's right to appointed
counsel, but the right to have retained counsel attend the hearing. The
courts have consistently held that, absent a statute to the contrary, no
right to retained or appointed counsel exists. 498 They have re4 94
495

See notes 392-95 supra & accompanying text.
A 1956 survey found that only Georgia, Missouri, Nevada and Ohio did not
provide some form of hearing prior to the release determination. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 305.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). Georgia currently allows, but
does not require, a hearing. GA. CODE ANN. § 77-516 (1964). Missouri now requires
a hearing. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 549.261(2), (3) (Supp. 1971). Nevada requirements
do not mention a hearing. NEv. REv. STAT. § 213.133 (1965). Ohio mentions the use
of a hearing only for prisoners serving life sentences for first degree murder. OHIO
Rxv. CODE ANN. §2967.13 (Supp. 1970).
496389 U.S. 128 (1967).
497

Id. at 135.

498 E.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Sorensen v. Young,
282 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Minn. 1968); It re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d
200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967); Puchalski v. State Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294,
250 A.2d 19 (App. Div.), aff'd, 55 N.J. 113, 259 A.2d 713 (1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 938 (1970); Briguglio v. State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512,
298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969).
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jected the argument that because the parole board is essentially exercising a delegated sentencing power and Mempa requires counsel at the
99
sentencing hearing, counsel is therefore required at the parole hearing.
The primary reason given for the different treatment accorded the
two types of hearings is that the parole release proceeding occurs after
the decision to incarcerate has already been made."' ° The judge at a
sentencing hearing has the option never to incarcerate, 0 ' which he can
exercise by giving either a suspended sentence or probation. The distinction does not appear persuasive, however, because both decisions
turn on the same "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may
become rather than simply what he has done." 502
Further, this distinction is even less persuasive when the parole
hearing is compared to the actual hearing in Mempa. Unlike a general
sentencing hearing, after a violation of probation conditions is found
the judge's role in Mempa was limited to incarceration, since probation
had already been unsuccessful. Furthermore, under applicable state
law, the judge could not set sentence at less than the statutory maximum.. 0 3

In effect, the actual decision as to the length of sentence was

left to the parole board. If counsel is required at hearings in which the
court's role is, in actuality, limited to that of advising the parole board,
there is considerable force to the argument that when the board makes
the actual decision, counsel is even more essential and should be required."'4 "Substantial rights" of the parolee are affected at the release
determination; this would seem to trigger the Mempa requirement that
counsel be provided. 5°
2. Retained Counsel
The case for a due process requirement of retained counsel is even
stronger than the justification for appointed counsel: the legitimate state
interests in preventing the appearance of counsel are insubstantial.
While some courts have summarily dismissed due process claims in the
parole determination process9 0 6 others have had considerable difficulty
499 See cases cited note 498 supra.
500 E.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970) ("We do not
accept appellant's contention that a parole release determination is simply a continuation or deferment of sentencing. The prisoner's sentence has already been
finally decreed by the court and cannot be changed.").
50 1 See Briguglio v. State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298

N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969)

(Mempa was a sentencing situation and therefore of little

value to one already sentenced).
502 Kadish, supra note 427, at 813.
503 389 U.S. at 135.
504 See Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hear-

ings, 54 IowA L. Rav. 497, 506-07 (1968).
505 See text accompanying notes 470-73 supra.
506 E.g, Barnes v. United States, 445 F2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Schawartzberg
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 399 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1968).
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reaching the same conclusion. Menechino v. Oswald 507 presents the
most detailed analysis of the question. The Menechino court listed
three essential elements that must be present before a constitutionally
mandated due process requirement would be implied.
First, there must be an adversarial nature to the proceedings. °8
In the court's opinion, not only is the board not the prisoner's adversary,
but it shares "an identity of interest with him to the extent that it is
seeking to encourage and foster his rehabilitation and readjustment to
society." 509 Yet, if this is true of the parole board, it would seem
equally true of the sentencing judge. 510 Further, the identity of interest
rationale is similar to the argument that the Supreme Court rejected in
In re Gault.511 In Gault, referring to the early reformers in juvenile
justice, the Court stated:
They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether
the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career." 512
The Court rejected the argument that because of this alleged identity
of interest, procedural due process requirements could be dispensed with.
It held that due process requirements depend on the reality of the system, which in that case involved adversary interests in fact and substantial injury to the individual flowing from the proceeding. 513 There
is no indication that the Supreme Court would approach the parole
system differently. Thus, the presence or absence of what the Menechino court termed the "identity of interest" of the parties to the proceeding would not negate the requirement of procedural due process if
adverse interests exist in fact. At the parole release determination
there are definite adverse interests: the prisoner always has an interest
in his freedom; the parole board's interest in his freedom exists only if
a release would further his rehabilitation and not endanger the public.
The second due process prerequisite the Menechino court found
missing was the need for a resolution of a disputed issue of fact:514
The Board's function is a different one. It must make
the broad determination of [how] rehabilitation of the pris507 430

F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).

Menechlno has been followed by later cases.

E.g., Buchanan v. Clark, 446 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Lewis v. Rockefeller,
431 F.2d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 1971).
508 Id.at 407.
509 Id.
510

See notes 392-95 supra & accompanying text.

511387 U.S. 1 (1967).
512d. at 15.
513Id. at 27-29.'

514 430 F.2d at 407.
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oner and the interests of society generally would best be
served .

.

.

. In making that determination the Board is not

restricted by rules of evidence or procedures developed for the
purpose of determining legal or factual issues. It must consider many factors of a non-legal nature ....
....
[T]he problem to be resolved is not one which
usually demands the traditional skills, training and expertise
of legal counsel. Far more important is an understanding
of the numerous other factors we have mentioned, which have
to do with medicine, psychiatry, criminology, penology,
psychology and human relations." 5
But this approach oversimplifies the process. While not subject
to fact adjudication in the traditional sense, these are the same factors
the attorney is called on to analyze at the sentencing hearing, and facts
themselves still play a most important role in determining what action
will best serve the rehabilitation of the prisoner and the interests of
society. Just as at the disposition phase of the revocation hearing, the
disposition determination at a release hearing involves some adjudications of facts. The prisoner's prior criminal record, his personal situation at the time the crime was committed, and his conduct in prison
are all facts, and their significance must be determined.516 These determinations are largely based not on the hearing, but on the record.
But it is a record prepared without the prisoner's involvement, a record
he generally cannot even see.51 7 That the hearing may be the prisoner's
one opportunity to present his arguments makes his need for expert
assistance all the more compelling.
Usually the prisoner will be a person of limited education. In
addition, because of the tension caused by the importance of the decision
to him, he may be unable to express himself as logically as he might
under normal circumstances. Counsel could assist both the board and
the prisoner by obtaining and presenting additional relevant evidence.
He could protect against action premised on inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading factual information.51 He could also aid the board in putting the information together into a composite picture.
Often when passing on the prisoner's institutional conduct record,
the parole board must make the very sort of factual determination we
are accustomed to see in the courtroom. In United States ex rel.
Gallagher v. Daggett 59 the court was impressed with the prisoner's
'515Id.at 407-08.
516 See Kadish, supra note 427, at 829.
517 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 86; Comment, supra note 504, at

508.

518 430 F.2d at 408 n.2; see Kadish, supra note 427, at 829-30; Tappan, supra
note 135, at 26.
519 326 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1971).
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claim that he was unfairly disciplined by prison authorities, but it refused to reach the merits because it thought correctional decisions were
not usually open to review. In response to the prisoner's fear that
parole might later be denied on the basis of prison misconduct reports,
the court replied:
[Federal regulations] give the parole applicant certain procedural rights when he becomes eligible for parole. The regulations permit the prisoner to explain his version of the events
upon which disciplinary action was taken and to offer whatevidence he may deem appropriate to his
ever mitigating
0
case.

52

But at the hearing when such explanations are permitted the regulations
will prevent his attorney from participating, despite the need for the
most traditional legal skills. In light of these considerations, the factual
dispute requirement announced by the Menechino court would certainly
seem to be satisfied.
The third due process precondition the court found missing was a
private interest presently enjoyed,5 21 such as the welfare benefits protected by Goldberg v. Kelly 522 or the attendance at college safeguarded
in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. 23 In the court's view
nothing was being taken from the prisoner because he had been constitutionally deprived of his liberty for the full term of his sentence and
because the board had "absolute and exclusive discretion." 524 This is
essentially the right-privilege dichotomy in not-too-deceptive disguise.
But the defendant before sentencing has no greater claim to a genuine
interest than the prospective parolee, for "[o] ne who is legally convicted
has no vested right to the determination of his sentence at less than
maximum

.

5.25

In either process the stakes are the same: free-

dom under probation versus incarceration, or freedom under parole
versus incarceration.
Mempa emphasized the critical nature of the probation revocation
process and illustrated that certain important legal rights might be lost
at such a proceeding.5 26 While in some narrow sense, it may be true
that there are no ancillary legal rights that must be protected at the
520Id. at 390; see F. COHEN, supra note 29, at 38.

521430 F.2d at 408.
U.S. 254 (1970).
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
524430 F.2d at 408.
522397
523

525 1h

re Schoengaxth, 66

l.2d 295, 300-02, 425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr.

600, 603-04 (1967) (discussing board discretion) ; see Sturm v. California Adult
Authority, 395 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1967) (Browning, J., concurring) ("[A
prisoner] may have no 'right' to be imprisoned for less than his whole life; but he is

entitled to have the time he must serve determined in a manner consistent with the
Constitution.").

526 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
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parole hearing,"' counsel may often be required to compensate for legal
rights already lost and, more importantly, to protect the future interest
of the parolee. As discussed in regard to the factual determinations
often made at parole hearings, 2 s counsel may be needed to explain
prison disciplinary measures, which are often based solely on hearsay and
imposed through summary administrative action. Counsel is also needed
to protect the prisoner's possible appeal of an arbitrary, adverse board
decision. If the board clearly abused its discretion or violated a positive
statutory requirement, counsel may be unable later to provide effective
assistance if he was not present at the initial hearing.52 9 This is especially true in those jurisdictions that make no records of the initial
hearing,5 or that will not disclose such records to the prisoner or his
attorney. 3' Unlike the constitutionally guaranteed public trial, "the
board operates in secret, where its arbitrariness cannot be observed or
criticized, even though other safeguards [present in trials] are almost
totally absent." 532 The presence of counsel can help guarantee the
integrity of the system and can force the board, through questioning of
values and assumptions, to make needed appraisals.53 3
It is the attorney's very propensity to question rather than accept
that is focused upon by those who oppose the introduction of counsel.
The Menechino court found two burdens that would be placed on an
already over-burdened system by the requirement of counsel. Counsel
will have more information to provide and more arguments to make,
thereby increasing the length of each hearing. The result may be an
exacerbation of present delay and backlog.5 34 Concern with possible
administrative burdens is clearly legitimate, but posing the problem in
terms of an all or nothing choice is not: the manner of counsel's participation could be limited. Furthermore, the problem of possible delay
should be solved by administrative reorganization of the parole process,
not by potentially unfair procedures. 35 Under a due process analysis,
any added administrative burden must be weighed against the individual
interests that might be harmed by limiting procedural protections.
527 For example, the Court in Mempa pointed out that counsel might be required
to exercise a right to appeal following probation revocation, 389 U.S. at 136, or the
right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to deferred sentencing. Id.
528 Text accompanying notes 519-20 supra.
529 See Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services
in the Crimtinal-CorrectionalProcess, 18 KAN. L. REv. 493, 535 (1970); cf. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1967).
530 Cf. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 86.

But cf. Thomas, supra note

172, at 174; MAINE STATE PROBATION & PAROLE BD., EIG TH ANN. REP. 7 (1966).
531 E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 2.16 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.574.12 (Supp. 1971).
532 K. DAVIS, DlScRETIONARY JUSTICE 130 (1969).
533 Kadish, supra note 427, at 832; see Jacob & Sharma,

supra note 529, at 536;

Tappan, supra note 135, at 27.
534 430 F.2d at 410.
535

supra.

See Kadish, supra note 427, at 837-38; cf. text accompanying notes 140-42
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The second burden is more substantial. Permission to retain counsel for the parole hearing might require appointment of counsel for
indigents unable to retain their own.53 While it has been suggested
that the result is not inevitable, 37 such appointment of counsel seems
highly desirable in view of the importance of the release hearing. In
addition, the argument that due process should not be required because to
do so would require the same process be provided to those financially
unable to underwrite the costs seems particularly unpersuasive. While
the costs resulting from a requirement of counsel would be considerable,
the benefits of counsel's presence are potentially greater.
Several alternatives to allowing counsel at the parole hearing have
been suggested. The Model Penal Code would permit the prisoner to
consult with his attorney prior to the hearing but would not permit
counsel to attend.538 The defects of this proposal are obvious: the
prisoner will still be denied the clear and forceful presentation of counsel
that the prisoner's intelligence, temporary anxiety, and language difficulty may make impossible. 39 The board will remain in a position in
which it may accord very different treatment to those prisoners who are
able to communicate effectively.
Another scheme allows counsel to submit written arguments on
behalf of the applicants.5 4 ° This system at least ensures that information
favorable to the prisoner is made available to the board. There is no
way, however, to ensure that the arguments are considered by the board.
The written submissions may be subjected to the same cursory treatment that other aspects of the prisoner's record receive. Furthermore,
written presentations are rarely as effective as oral ones. The lawyer
will often be unable to know at the time he prepares written presentations with what aspects of the prisoner's record the board will be
concerned.
A third alternative was suggested by Judge Feinberg's dissent in
Menechino. Under this proposal counsel would not be permitted in the
original hearing, but if parole were denied, counsel would be permitted
to represent the prisoner at the next release hearing the prisoner is
granted.5 41 While this proposal seems attractive because it might
538 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf. Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
But see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
537 The dissent in Menechlino attempted to minimize the impact of allowing
retained counsel by arguing that appointment was not constitutionally mandated.
Relying on Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), for the proposition that prisoners
were not entitled to appointed counsel for their initial petition for post-conviction
relief, judge Feinberg suggested that counsel be appointed for the next scheduled
hearing if parole was denied on the first consideration. 430 F.2d at 416 (Feinberg,
J., dissenting).
538 MoDE PENA . CODE § 305.7 (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
539 Tappan, supra note 135, at 26-27.

540 E.g., N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 41-17-27 (1964); Law of July 1, 1957, ch. 331,
§ 23, [1957] Kan. Laws 732 (repealed 1970).
541430 F.2d at 416.
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42
reduce the number of hearings in which counsel would be required,"
it has a number of serious drawbacks. The prisoners who are not
paroled at the initial hearing must be provided with another hearing
and the opportunity to retain counsel. One problem is that the system
would be burdened unnecessarily by multiple hearings for some inmates.
The advantage of Judge Feinberg's proposal depends on a high percentage of first-time parolees, an assumption that may be unfounded in
some jurisdictions.54 Further, denial of the assistance of counsel to the
successful first-time applicant may adversely effect the terms and conditions of his parole, since counsel might argue successfully for modification of uniform conditions or for specific and individualized conditions for the parolee.
In view of the shortcomings of the various alternatives, it seems
apparent that allowing the parolee to retain counsel for the release
hearing would provide the greatest benefit to the parolee and to the
parole system. While the cost of this may be a considerable increase in
administrative burdens, that cost does not seem appreciably greater than
that which would be incurred under any of the proposed alternatives.
That some states have successfully functioning parole systems and yet
have allowed the prisoner to be represented by counsel 544 provides
concrete evidence of the feasibility of the system and a refutation of any
inference that the burdens of counsel's participation would destroy the
parole system.

3. Conclusion
The primary difference between the parole release determination
and the parole revocation determination is that the revocation involves
the deprivation of a presently enjoyed interest. The types of things
considered and the intellectual process involved in the decisionmaking
are essentially the same. One could argue that an adverse release determination does not affect the individual as significantly as an adverse
revocation decision because the in-prison convict does not have any currently enjoyed freedom to be taken away. The paroled convict is not
only free but has been encouraged to establish new community ties and
personal relationships by the state action in granting him parole. These
542 Judge Feinberg noted that approximately 65% of those persons appearing
before the parole board for the first time were granted parole. Id. at 416 n.16. Thus
counsel would be dispensed with in a substantial number of cases.
543 For example, approximately 10% of those released from South Carolina state
prisons in 1964 were released on parole. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 61.
Yet a prisoner is eligible for parole in most cases after serving 1/3 of his sentence
in South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §55-611 (Supp. 1971), and the state parole board
is obligated to review each case for possible parole eligibility. Id. §55-611.1. Given
the low percentage of parole release and the statutory mandate to consider all prisoners for parole, it seems plausible to suggest that a substantial number of first-time
applicants are denied parole.
544 E.g., MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. §94-9835 (1969); TEXAS CODE CRam. PROC.

ANN.

art. 42.12, § 18 (Supp. 1971).
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distinctions, however, do not accurately measure the extent of the injury
to the individual that the proceeding will cause in each case. Whether
the convict is already paroled or still in prison, the real question is the
enjoyment of freedom and community ties in the future. The enjoyment
of this opportunity in the future is as important to the in-prison convict
as it is to the already paroled convict.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCRETIONARY BOARD POWER

A. The ParoleRelease Determintation
In the past judicial review of parole release determinations has
been extremely circumscribed. It is often stated that the parole board
has complete discretion to determine parole eligibility and that courts
will not review the exercise of that discretion absent exceptional circumstancesr 45 In the language of one court, "[S]o long as the [Parole]
Board violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review in the courts." 546 Similar statements are
common.547 Often, courts are able to look to statutes that not only give
wide discretion to the boards, but specifically provide that its determination is not subject to judicial review. 48 Moreover, the courts
consistently dismiss constitutional claims 541 on the theory that parole
is a matter of legislative grace,"50 a privilege not a right, 51 or merely
another form of custody. 552
While such sophistic analysis is deserving of criticism, the end
result of that process-insulation from close judicial supervision-may,
in some degree, be desirable. The boards require considerable operating leeway because their determinations depend upon so many different
considerations and ultimately include a prediction of the parolee's future
conduct if he is released 5 3 Yet, despite the need for considerable discretion in the administrative process, guidelines are definitely needed,
545 Ott v. Ciccone, 326 F. Supp. 609, 611 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), is one case in which review was premised

upon exceptional circumstances. Id. at 484.
5-46 Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257, 56 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1944).

54t See, e.g., Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403

U.S. 934 (1971) ("[Ilt is not the function of the courts to review the discretion of
the Board in the denial of application for parole or to review the credibility of reports
Brest v.
and information received by the Board in making its determination.").
Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1967) ; lt re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 300, 425
P.2d 200, 203, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1967).
548
See N.Y. CoRRc. LA w §212(10) (McKinney Supp. 1971) ("Any action
taken by the board pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function and
shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law.").
54 9
See text accompanying notes 6-28 supra.
550 E.g., Briguglio v. State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298
N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969) ; notes 6-10 supra & accompanying text.
55' E.g., In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1967) ; notes 6-10 supra & accompanying text
552 E.g., Padilla v. Lynch, 398 F.2d 481, 482 (9th Cir. 1968) ; notes 17-23 supra
& accompanying text.
553 Text accompanying note 502 supra.
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whether imposed by statute or the judiciary. If no guidelines exist,
then the parole system can operate without any correctional policy: even
if decisions are not arbitrary, there is no guarantee that similar criteria
are applied to all prisoners applying for a parole release. In the absence
of a correctional policy, however, the danger of arbitrary action is increased. Arbitrariness should be avoided both because of its unfairness
to the prisoner and because of its dysfunctionality to the attainment of
the rehabilitative goal of the parole system.554 It is therefore important
to have a correctional policy and judicial review to ensure the administrative implementation of that policy.
The danger of unbridled discretion is greatest in those parole systems that provide no reasons for the denial of parole. Effective judicial
555
review is impossible if no reasons are given for the action taken.
That the danger is real can be seen from the policy of the federal system,
in which members vote in the privacy of their own offices without any
prior mutual discussion, and more importantly without reported reasons
for their decisions. Board members in such a system would be unable
to discover even complete irrationality in their colleagues' votes. 556
The importance of stated reasons for a denial of parole has been
recognized by some courts. In one of few court-imposed limitations on
parole board discretion, the New Jersey Supreme Court has required
55 7
that the parole board furnish reasons to prisoners denied parole.
While not limiting the substantive discretion of the board, the court
noted that:
One of the best procedural protections against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power lies in the requirement of findings
and reasons that appear to reviewing judges to be rational.5 5
Other courts should follow this lead unless specific statutory provisions
clearly bar a judicially imposed requirement of a statement of reasons
554 Allen, supra note 161, at 129.
555 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly functioning
of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative
agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.") ; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).

556 K. DAvIs, supra note 532, at 128-29. The United States Parole Board has
apparently reversed a longstanding policy and agreed to give unsuccessful parole
applicants reasons for denial of their parole applications. Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1972,
at 1, col. 1. The reasons, however, will be furnished on a form with predetermined
categories and space for amplification of individual reasons by the board. Id. If
reasons are to perform their functions of improving Board decisionmaking and
enabling the parolee to comprehend what is expected of a successful parole applicant,
maximum use of individualized reasons is mandatory.
In adopting a procedure that informs prisoners of the reasons for parole denial,
the federal system joins a minority of state parole systems that provide reasons for
unfavorable decisions. See TAsx FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-65. The federal
system, however, will still fall short of state systems that allow the inmate to discuss
an adverse decision with the board immediately after it is rendered. Id.
557 Monks v. State Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
558 Id. at 245, 277 A.2d at 196 (quoting K. DAVIS, supra note 33, § 16.12, at 585

(Supp. 1970) ).
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and review in terms of the rationality of the determination. The
efficacy of this judicial review will, of course, be significantly enhanced
by a full hearing at which the parolee has been accorded full procedural
rights, of the type discussed in the preceding section of this Comment.
At the same time, it is imperative that legislatures enact not only
procedural limitations to this discretion, but also substantive limitations,
however difficult these may be to articulate. Particularly as to substantive limitations, the legislature, with its deliberative and investigative capacities, will be able better to determine what standards are most
consistent with the successful operation of a parole system. By virtue
of its reviewing function and its limited resources, a court can do little
more than review a decision on the basis of the rationality of its relation
to the facts and of the logic of the articulated reasons; it is ill-equipped
to formulate even basic substantive standards. While legal rules cannot
replace the judgment required in individual cases, specific standards
are needed:
[I]f the law cannot decide such hard cases in advance, it can
contribute to sound resolution by making clear what policies
the . .

.

administrative action is intended to achieve and by

specifying at least some of the factors that should be pondered
when decisions are under consideration. And if the factors
are so elusive as to evade satisfactory legislative statement, the
area of uncertainty may sometimes be narrowed by at least
specifying what factors ought not to be given weight by the
decision maker .

. . .

59

As the specificity of the correctional policy enacted by the legislature
increases, judicial review will be more effective in ensuring implementation of the policy and in eliminating arbitrary decisions from the system.
When the parole board does give the parolee a statement of reasons,
although a subject of legislative not judicial concern, the method that
a parole board uses to inform a prisoner of its decision also may have
considerable rehabilitative impact. Generally, the prisoner is informed
in writing weeks after the hearing. O This delay probably harms the
rehabilitative aspects of parole: it is likely to appear unfair to the
prisoner and may beget disrespect for the system. In addition, the
prisoner is likely to be extremely anxious during this interim period.
Such anxiety may cause him to commit a prison disciplinary infraction
that would prevent or postpone the release. The better system, now
utilized in some jurisdictions, requires that the board make the decision
immediately after the hearing and then recall the prisoner to inform him
of that decision.5 ' Yet, even under this system there is sometimes a
559 Allen, supra note 161, at 125.

560 See TAsK FoacE
561 Id.

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 64-65.
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long delay before the actual release of those prisoners who have been
granted parole. 562 In order to prevent the same sort of anxiety and
possible consequent discipline problems, this interim period must be
kept to a minimum. The prisoner should also be removed from the
prison atmosphere. A separate cell-block where the future parolee
would be allowed to wear civilian clothes and granted other privileges
would be helpful in this regard.
Courts have held board procedures that clearly impinged upon constitutionally protected activity invalid. In Smart v. Avery "' the
Sixth Circuit held unconstitutional a parole board rule providing that
any prisoner who unsuccessfully sought state or federal post-conviction
relief would have his initial parole consideration delayed at least one
year. The court held that the right to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus could not "be discouraged by withholding of a privilege [that
would otherwise be accorded] by state law or regulation." "
This result is unassailable, but when the infringement was less
substantial and the administrative interest greater, courts have sustained board regulations. In Commonwealth v. Brittingham5 65 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a valid waiver in the prisoner's
failure to appeal his denial of post-conviction relief despite his contention
that he was "forced" to waive his appeal because of the parole board's
policy of delaying consideration, during the pendency of such an appeal,
of the prisoner's suitability for parole release. The court reasoned that:
[A]ppellant here admittedly knew of his right to appeal, and
made a well-considered strategic choice as to whether to appeal
his conviction or hazard an application to the Parole Board.
We do not believe the burden of having to delay an application
for parole if appellant chooses to file an appeal can in any way
be considered a meaningful deprivation of or encroachment
upon the right to appeal.

. . Here, Brittingham delayed

.

filing his [post-conviction relief] petition until almost four
years after judgment of sentence was entered. That the time
for appealing from the denial of his . . . petition and the time

of his earliest eligibility for parole coincided was due solely
to his actions. 566
Yet the decision glosses over the possibility that new evidence might
arise or a new evidentiary rule be made retroactive, unfairly forcing the
prisoner to make a difficult choice. These conditions for parole eligi562

See

P.

Takagi,

The Role

of the

(unpublished manuscript 1968), reprinted in
Williams eds. 1970).
563370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
64
5
Id. at 790.
565 442 Pa. 241, 275 A.2d 83 (1971).
66
5
Id. at 245, 275 A.2d at 85.
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bility should be approached in the same manner as release conditions
imposed after the decision to release is made.567 The aim of the state in
imposing the condition should be scrutinized to make sure that it is
legitimate, and the interest of the government in attaining it through
the means chosen should be balanced against the prejudice to the individual. Whether the individual made a knowing choice should not be
determinative; otherwise the bargaining power of the state would determine what conditions it could impose, and judicial protection of individual rights would be lost.
B. JudicialReview of Parole Conditions on Nonconstitutional Grounds
There have been few cases dealing with judicial review of parole
conditions on other than constitutional grounds."'8 The statutes are
uniform in their grant of discretion to the parole boards to set parole
conditions and revoke parole for violation of those conditions. 569 The
federal statute is typical of the formulation investing broad discretionary
power in the board:
Such parolee shall be allowed in the discretion of the
Board, to return to his home, or to go elsewhere, upon such
terms and conditions, including personal reports from such
paroled person, as the Board shall prescribe. . .. 5"
Courts have been hesitant to interfere with the parole board's exercise
of discretion,571 especially in finding an abuse of statutory discretion in
the establishment and enforcement of particular terms and conditions.
Attempts by parolees to secure judicial examination and modification or removal of parole conditions outside the context of a revocation
proceeding have usually met with short shrift. In United States v.
Binder, 72 the parolee argued that unless restrictions on his ability to
travel were removed, he would be "in danger of losing his employment,"
and further, "that it would be highly difficult, or perhaps even impossible, to obtain other gainful employment which would enable him to
support himself and his family." 171 Without reaching the merits of the
567 Text accompanying notes 183-219 supra.
56

In contrast to the paucity of decisions in the parole area, cases dealing with

judicial review of probation conditions have occurred with somewhat greater frequency, although with equal confusion as to the proper scope of judicial review.
It seems likely that a general deference to administrative judgment and expertise,
not present in the probation cases where judges are reviewing judge-imposed conditions, would explain the scarcity of court challenges to parole conditions. For general
discussions of the area of judicial review of probation conditions, see Best & Birzon,

Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J. 809 (1963); Note, Judicial
Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 181 (1967).
569 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §3056 (1970); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-126
(Supp. 1971).
57018 U.S.C. §4203(a) (1970)
571 See,

(emphasis added).

e.g., Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967); Clark v.

Stevens, 291 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1961) ; State v. Brantley, 353 S.W.2d 793 (1962).

572 313 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1963).
573 Id. at 244.
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contentions, the court made plain that it was generally unsympathetic
to claims directed at the wisdom of particular parole conditions:
Petitioner's request for relief from the terms and conditions which he claims impose an undue and inequitable hardship upon him5 74should be addressed to the Board rather than
to the Court.

More often the conditions attacked are in the context of a parole
revocation proceeding. Unlike cases raising claims of procedural due
process in such hearings,575 cases dealing with the substance and wisdom
of regulations pursuant to which parole is revoked are a rarity. Often,
the courts avoid a ruling on the individual regulations and instead limit
their inquiry to a determination whether the board made a finding,
supported by the evidence, that the parolee no longer presented an acceptable parole risk.57 6 This avoidance technique is initially attractive
because, in revoking parole, the board can look to violations of more
than one condition as a basis for its action, and therefore the invalidity
of one condition may be irrelevant to the validity of the revocation.
Mead v. CaliforniaAdult Authority 17 is illustrative of this technique.
Revocation was based on both a violation of a condition prohibiting
the parolee from entering the county of his former residence and a violation of a condition requiring the parolee to submit monthly reports.
The Ninth Circuit adroitly avoided a decision on the validity of the
travel restriction, while, at the same time, affirming the revocation:
[N] either the imposition of a void condition of parole nor the
finding that a parolee violated a void condition creates any
constitutional issue where, as here, grounds other than5 7violation of the void condition support revocation of parole. 8
4
57 Id. at 245; accord, Ex parte Cassella, 313 Mich. 393, 394, 21 N.W.2d 175, 176
(1946) (reversing lower court release of appellee for lack of evidence of parole
violation, on grounds that "granting and revocation of paroles are purely administrative
functions and that the parole board is given exclusive jurisdiction as to such matters").
575 See notes 356-542 supra & accompanying text.
576Note, ParoleRevocation in the Federal System, 56 Gao. LJ.705, 708 & n.34
(1968) ; see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 242, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963)
("The basis for Board action in revoking parole must have a rational and legitimate
relationship to whether the parolee is a good risk. What constitutes such cause is
left by Congress to the discretion of the Board .
").
Effective review of the revocation decision depends upon some statement of
reasons for the board's action. In the context of the revocation hearing, due process
should compel such a statement. See text accompanying notes 557-58 supra. Even if
due process did not lead to this result, courts could require such a statement in order
to protect their reviewing function. See text accompanying notes 555-58 supra. At
least one court has held that procedural due process does not require a statement of
reasons for denial of parole. Williams v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 986, 987

(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
577415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969).
58s Id.at 768.
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Yet, by arguably conceding the invalidity of the condition, and still
upholding the revocation because of the parolee's failure to file monthly
reports, the court apparently failed to consider the possibility that the
two conditions may have been intimately related, in the parolee's
view. The parolee may well have failed to file the required reports
because to do so would have required that he either lie or admit the
condition violation. This problem indicates that the board should
examine the rationality of the relation of each condition to a legitimate
goal of the parole system, the constitutionality of the condition, and,
finally, the connection between that condition and any alleged violation.
While most cases dealing with the board's discretion in fixing conditions are those based on specific constitutional infringements, 579 rather
than a general abuse of administrative discretion, there are at least two
cases dealing with the issue of the reasonability of the board's decisiorl
to revoke parole based on a particular technical violation. While these
decisions do not pass directly on the reasonability of imposing particular
conditions, because each decision is based on the validity of the revocation in terms of whether the board made a determination that the parolee
was no longer a good risk, they do manifest a judicial attitude on the application of such conditions and thus, indirectly, on the reasonableness of
the particular conditions. In Compagnav. Hiatt ..the parole board revoked parole on the basis of a narrow and overly technical interpretation
of conditions. The board found technical violations in the parolee's
failure to disclose the names of his fellow travelers on an airplane flight
from the prison to his home. Despite the lack of any evidence that the
associates were disreputable, or that if they were, the parolee was aware
The board had also found
of it, the board found a parole violation."
Compagna in violation of another condition because of his refusal to
disclose income sources for monies used to effect a tax settlement while
still in prison. 5 2 The court noted that Compagna could hardly be expected to disclose the source of the income since he maintained that the
source was unknown to him." 3 There was no evidence other than the
suspicion and assumption of the board to contradict Compagna's assertion. The court subsequently found an abuse of discretion in the
revocation, indicating that the board appeared motivated by other than
rehabilitative and correctional considerations.
The court in Stubblefield v. Kennedy ..was much less willing to
find an abuse of discretion, although it did review the revocation decision on the merits. Upon release from federal prison, the parolee had
been placed in state incarceration for other offenses. After his release
notes 221-304 supra & accompanying text.
580 100 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ga. 1951).
579 See

581 Id. at 76.
582 Id.

at 77.

583 Id.
584 328 F.2d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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from state custody, his federal parole was revoked for failure to file
required parole reports. While conceding that the parolee might not
have been required to file federal reports during the period of state incarceration, the court maintained that release from state prison revived
the federal parole reporting requirements. 5
Although the case was
remanded to the parole board for reconsideration of the revocation, the
court apparently considered it within the board's discretion to revoke
solely for failure to file reports, despite the parolee's good-faith belief
that further reports were not required." 6 Thus, even if the parolee's
behavior was founded on a reasonable belief, the court would still allow
the board discretion to reincarcerate.
That some standard of nonconstitutional review is desirable seems
clear. The decision in Mansell v. Turner 587 illustrates the inadequacy
of denying nonconstitutional judicial review entirely. In that case the
parolee, after revocation, challenged a parole condition requiring him
to leave the state upon his release from prison. Although the Utah
Supreme Court was unanimous in upholding the constitutionality of the
condition, the concurring opinion did raise the issue of the proper
standard by which parole conditions should be tested on nonconstitutional grounds. For the concurring justice, the authority of the
parole board was not unbridled:
I think it is implicit in the creation of the Board and its duties
that the condition imposed must bear some reasonable relationship to the function it is purposed to perform. That is,
it should be something calculated to assist in the treatment or
rehabilitation of the individual and/or the protection of
society. 5 8
This suggestion, that an intelligible standard of review-a rational relation to the purpose of parole-could be applied by a reviewing court,
was emphatically rejected by the writer of the court's opinion. The
board's choice of conditions was clearly beyond review under any
"reasonable relation" test. "It is not for this court to graze in [the
board's] policy pasture." 589 Further, "[r]idiculosity of the condition
is not a matter of concern to us, if, no matter how ridiculous, it is not
tainted with unconstitutionality." "' The untenable character of this
position is obvious. It would permit completely arbitrary board action,
limited only in those cases in which the parolee could prove a specific
constitutional infringement.
585M. at 328.
586
d.
587 14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 394 (1963).
588 Id.

at 354, 384 P.2d at 396.
5s9 Id. at 354 n.4, 384 P.2d at 395 n.4.
590 Id., 384 P.2d at 395-96 n.4.
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Considered together, the cases indicate no clear test by which courts
will measure conditions fixed by the board. They also illustrate the
courts' preference for testing those conditions, if at all, only in the concrete factual context of the revocation proceeding. Yet it would be
erroneous to draw the conclusion that there are or should be no standards
for such review or that judicial review on nonconstitutional grounds
is not a desirable judicial participation in the parole system. The Mansell decision illustrates the absurdity of this position, and the "reasonable
relation" test seems to provide a workable rule that allows a degree of
judicial scrutiny while at the same time reserving to the parole board
the discretion needed to formulate individualized conditions. This test
should be adopted in areas where more specific legislative direction is
lacking. It should be applied to the individual conditions as well as to
the revocation decision when that decision is not based on violations
of specific conditions.
Finally, there is no apparent reason for limiting review to instances
when a condition has been used as a basis for revocation. To limit
judicial review to the revocation context may unnecessarily subject the
parolee to unreasonable conditions. These conditions might be both
unfair to him and inconsistent with the rehabilitative function of the
parole system.5 9' The parolee should not be forced to violate the
condition and risk reincarceration in order to have an unreasonable
condition removed. 92 The interests of fairness to the parolee and a
more effective parole system should lead to judicial review at the earliest
possible stage.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Comment has examined the parole system, focusing specifically on those areas in which change is mandated by law or strongly
suggested by policy considerations. The examination indicates that
fundamental changes are required if the system is to deal adequately
and fairly with those enmeshed in it and to fulfill its potential. Initially,
courts must discard shopworn legal theories and inappropriate modes
of analysis imported from fundamentally different areas of the law. The
current reliance on legal fictions serves only to obfuscate the clear
identification and precise balancing of interests necessary to the satisfactory resolution of almost all parole questions. The tools for such
analysis are already at hand; they await only the determined effort of
the judiciary to implement them.
Parole release determinations must make increased use of the
maximum amount of available information about the inmate. Current
591 See text accompanying notes 183-219 supra.
592 Increasingly, federal courts reviewing federal agency action have focused on

the practical impact of the action on the individual. See Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examination of Federal Regulatory Agency
Practices, 120 U. PA. L. RFv. 39, 97 & n.234 (1971). The same principles should
be applied to the review of conditions imposed by the parole board.
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statutory requirements for board membership that mandate a degree of
correctional or other expertise should provide a model for those states
that still appoint board members with little apparent regard for objective qualifications.
Parole conditions must be considerably simplified. The current
prolixity of conditions sets an unrealistic goal for parolee achievement.
And beyond simplification, conditions must be, to as great an extent
possible, shaped to the particular correctional and rehabilitative needs
of the individual parolee. There are also significant constitutional objections to certain conditions. Restraints on speech and assembly, travel
restrictions, and consents to general searches seem probable candidates
for invalidation. In addition to constitutional limitations, such conditions are dysfunctional to the rehabilitation and reintegration goals
of parole.
Due process deficiencies in the system warrant special attention.
Here, the theoretical foundations of the system have exerted a particularly stultifying effect on lucid analysis. Revocation highlights
interests so fundamentally conflicting that no parens patriae theory can
adequately encompass them. The parolee has an interest in his limited
freedom that should be protected through notice and hearing, the opportunity for representation by counsel, and a chance to present evidence
on his own behalf. Modified due process safeguards may also be applicable to the initial parole release determination. While perhaps not
fitting precisely the usual due process analysis, the inmate's interest in
obtaining parole is worthy of protection.
Finally, the examination reveals the need for increased judicial
participation in the parole process. Allowing unreviewed exercises of
board discretion in determining who will be released on parole permits
the parole board to wield a power of deferred sentencing that is dangerously free of restraint. Similarly, allowing almost complete discretion in establishing parole conditions represents an abdication of
judicial responsibility in the criminal justice system.
The strong impetus toward increased judicial participation in the
system is explained by the remarkable similarity between the parole
process and the traditional criminal justice system, where judicial participation and supervision is the norm. Both systems posit similar
goals: the rehabilitation of offenders and the protection of the public.
Both identify and proscribe certain undesirable conduct: the criminal
justice system through legislatively defined substantive crimes, the
parole system through the board's promulgation of parole conditions.
Both systems attempt to detect violations of conduct norms: the traditional system through police forces, the parole system through parole
officers. Both systems hold adjudicatory proceeds to determine whether
violations did occur: the criminal trial performs this function in the
familiar system; parole revocation makes substantially similar determinations for the parole system. And finally, both systems visit sanc-
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tions upon those who violate systemic conduct norms: courts impose
fines and prison terms for the traditional system; parole boards reincarcerate for the parole system.
The continued operation of a parole system in isolation from other
facets of a criminal justice system is obviously unacceptable. The
process must be subjected to legal and institutional constraints similar to
those designed to achieve protection of the individual in the more
visible areas of the criminal justice system.

